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The Maine Turnpike Authority 
Maine Turnpike Authority – Strong Planning Process Drives Bond and Toll 
Decisions; Some Contracting Practices and Expenditure Controls Should Be 
Improved; Additional Clarity Needed Around Surplus Transfer and Operating 
Expenses 
Introduction ――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― 
The Maine Legislature’s Office of Program Evaluation and Government 
Accountability (OPEGA) has completed a review of the Maine Turnpike Authority 
(MTA).  This review was performed at the direction of the Government Oversight 
Committee for the 124th Legislature.  The questions addressed by OPEGA were 
approved by the Committee prior to the review’s initiation.  See Appendix A for 
complete scope and methods. 
Questions, Answers and Issues ――――――――――――――――――――― 
1. Why hasn’t MTA been transferring operating surplus to MaineDOT as required by statute?  Does MTA 
have an operating surplus as defined by 23 MRSA §1964? What other types of financial support has 
MTA been providing to MaineDOT, if any? To what degree can MTA provide financial support to MaineDOT 
without increasing toll rates? 
MTA maintains there has been no operating surplus per the definition in statute.  
OPEGA agrees there is technically no surplus given the statutory definition of 
operating surplus.  The Legislature and MaineDOT appear to have been satisfied 
with this explanation, since no surplus funds have been transfered or specifically 
requested by the Legislature since 1997. 
see page 11 for 
more on this point 
MTA is still paying on bonds it issued for MaineDOT's benefit in 1996.  The 
Authority has also provided significant support for the State's transportation 
infrastructure and other efforts.  Examples include paying all costs associated with 
State Police Troop G that patrols the Turnpike, conducting and/or funding 
transportation studies, and paying a portion of costs associated with constructing 
interchanges. 
Any required transfer of funds to MaineDOT would affect the Authority's current 
financial situation and, therefore, its strategy for achieving stated objectives and 
maintaining a strong bond rating.  MTA would likely make other adjustments to 
compensate for the transfer after analyzing various options and their impacts.  
Those options include changing the amount and timing of toll increases.  
Modifications to future bond amounts and their timing, the schedule for planned 
capital projects and/or the level of operating expenses could also be considered.  
MTA is constrained, however, in how much it can adjust any given area. 
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2. What factors most significantly affect MTA’s bond rating?  How is the bond rating affected by legislative 
oversight actions, including OPEGA reviews, or by changes in MTA’s operations, governance structure, 
revenue stream, etc? 
The three major rating agencies consider similar factors when determining bond 
ratings for tolling entities, but they do not specify which are most significant.  Their 
assessments appear more subjective than formulaic.  OPEGA's observation is that 
those factors most directly affecting the level and stability of MTA’s revenue 
stream, and its ability to pay bondholder obligations, are most significant.  Factors 
most frequently mentioned in rating agency reports include independent ability to 
raise tolls, a history of raising tolls when necessary, and maintaining an acceptable 
debt service coverage ratio.   
see page 16 for 
more on this point 
OPEGA noted legislative and other events since 1991 that could have concerned 
rating agencies.  Nonetheless, MTA’s revenue bond ratings have been stable, 
strong, and gradually improved between 1997 and 2003.  These favorable ratings 
were likely due to the fact that none of the changes resulting from the activity 
substantially interfered with MTA’s ability to repay bondholders and/or there were 
other positive factors offsetting any changes perceived as negative. 
There is risk, however, of certain legislative actions negatively impacting MTA’s 
bond rating.  Any actions that could adversely affect MTA’s revenue stream, or its 
ability to repay bondholders, should be approached with caution and a thorough 
understanding of potential impacts. 
3. What specific obligations does MTA have to its bondholders as expressed in the Bond Resolution?  Are 
these typical obligations for an entity that issues revenue bonds? 
MTA’s Bond Resolution includes specific obligations that prevent it from issuing 
more bonds than can be paid, assure it has sufficient money to repay existing 
bonds, and require it to maintain the Turnpike in adequate condition.  These 
obligations are generally typical of revenue bonds, but MTA’s are more specific in 
some areas when compared to bond resolutions for other tolling authorities.  The 
additional specificity provides all parties with more clarity and, while it could 
restrict MTA more in some situations, it does not appear to be unreasonable.  
see page 19 for 
more on this point 
The Bond Resolution is a contract between MTA and bondholders. There is risk 
that legislative actions could result in a violation of this contract which could result 
in legal action being brought against the State.  Legislators should proceed 
cautiously when considering action that would impact MTA’s ability to meet it 
obligations under the Resolution.  
4. Is the amount of bond debt currently held by MTA reasonable, and has the full amount of that debt been 
necessary to ensure the Authority could effectively carry out its mission? 
Overall, MTA’s debt level appears reasonable.  The Authority currently owes just 
over $400 million in bonds.  This amount does not exceed the statutory bond cap, 
and rating agency reports have not included any negative comments about MTA’s 
debt level.  MTA uses cash to fund a portion of its capital and maintenance 
projects.  Bond funding is limited to longer term capital improvements.    
see page 23 for 
more on this point 
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The Board has a strong, established process for deciding when to bond, and for 
how much, based on the Authority’s 20 year financial and capital plan.  OPEGA 
observed that decisions to refinance existing debt are well supported and justified 
in terms of cost savings or cashflow improvements.  Decisions to issue new debt 
have been tied to capital projects related to MTA's mission.  
5. Are MTA’s policies, procedures and processes for selecting contractors and administering contracts 
adequate to ensure that MTA receives best value for contracted services? 
MTA manages its contracts for construction projects well.  Processes and practices 
for selecting and monitoring construction contractors are sound, consistent and 
adequate to ensure best value.  The same is true for contracts involving the 
procurement of goods.  Services contracts, however, are not handled as well.  
Processes for selecting service contractors, and administering those contracts, are 
informal and do not consistently include practices typically relied upon to ensure 
best value.  
see page 26 for 
more on this point 
6. What entities have a role in governing and overseeing MTA?  What role is each entity supposed to play 
and how effectively does each entity carry out that role?  How does MTA’s governance structure compare 
with those of similar authorities in other states? 
 MTA is overseen by a number of public and private entities, all of which appear to 
have appropriate and adequate authority to fulfill their roles.  Effectiveness in 
filling these roles can vary with the characteristics, perspectives and priorities of the 
individuals representing these entities.  Taken together, these oversight entities 
form a comprehensive governance structure that is not substantially different from 
the governance structures of tolling entities in other states OPEGA selected for 
comparison. 
see page 30 for 
more on this point 
The specific entities overseeing the MTA include: the Legislature, which approves 
the operating budget and confirms board members appointed by the Governor; the 
Authority Board, which approves all significant financial matters, capital plans, and 
general operations; MaineDOT, which has a position on MTA’s Board and 
separately approves all MTA construction contracts; the Consulting Engineer, 
responsible for inspecting the Turnpike and ensuring the Authority is in 
compliance with the Bond Resolution; and, the Trustee, responsible for ensuring 
MTA has adequate funds to repay bondholders and releasing bond funds for 
appropriate expenditures. 
7. What is MTA spending its toll revenue on?  How does MTA define reasonable expenditures?  Are the 
Authority’s expenditures reasonable? 
MTA spends its toll revenue on three major categories of expenses: operations, 
including routine maintenance; payments and required reserves for outstanding 
bonds; and projects to construct, reconstruct or repair the Turnpike and Authority 
facilities. 
see page 36 for 
more on this point 
The Authority defines reasonable expenditures as any that are legal, consistent with 
MTA's mission and goals, within approved budgetary limits, and authorized for 
payment.  Whether outsiders would judge MTA’s expenditures reasonable depends 
on their perception of the Authority’s mission, and their expectations for how this 
quasi-governmental agency should conduct its business.   
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OPEGA observed that MTA’s current expenditures are consistent with the culture 
of a regulated private entity that is financially sound, values quality, desires to stay 
current, believes in being a good corporate citizen, recognizes its employees and 
assertively promotes its own best interests.  From this perspective, MTA’s 
expenditures overall could be judged as reasonable.  However, certain categories of 
operating expenditures – by virtue of their nature or magnitude – might be 
questioned as to their reasonableness, appropriateness or necessity when judged 
against expectations for fiscal stewardship or adherence to statutory purpose 
typically applied to State agencies.  
8. How does MTA compare to toll authorities in other states on financial and performance measures such 
as personnel and management costs and cost per mile? 
OPEGA attempted to compare MTA to a number of its peers in other states based 
on 26 selected financial and performance measures.  MTA provided all data 
requested, but we encountered significant issues in collecting the necessary data 
from the other tolling entities.  Those issues included difficulty finding truly 
comparable entities, incomplete survey responses and inconsistent publicly 
available data.  In the end, we had too little useful data to complete a meaningful 
analysis on our selected measures within the timeframe for this review.  
see page 46 for 
more on this point 
Bond ratings encompass both financial and other performance considerations and 
offer one general comparison point among tolling authorities.  We noted that 
MTA’s bond ratings compare favorably with those of other tolling entities.  
OPEGA also observed that MTA is pursuing some financial and performance 
objectives and is collecting performance-related data.  We shared with MTA the 
performance indicators we had identified and discussed the benefits of establishing 
a more formalized performance measurement effort.  
 
OPEGA identified the following issues during the course of this review.  See pages 49 – 60 for further 
discussion and our recommendations. 
 
• Current Definition of Operating Surplus Makes Transfers to MaineDOT Unlikely 
• Nature of MTA’s Relationship with Contracted Engineering Firm has Implications for Capital 
Program and Bondholder Protections  
• Management of Services Contracts Often More Informal than Prudent 
• MTA is Sole Sourcing Services that Could be Competitively Bid  
• MTA’s Operating Budget Does Not Include All Operating Expenses 
• MTA’s Sponsorships and Donations Suggest Expansion of Mission and Present Risk of 
Inappropriate Expenditures  
• Policies Governing Expense Approvals, Required Documentation and Allowable Expenses Not 
Effectively Implemented, Particularly for Travel and Meal Expenses  
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In Summary―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――
MTA was established in 1941 as an independent agency to fulfill a governmental 
purpose operating and maintaining the Turnpike.  The Authority, as established in 
statute, is a Board that currently has a staff of about 470 to assist in carrying out its 
assigned function.  MTA’s status as a quasi-State agency, with its own self-
generating revenue source and bonds secured by that revenue, make it challenging 
to find a comparative standard.  Some expect MTA to behave like a State agency, 
others expect it to behave like a for-profit private entity.  Judgments of MTA’s 
conduct and performance will be based on those expectations.  In conducting this 
review, OPEGA used what is typically expected of both types of organizations as 
comparisons. 
Some expect the MTA to 
behave like a State 
agency.  Others expect it to 
behave more like a for-
profit private entity.  In 
actuality, the MTA’s 
culture is closer to the 
latter. 
OPEGA finds MTA’s culture is, in many ways, more like a regulated private entity 
than a State agency.  MTA has a stable management team and a strong planning 
process that looks beyond the organization’s immediate needs and drives financing 
decisions on bonding and tolling.  The Authority’s long-term focus also leads it to 
invest in items or projects that it believes will produce benefits over time - even if 
they have higher current costs.  Examples include MTA’s consistent pursuit of 
technologies to improve efficiencies and customer service, and investments in 
higher quality equipment and assets likely to have a longer useful life.  MTA sees 
itself as a customer service oriented organization that needs to compete for 
customers and wants those customers to view it positively.   
While MTA is current and progressive in many ways, there are other areas where its 
culture is old-fashioned compared with what is expected of either a regulated 
private entity or a State agency today.  Over time the public has increasingly come 
to expect fiscal restraint and stewardship, transparency and accountability from its 
government and private entities alike - especially when tax dollars, personal 
investments, and fees for essential services are involved.  MTA has been slow to 
effectively implement some changes in policies and practices that would keep it in 
line with these expectations.  This may be because MTA’s quasi-governmental 
status, and the fact that it receives no State or federal funds, has shielded it from 
needing to comply with certain State and federal rules and regulations, and the risk 
of scrutiny and penalties that accompany them. 
While the MTA is 
progressive in many ways, 
it has been slow to 
implement some practices 
that would keep it in line 
with public expectations. For example, MTA is not required to have an accounting and financial reporting system in compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and 
Standards (GAAP).  GAAP compliance has been required for publicly traded 
entities for many years in a federal effort to assure transparency and consistency in 
their financial statements.  MTA is not subject to these regulations, however, and 
previously maintained its financial system in accordance with the funding and 
reporting requirements in the Bond Resolution.  MTA moved to become GAAP 
compliant in 2008, however, at the insistence of the Chairman of its Finance and 
Audit Subcommittee.   
MTA also has yet to fully establish strong policies and practices to assure economic 
purchasing and reduce risk of inappropriate, unnecessary or excessive expenditures.  
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Some progress has been made in this area over the past decade, but a number of 
written policies and procedures still need to be developed or updated to provide 
adequate guidance.  Even where written policies are strong, OPEGA identified 
incidents of non-compliance indicative of ineffective implementation, particularly 
among the Authority’s top management.   
A number of expenditures OPEGA reviewed might be questioned as reasonable, 
necessary or appropriate if one is expecting the same kind of fiscal stewardship and 
adherence to mission typically expected of governmental entities.  According to 
MTA, some of these expenditures resulted from State requests for assistance.  
While MTA also benefitted from some of these expenditures, in other situations 
the benefit to MTA was less clear. 
A number of MTA’s 
expenditures might be 
questioned as they are not 
typical of governmental 
entities. Though the 
amount of these 
expenditures is small 
compared to MTA’s total 
operating expenses, they 
may indicate an expansion 
of MTA’s mission or a use 
of toll revenue that differs 
from what may be 
expected based on MTA’s 
statute. 
MTA has also been incurring expenses for purposes that seem more related to 
supporting general economic development, or other efforts, than to operating and 
maintaining the Turnpike.  While such expenditures are a small portion of MTA’s 
total operating expenditures, they are indicative of a possible expansion of MTA’s 
mission being driven either by the State or MTA’s perception of its role, or both.  
It also represents a use of toll revenue that some may not expect based on the 
language in MTA’s statute and the Bond Resolution. 
OPEGA observed a high degree of sensitivity to the terms and conditions of the 
Bond Resolution, and MTA’s bond rating, exists among MTA’s management and 
has apparently been passed down over time.  Consequently, Bond Resolution 
requirements, input from the private oversight entities and advisors assigned under 
the Resolution, and MTA’s desire to maintain a strong bond rating are primary 
considerations in MTA’s planning and decision-making.  They also drive how MTA 
manages its finances on a day to day basis with financial accounts established and 
funded according to a structure defined in the Bond Resolution. 
MTA’s focus on the Bond Resolution has several implications for the Legislature’s 
ability to effectively carry out its oversight and policy-making role.  For example, 
the Legislature has a role in determining “reasonable” operating expenses for MTA 
through its annual review and approval of MTA’s operating budget.  While the 
operating budget MTA provides to the Legislature for approval has substantial 
detail, it does not include all of MTA’s operating expenses.  Rather, it only includes 
those operating expenses MTA is planning to fund with monies in its Revenue 
Fund account.  Operating expenses that MTA plans to pay for with monies from 
its Reserve Maintenance Fund – a separate fund mandated by the Bond Resolution 
- are presented separately, for informational purposes only, in the form of budgeted 
costs for perennial “projects” the Authority is undertaking.  This format does not 
allow the Legislature to see, or approve, total dollars spent on all operating expense 
categories. 
MTA’s focus on upholding 
its contract with 
bondholders makes it 
highly sensitive to any 
legislative activity that 
might be perceived as 
impacting this contract or 
MTA’s bond rating. 
MTA’s sensitivity to its contract with bondholders, and its bond rating, also leads it 
to be highly alert to any legislative activity that might infringe on its independence 
or impact its finances.  MTA’s assertiveness in protecting its bondholders’ interests 
can have a dampening effect on legislative inquiry and debate that may not always 
be warranted.  There is risk, however, that legislative actions with the potential to 
adversely impact MTA’s revenue stream, its ability to repay bondholders or comply 
with Bond Resolution requirements could result in a downgrading of MTA’s bonds 
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or legal action against the State.  Consequently, such actions should be approached 
with caution and a thorough understanding of potential impacts. 
MTA’s enabling statute requires the Authority to annually transfer its operating 
surplus to MaineDOT.  MTA has not transferred any surplus since it began paying 
on bonds issued on behalf of MaineDOT in 1996.  The Authority maintains that it 
does not have an operating surplus under the definition in statute and OPEGA 
found this position to be supportable.  However, there are a number of other 
significant ways MTA has contributed, and continues to contribute, to Maine’s 
transportation infrastructure.  
MTA’s Mission ―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― 
MTA's Statute 
The Maine Turnpike Authority is authorized and governed by 23 MRSA, Chapter 
24, §§1961-1983.  Statute establishes the Authority as a board with seven members, 
six of which are appointed by the Governor subject to confirmation by the 
Legislature.  The seventh member, ex-officio, is the Commissioner of the 
Department of Transportation or designee.  Among the six appointed members, 
there must be at least one resident from each of the four counties through which 
the Maine Turnpike passes - York, Cumberland, Androscoggin and Kennebec.  
The Governor is also charged with naming one of the appointed members as 
chairperson of the Authority.  A member who is named to represent a certain 
county ceases to be a member if they move their residence to another county.  MTA is governed by 23 
MRSA §§1961-1983 
which establish the 
Authority and list its 
powers and duties. The 
statute also defines the 
Authority’s purpose as 
public and states that MTA 
is performing a 
governmental function. 
Statute requires the Authority to operate and maintain the Turnpike including 
connecting tunnels, bridges, overpasses, underpasses, interchanges and toll 
facilities.  To carry out this purpose, 23 MRSA §1965 establishes the Authority as 
"a body both corporate and politic in the State" imbued with certain powers 
including: 
• adopting rules governing use of the Turnpike and other services; 
• acquiring real property by purchase, lease, eminent domain or otherwise; 
• charging and collecting fees, fares and tolls for use of the Turnpike and 
other services made available in connection with the Turnpike; 
• entering into contracts; 
• employing such assistants, agents, experts, inspectors, attorneys and other 
employees as deemed necessary or desirable; and 
• issuing revenue bonds or other instruments of indebtedness secured by 
pledging all or part of the operating revenues of the Turnpike. 
Statue further specifies that the assigned purpose of the Authority is public and that 
MTA shall be regarded as performing a governmental function.  It also sets out 
particular duties and requirements for MTA.  The sections of 23 MRSA Chapter 24 
most relevant to this review are summarized in Appendix B. 
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Historical Changes to MTA’s Statutory Mission 
The Maine Turnpike Authority was originally created in 1941 via Public and Special 
Law 1941, Chapter 69.  The Authority was authorized to build a turnpike from 
Kittery to Fort Kent and to issue revenue bonds, payable only by tolls, to fund this 
construction.  The law specified that MTA’s debt would not be considered a debt 
of the State, or a pledge of the State’s faith and credit.  It established the 
Authority’s powers, appointment of board members, and eminent domain 
authority.  The law also called for the Authority’s termination when all bonds and 
interest had been paid in full, or enough money had been set aside to do so.  When 
that time came, the Turnpike and all of MTA’s other assets, were to become 
property of the State with toll revenue payable to the State Treasurer and the 
Turnpike maintained by the State highway commission. 
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Figure 1.  Timeline of Select Legislative Activity Significantly Impacting MTA’s Mission, Structure or Operations 
               1980s 
 
MTA to be continued regardless of 
outstanding bonds. MTA to pay greater of 
25% of operating revenue, or $4.7 
million, to MaineDOT annually. MTA 
assumes cost of State Police activities on 
the Turnpike. 
 
MTA to pay MaineDOT $4.7 million of 
total annual operating revenue after 
money has been put aside to pay 
operating expenses and meet bond 
payments. 
 
Gubernatorial appointments to MTA 
board become subject to legislative 
confirmation. 
   
MTA required to report semiannually to 
Legislature and MaineDOT on activities, 
receipts and expenditures. 
 
MTA’s maximum annual contribution to 
MaineDOT increased to $8.7 million. 
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         1940s-1970s 
MTA created – once bonds paid off 
Turnpike to become property of State, 
toll revenues to go to State Treasurer. 
 
After bonds paid off MTA to be dissolved 
and road to be toll free. 
 
After bonds paid off MTA to be 
administered by MaineDOT, toll revenue 
for use by MaineDOT. 
                                1990s 
 
MTA’s maximum annual payment to MaineDOT increased to 
$17.4 million. MTA to make $6.3 million early payment for 
Scarborough Interchange. 
 
Sensible Transportation Policy Act passes by referendum – 
MTA required to pay MaineDOT its annual operating surplus. 
Before highway capacity can be increased reasonable 
alternatives must be evaluated. Requires legislative approval 
of MTA’s operating budget and revenues needed to meet 
requirements of any resolution authorizing MTA bonds. MTA 
may only make expenditures in accordance with allocations 
approved by the Legislature. 
 
MTA to make one time payment of $5 million to General 
Fund in addition to annual MaineDOT payments. 
 
MTA to purchase 4.7 miles of I-95 for $16 million in two 
installments; $15 million in 1993 and $1 million in 1994. 
Proceeds used for general purpose education aid. 
 
MTA to issue up to $40 million in bonds for MaineDOT’s use. 
Bonds secured by no more than $4.7 million of the annual 
Turnpike revenues that would otherwise be deducted from 
operating surplus and provided to MaineDOT. 
 
Clarification that Legislative approval only required for MTA’s 
operating budget.  MTA provides, for informational purposes, 
statement of revenues needed for capital expenditures, 
reserves, and to meet bond requirements. Legislative 
approval not required for those expenditures. 
 
MTA board increased by 2; one to be added in 2000, one to 
be added in 2002. Of the total members one must reside in 
 
 
York County, one in Cumberland County, one in 
Androscoggin County and one in Kennebec County. 
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In 1981, 23 MRSA §§311-318 were enacted to continue the MTA beyond the time 
when its initial bonds were repaid.  The Turnpike was to be a closed toll facility 
whether there are bonds to pay off or not, and toll revenues were to be used to 
retire debt, operate, maintain, and reconstruct the Turnpike.  For the first time in 
statute, MTA was required to support the State by paying MaineDOT the greater 
of 25% of total operating revenue or $4.7 million.  To the extent possible, MTA’s 
net revenues were also to be used to pay for costs, or portions thereof, associated 
with maintaining, operating, constructing or reconstructing interconnecting access 
roads and interchanges.  Although this new statute still included a provision to 
reorganize MTA when all bonds had been paid, in 1982 the language was amended 
again and replaced with a declaration that MTA would not be dissolved unless the 
Legislature called for such action.  
When the MTA was 
created in 1941, statute 
called for its termination 
once the bonds associated 
with the initial road 
construction were paid off.  
However, in 1981 statute 
was amended to allow for 
the MTA to exist as a 
closed toll facility 
regardless of whether 
outstanding bonds exist. 
Throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s there was also legislative activity that adjusted 
bond caps, increased the amount of cash MTA had to transfer to MaineDOT or 
contribute to other State purposes, and altered MTA’s governance or oversight 
structure.  Selected events with significant impact to MTA’s mission, structure or 
operations are summarized in Figure 1. 
MTA’s Mission, Goals and Objectives 
MTA’s Board has adopted a mission for the organization:   
“The Maine Turnpike Authority and its employees will continue to be national leaders in the user 
fee highway travel and significant contributors to Maine's transportation system. The Authority's 
primary function is to operate and maintain a toll express highway through its short term and long 
term capital improvement plans.”  
The Authority also has a number of goals and objectives including financial 
planning goals which reflect not only the Authority’s responsibilities to Turnpike 
users and the citizens of Maine, but also to those who invest in MTA bonds. 
Goals and Objectives of the Maine Turnpike Authority 
• To manage a top quality highway serving Maine, providing the link between the Maine 
Department of Transportation and the rest of the United States and Eastern Canada. 
• To seek innovative ways to improve service, building on our customer responsive tradition.  
• To affect traffic movement that will encourage commerce, and emphasize safety.  
• To provide excellent maintenance on a daily and long-term basis.  
• To provide quality service at a reasonable cost to Turnpike patrons.  
• To involve the talents and experience of our employees.  
• To use tolls, fees and the Maine Turnpike Authority's unique revenue bonding capability to build 
partnerships that will benefit Maine transportation.  
• To serve as facilitator for additional corridor needs.  
• To assist in implementing corridor improvements that clearly demonstrate benefits relevant to 
the Maine Turnpike.  
• To cooperate with local, regional, state and federal policies and initiatives.  
• To be sensitive to Maine's special environmental heritage. 
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 MTA’s Financial and Capital Planning Process―――――――――――― 
MTA’s staff and Board work together on an annual financial and capital plan in the 
context of the organization’s long term plan.  MTA pulls revenue projections, 
projected operating budgets, debt service obligations and capital improvement 
needs together in a model known as the 20-year Plan.  The model shows whether 
cash available from revenue and previous bond issuances will suffice to cover 
MTA’s anticipated operating expenses, debt service, and maintenance and 
construction costs.  It also projects when toll increases and new bond issuances will 
be necessary to meet those needs.   
MTA uses a 20 year plan 
to guide many of its long 
term decisions about 
capital improvements, tolls 
and bonding. The plan is 
updated regularly.  It 
incorporates MTA’s most 
current financial figures, 
recommendations from 
the Consulting Engineer, 
and forecasts from the 
Traffic Consultant. 
The Board uses the model to make 
decisions about the Authority’s ability to 
cover the costs of new and existing debt.  
The model calculates MTA’s debt service 
coverage (DSC) ratio for each year in the 
Plan, which informs the Board’s decisions 
about changes in toll rates.  One of the Authority’s goals, and an important factor 
for bond rating agencies, is maintaining a DSC ratio of at least 2.0.  The model 
shows when the DSC ratio will drop below 2.0 without a toll increase.  
Debt Service Coverage Ratio is 
a measure of how readily an entity 
can meet its debt service 
obligations.  It is calculated as: 
Net operating income (operating 
revenues less operating expenses) 
divided by total debt service. 
The Long Range Planning Subcommittee of the Board updates the capital portion 
of the 20-year Plan based on information in the annual inspection report prepared 
by the Consulting Engineer (CE).  The inspection report details current 
infrastructure conditions, and needed maintenance and capital improvement 
projects.  Subcommittee members work with the management team and 
consultants in developing the capital program.  It determines the schedule for 
projects and may choose 
whether to fund a project in 
one year or over two years.  
There is less flexibility with 
some projects, such as 
bridges in very poor 
condition that must be 
reconstructed quickly.   
The Board’s Finance and 
Audit Committee works with 
the Plan after the list of 
capital projects and their 
costs is completed by the 
Long Range Planning 
Committee.  Finance and 
Audit develops MTA’s annual 
operating and capital budgets 
and determines what level of 
bonding may be necessary. 
In addition to departmental 
budget submissions and the 
recommended capital program, MTA’s management team and the two 
Financial Planning Goals of the Maine Turnpike Authority 
• To maintain the 2 times or better annual debt service coverage financial ratio. 
(Operating Revenues less Operating Expenses divided by Debt Service) 
• To fund Reserve Maintenance Projects and all required deposits from operating 
cash flows. 
• To issue future debt using level debt service structures. 
• To minimize future toll increases. 
• To minimize future debt issuances. 
• To maintain or increase the MTA’s Financial Rating. 
• To provide adequate funding to make all necessary system upgrades. (Roadway, 
Interchange, Bridgework, Toll System, etc.) 
• To maintain manageability of capital improvement program by limiting the overlap of 
major projects. 
• To maintain manageability of capital improvement costs by equalizing, to the extent 
possible, annual capital project costs. 
• To maintain a minimum unencumbered residual value of at least 5 percent of 
annual toll revenue or five million dollars, which ever is greater, at each year end in 
working capital. (Exclusive of Reserve Maintenance Fund, and Bond Proceeds) 
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subcommittees consider toll revenue projections and MTA’s financial planning 
goals as part of this process.  Traffic and revenue projections incorporated into the 
model are based on projections developed by the traffic and revenue forecasting 
consultant and by MTA staff. 
Once both Board committees have agreed upon a final project list and budget, the 
CE calculates the Reserve Maintenance (RM) Fund1 deposit amount required by 
the Bond Resolution.  The CE’s final report includes the annual inspection results, 
approved list of projects to be funded with bond proceeds and reserve maintenance 
funds, and the RM deposit. 
MTA’s budget runs on a calendar year.  MTA’s Board approves a preliminary 
budget in October which is used to develop the legislative budget packet.  This 
schedule provides time for MTA staff to review the proposed budget with the 
Legislature’s Transportation Committee, and for the Board to consider issues raised 
during this review, before the Board approves the final budget.  After MTA Board 
approval, the final budget goes back to the Transportation Committee and the 
Legislature in the form of a bill.  The Legislature’s passage of the bill in the spring 
establishes MTA’s annual operating budget for the following calendar year 
beginning January 1.   
The Legislature’s 
Transportation Committee 
receives a bill including 
MTA’s proposed operating 
budget each spring.  Upon 
passage of that bill, the 
MTA’s annual operating 
budget for the following 
calendar year is 
established. MTA’s 20-year Plan is a living document updated regularly to reflect changes in 
projected revenues and costs.  For example, the Plan was recently updated to 
reflect revised traffic projections indicating additional capacity on the Turnpike will 
not be needed for some time.  The widening of the Turnpike through and north of 
Portland that had been anticipated in the next 3-5 years was shifted in the Plan to a 
time much further out.  However, bridge reconstruction projects along that stretch 
of the Turnpike, which must be completed in the near term, will be designed to 
accommodate a wider road.  
Transfer of Operating Surplus ―――――――――――――――――――――― 
Historical Support Provided by MTA to the State 
Since 1981, MTA has provided support of various kinds to the State, including cash 
transfers, spending to maintain interchanges, and other non-cash assistance 
MaineDOT.  Cash transfers for State programs have totaled approximately $75 
million since 1994.  Most of that money went to support MaineDOT’s 
transportation needs, but $16 million, paid by the MTA to purchase approximately 
4.7 miles of Interstate 95 between Kittery and York, went to general purpose aid 
for education. 
The MTA has provided 
support in various forms to 
the State since 1981. 
Total cash support of State 
programs has been 
approximately $75 million 
during that time. Some of 
this amount came from 
the annual payments of 
between $4.7 and $8.7 
million MTA was required 
to make to MaineDOT for a 
period of years.  
About $34 million of the $75 million was given to MaineDOT in a lump sum in 
1996. MTA issued a special obligation bond specifically and solely to provide funds 
to the State.  MTA was originally obligated to pay approximately $4.7 million per 
year to cover the interest and principal on those bonds over their ten year life.  
                                                     
1The Reserve Maintenance Fund is one of the specific accounts established by the Bond 
Resolution.  The purpose and allowed uses of this account are described on page 20 in the 
section of this report that discusses MTA’s Obligations to Bondholders.   
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2MTA refinanced these bonds in 1998, then again in 2008 .  As a result, the 
Authority is still making payments on the special obligation bonds, though with a 
significantly lower annual cash outlay due to the refinancing.  Current interest and 
principal payments on these bonds is approximately $2.4 million annually.  These 
bonds cannot be refinanced again and are scheduled to be paid off in 2018.  MTA’s 
total cost for the bonds issued on behalf of MaineDOT, including interest paid, will 
be over $47 million. 
MTA also provides non-
cash assistance to 
MaineDOT. This includes 
reduced cost services 
such as striping, plowing 
or mowing. MTA estimates 
that support of this type in 
2008 represented 
$78,960 in avoided costs 
for MaineDOT. 
MTA has also paid over $60 million additional dollars since 1994 to the State in the 
form of payment for the services rendered by the Maine State Police (MSP).  MSP 
has a separate troop responsible for patrolling the Maine Turnpike. MTA pays all 
costs associated with that troop.  Table 1 summarizes transfers of actual cash to the 
State from 1994 to 2009. 
Table 1.  Cash Transfers from MTA to State 1994 – 2009 
MTA Cash MTA Bond MTA 
Year 
Transfers to 
the State 
Proceeds to 
MaineDOT   
Payments to Total Cash to 
MSP the State 
$25,754,080 1994 $23,354,488*   $2,399,592 
$10,048,361 1995 $7,700,000*   $2,348,361 
$42,142,111 1996 $4,700,000 $34,000,000** $3,442,111 
$6,086,325 1997 $4,700,000   $1,386,325 
$2,878,080 1998     $2,878,080 
$3,253,886 1999     $3,253,886 
$3,625,449 2000     $3,625,449 
$3,324,068 2001     $3,324,068 
$3,946,214 2002     $3,946,214 
$4,798,213 2003     $4,798,213 
$4,647,854 2004     $4,647,854 
$4,769,211 2005     $4,769,211 
$5,415,847 2006     $5,415,847 
$4,933,797 2007     $4,933,797 
$5,706,942 2008     $5,706,942 
$6,142,065 2009     $6,142,065 
Total $40,454,488 $34,000,000 $63,018,015 $137,472,503 
*$15 million of the cash transferred in 1994 and $1 million of the amount 
from 1995 were transferred to the State by MTA in exchange for 4.7 miles of 
the interstate from Kittery to York. 
**$34 million was actually transferred to MaineDOT and the MTA incurred 
an additional $1.27 million in bond issuance costs. 
Source: Data provided by MTA and confirmed to records maintained by the 
Legislature’s Office of Program and Fiscal Review. 
In addition to cash transferred directly to the State, MTA has provided certain non-
cash assistance to MaineDOT.  Such assistance has included performing 
maintenance on particular interchanges and stretches of road - striping, plowing, 
and mowing - at or below cost.  In 2008, MTA provided these services to 
MaineDOT for $78,960 less than the cost incurred in providing them.  
                                                     
2 According to MTA, the Legislature’s Transportation Committee agreed that refinancing the 
bonds, and extending the term, was preferable to a substantial toll increase. 
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Other Contributions to Maine’s Transportation Infrastructure 
MTA contributes to improving Maine’s transportation infrastructure more 
generally by participating in cooperative projects with MaineDOT.  MTA and 
MaineDOT share costs on these projects which are linked directly – physically, 
functionally or both – to Maine Turnpike infrastructure. When doing a cooperative 
project, MaineDOT and MTA establish a Cooperative Agreement and assign 
responsibility for administering that agreement.  When MTA administers the 
agreement, it pays all costs on the project and MaineDOT reimburses MTA for the 
percentage of project costs that has been agreed on. When MaineDOT administers 
the Agreement, it pays the upfront costs and MTA reimburses. 
MTA assists with Maine’s 
overall transportation 
infrastructure by working 
cooperatively with 
MaineDOT to share costs 
on projects that are 
directly linked to the 
Turnpike. 
Table 2 lists examples of the cooperative projects MTA and MaineDOT have 
undertaken through the spring of 2008 with MTA’s share of the costs.   
Table 2.  Examples of MaineDOT and MTA Cooperative Projects with MTA Share of Cost  
$2.3 million 1. Gray By-Pass/Route 202 bridge - joint agreement with MaineDOT 
2. GPCOG/Shuttlebus - Rideshare program and Zoom bus $2.8 million 
3. Park & Ride Studies - joint with MaineDOT (more in 2009 planned) $53,000 
4. Interchanges/Intersections/Connector studies with local roads - all 
joint efforts with MaineDOT/Communities  
$32.6 million 
 
5. Wells Train Station - joint project with FTA/MaineDOT/Wells $2.4 million 
6. West Gardiner Service Plaza/Truck Parking - joint project with 
MaineDOT 
$11.2 million 
$6 million 
7. Payne Road Bridge - MTA agreed to repurchase the bridge after it was 
rebuilt by MaineDOT  
 $500,000 8. Other Transportation planning/Origin & Destination studies not 
related to toll plazas/MaineDOT funding issues/ARTC   
9. Interstate renumbering/re-designation effort  $50,000 
10. Streamlining and Mallar Studies (2000 and beyond)  $15,000  
Source: Data provided by MTA.   OPEGA was unable to obtain confirmation from MaineDOT. 
MTA reports it is currently considering providing support to the replacement or 
rehabilitation of the Interstate-95 and Sara Mildred Long Bridges in Kittery, Maine.  
This support could be approximately $3 million annually for the next 30 years. 
Statutory Requirement for Transfer of Operating Surplus 
Statute used to require Maine Statute Title 23 §1961.2 states in part that the Department of Transportation 
must be provided each year the operating surplus of the Maine Turnpike Authority.  
Title 23 §1964.6-A goes on to define operating surplus: 
MTA to transfer a set 
amount of money to 
MaineDOT each year, but 
since 1991 has required 
MTA to transfer their 
operating surplus instead. 
"Operating surplus" means the total annual operating revenues of the 
Maine Turnpike Authority, after money has been put aside to pay the 
reasonable operating expenses, to pay or to reserve for capital 
expenditures and to meet the requirements of any resolution 
authorizing bonds of the Maine Turnpike Authority, including any 
amounts pledged to secure obligations issued pursuant to section 1968, 
subsection 2-A or to pay principal, interest or premium, if any, with 
respect to these obligations. 
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This language resulted from the passage of a voter referendum in November 1991.  
Prior to that time, from 1982 – 1991, statute specified a particular dollar amount 
that MTA would transfer to MaineDOT.  As shown in Figure 1 on page 8, statute 
was amended to adjust the maximum amount of this transfer several times through 
the 1980’s and early 1990’s with the amount ranging from $4.7 million to $17.4 
million. 
For several years after the requirement for a specified dollar amount was replaced 
with the requirement to transfer “operating surplus”, MTA continued to make 
annual cash transfers to MaineDOT in amounts ranging from $4.7 million to $8.7 
million.  These transfers continued until MTA began paying on the special 
obligation bonds issued on behalf of MaineDOT.   
Determining Whether MTA Currently Has an Operating Surplus 
MTA has not transferred any operating surplus to MaineDOT since its last 
payment of $4.7 million in 1997.  MTA management maintains the Authority has 
no surplus according to the definition in statute.  A cursory look at some key 
financial data would seem to confirm this.  Operating the Turnpike and 
maintaining it in the manner required by the Bond Resolution costs MTA more 
money annually than it receives in revenue.  As a result, the Authority issues bonds 
to pay for some long term capital improvements.  MTA currently has over $400 
million in outstanding bond obligations. 
MTA has not been 
Additionally, as described on page 20, MTA manages its finances using a “bucket” 
system as required by the Bond Resolution.  It is designed to prioritize the uses of 
MTA’s revenues and is a typical requirement in revenue bond resolutions for 
tolling authorities.  Over the course of a year, this bucket system continually moves 
funds to lower priority buckets as higher priority ones fill.  Any monies in the lower 
priority buckets can be, and often are, used to pay for capital improvements and 
emergency repairs to the Turnpike.  All funds are assigned to a purpose at all times.  
As a result, there has never been any money that MTA would consider “surplus”. 
transferring any operating 
surplus to MaineDOT and 
maintains there has not 
been any “surplus”. 
OPEGA found MTA’s 
position supportable given 
the statutory definition, 
and further noted the 
definition is not specific 
enough to calculate a 
definitive surplus figure. 
Consequently, OPEGA 
believes it unlikely that any 
transfers of surplus will 
occur in the future.  
OPEGA attempted to definitively calculate whether MTA has had an operating 
surplus as defined in statute.  In doing so, we found the statute lacks specificity as 
to the point in time when the surplus is to be calculated, whether it should be based 
on budgeted figures or actual revenues and expenditures, and whether it is meant to 
capture only current year expenditures or also projected future expenditures. 
For example, the phrase “after money has been put aside to pay the reasonable 
operating expenses” could be taken to mean after MTA has paid its current 
operating expenses.  It could also be taken to mean after MTA has put aside (or 
saved) any amount of money it reasonably believes it could need to cover operating 
expenses now or in the future.  Similarly, the phrase “to pay or to reserve for 
capital expenditures” could be taken to mean MTA should only set aside funds 
needed for current capital expenditures.  But, it could be taken to mean that MTA 
may first set aside any amounts needed for current and projected future capital 
expenditures before transferring any surplus to MaineDOT. 
Consequently, OPEGA finds there is no operating surplus under the definition 
currently in statute, and further asserts it is unlikely there will ever be a surplus.  
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This is both due to the lack of specificity mentioned in the statutory language, and 
because MTA makes the decisions about what projects are to be done in any given 
year.  Thus, the Authority can legitimately continue to “reserve” all monies for 
capital and reserve maintenance expenditures for as long as the annual resources 
needed to properly maintain and improve the Turnpike exceed annual revenues. 
Potential Impacts of Requiring MTA to Transfer Funds to the State 
If the Legislature wants MTA to transfer some amount of money to MaineDOT 
each year, then a change to statute would be required.  Whether this is desirable is a 
policy matter for the Legislature’s consideration.  (See Recommendation 1.)   If required to transfer 
funds to MaineDOT, the 
MTA would likely make 
other financial 
adjustments.  Options that 
may be considered under 
MTA’s current planning 
model include: changing 
amount or timing of toll 
rates or bond issuances; 
adjusting schedule for 
capital projects; and 
reducing operating costs. 
Any required transfer of funds to MaineDOT would affect the Authority's current 
financial situation and, therefore, its strategy for achieving stated objectives and 
maintaining a strong bond rating.  MTA would likely make other adjustments to 
compensate for the transfer after analyzing various options and their impacts.  
Those options include changing the amount and timing of toll increases.  
Modifications to future bond amounts and their timing, the schedule for planned 
capital projects and/or the level of operating expenses would probably also be 
considered under MTA's current planning model.  MTA is constrained, however,  
in how much it can adjust any given area, as depicted in Table 3. 
Table 3.  Adjustments MTA Could Make to Maintain Desired Financial Position if 
Required to Transfer Money to MaineDOT 
Potential Adjustments Limiters Decision Makers 
 
Toll Rates Public Acceptance MTA Board 
 Frequency or Amount 
of Bonds 
Statute &              
Bond Resolution MTA Board 
 MTA Board & 
Legislature Operating Costs Bond Resolution 
 MTA Board &                
CE Capital Improvements Bond Resolution 
 MTA Board &               
CE Maintenance Costs Bond Resolution 
Further analysis would need to be done by MTA, or the Legislature’s non-partisan 
staff, to determine the potential impacts of any specific action(s) the Legislature 
considers.  The amount of any required cash transfer from MTA to MaineDOT 
would be constrained by the Bond Resolution which appears to allow for a 
maximum transfer of $8.7 million from MTA’s MaineDOT Provision Account.  
Additional funds might be transferable from the Improvement Account, but would 
be limited by allowable uses for that account and a Net Revenues test3. 
                                                     
3As stated in the Bond Resolution, payments from the Improvement Account for “any other 
lawful purpose” may only be made if certain criteria are met.  Those criteria include the 
condition that net revenues during the preceeding fiscal year were at least equal to 200% of 
the debt service on outstanding bonds for that fiscal year.   
Office of Program Evaluation & Government Accountability                                                                                                        page  15      
The Maine Turnpike Authority 
Factors Affecting MTA’s Bond Rating ―――――――――――――――――― 
The Most Significant Factors Driving MTA’s Bond Rating 
The interest rates on MTA’s bonds and the attractiveness of those bonds are based 
on the Authority’s bond rating, and how MTA’s rating compares with other tolling 
entities.  MTA guards its bond rating very carefully because this rating determines 
whether the Authority is able to borrow money and what interest rate it will have to 
pay.  Given the substantial bonds the Authority issues to support its capital 
improvements, it is easy to see how a small difference in a bond’s interest rate 
could have a big impact on the organization’s finances.   
MTA’s bond rating is a 
measure of the risk 
associated with its bonds.  
The rating affects whether 
the bonds will be 
marketable and the 
interest rate the Authority 
must pay on the bonds it 
issues. 
The three major bond agencies that rate MTA’s bonds, and most other bonds 
nationally, are FitchRatings, Moody's Investors Service, and Standard & Poor's.  
They assess an organization’s finances, management structure, economic 
environment, political environment, revenue forecasts, and asset characteristics to 
determine whether an entity’s bonds appear to be a stable investment.  Ratings 
indicate how sure investors can be that an organization will be able to repay bonds 
over the long term.  Table 4 shows the bond rating scales used by the three major 
rating agencies. 
Table 4.  Bond Rating Scale for Three Major Rating Agencies 
 Moody’s S&P Fitch 
Strongest/extremely strong/high Aaa AAA AAA 
Very strong/very high Aa (1,2,3) AA (+,-) AA (+,-) 
Above average/strong/high A (1,2,3) A (+,-) A (+,-) 
Average/adequate/good Baa (1,2,3) BBB (+,-) BBB (+,-) 
Below average/major ongoing 
uncertainties/speculative 
Ba (1,2,3) BB (+,-) BB (+,-) 
Weak/highly speculative B (1,2,3) B (+,-) B (+,-) 
Very weak/vulnerable Caa (1,2,3) CCC (+,-) CCC (+,-) 
Extremely weak/highly vulnerable/probably 
default 
Ca CC  
Bankruptcy filed but payments 
made/imminent default 
 C C 
Weakest/default C D  D 
Source: MTA 
Although the big three rating agencies use a number of similar factors when 
determining bond ratings for tolling entities, they do not specify which are the most 
significant.  A review of their published analyses shows their consideration of 
factors appears more subjective than formulaic.  Furthermore, it appears rating 
agencies consider a tolling authority’s strong positives as possible offsets of some 
negatives.  An entity with a stable and mature asset (i.e. older, established toll road), 
strong financial performance, and a history of capable management presents less 
risk to potential investors and therefore will be rated higher. 
There are three major 
bond rating agencies. All of 
them use similar factors 
and their own subjective 
analysis to determine the 
ratings of entities issuing 
bonds. MTA has 
historically received strong 
ratings from all three. 
MTA has a history of strong ratings, and has most recently been rated A+, Aa3 and 
AA by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch respectively.  OPEGA reviewed a June 2009 
special report by FitchRatings entitled “U.S. Toll Roads and the 2007-2008 
Recession: A Diagnosis of Performance” that illustrated the interconnected factors 
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considered by a rating agency when assessing bond ratings.  It also showed MTA’s 
ratings comparing favorably with those of other tolling entities, some of which 
FitchRatings had downgraded due to conditions described in its report. 
Based on a review of rating documents published by the three major rating 
agencies, the most important factors appear to be those that directly affect MTA’s 
revenue stream and, therefore, its ability to pay bondholder obligations.  In 
particular, the following three factors seemed obviously important in the rating 
agency reviews: 
The factors that seem 
most critical to bond 
ratings for tolling entities 
are independent tolling 
Authority, a willingness to 
raise tolls when needed, 
and a good debt service 
coverage ratio. 
• independent tolling authority;  
• history showing a willingness to raise tolls when necessary; and  
• maintenance of an acceptable debt service coverage.  
It can be assumed, therefore, that any actions or events (including legislative 
actions) that would adversely impact any of these three things could potentially 
result in a change to MTA’s bond rating. 
The Effect of Legislative Actions on MTA’s Bond Rating 
Our review of legislative history for MTA identified several instances of legislative, 
and other activity, that could potentially have been concerning to rating agencies 
and, thus, negatively impacted MTA’s bond rating.  Examples of such activity 
include: 
• In the late 1980’s, the Legislature passed bills that required legislative 
confirmation of the Governor’s appointments to the MTA Board and 
increased the maximum amount to be transferred to MaineDOT, after 
operating expenses, from $4.7 million to $8.7 million.  
• In early 1991, the Legislature passed a supplemental budget bill that 
increased MTA’s transfer to MaineDOT for fiscal year 1991 to a maximum 
of $17.4 million and required MTA to make an early payment of $6.3 
million for the Scarborough interchange project. 
OPEGA compared MTA’s • In November 1991, the Sensible Transportation Act, adopted by voter 
referendum, changed MTA’s statute to require legislative approval of both 
MTA's operating budget and the revenues needed to meet Bond Resolution 
requirements.  It also replaced the cash transfer of a specific amount to 
MaineDOT with the requirement to transfer “operating surplus” as 
discussed on page 13.  Statute was changed in 1995 to clarify that only 
MTA’s budget for operating expenses needed legislative approval. 
legislative history to its 
past bond ratings and was 
unable to find a direct 
correlation between the 
two. 
• In early 1992, a supplemental budget bill for fiscal years 1992 and 1993 
required MTA to transfer $5 million to the State’s General Fund.   
• In 1995, the Legislature passed an act requiring MTA to evaluate reasonable 
alternatives to widening as per the Sensible Transportation Policy Act and 
report back to the Legislature by a specified deadline. 
OPEGA has been unable to detect, however, any direct correlation between 
specific past legislative actions and MTA’s bond rating.  As shown in Table 5, 
MTA’s revenue bond ratings have been stable and strong, even gradually improving 
between 1997 and 2003, despite the noted examples and legislative debate on a 
number of controversial bills involving MTA. 
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Table 5.  Bond Ratings for MTA’s Revenue Bonds 
  Bond Ratings (1)  
Year of Issue $ Bonds Issued Moody’s Fitch S&P DSC Ratio (2) 
1991 $15,250,000 A A A NA 
1994 $73,130,000 A A A 9.120 
1997 $50,000,000 A2 A+ A 2.66 
1998**  $47,970,000 A1 A+ A 2.27 
2000 $126,000,000 A1 AA- A+ 2.79 
2003 $51,000,000 Aa3 AA- A+ 1.9 
2004 $115,050,000 Aa3 AA- A+ 1.79 
2005 $76,715,000 Aa3 AA- A+ 2.62 
2007 $50,000,000 Aa3 AA- A+ 2.16 
2008**  $45,885,000 Aa3 AA- A+ 2.04 
2009 $50,000,000 Aa3 AA- A+ NA 
**These issuances were for the refinancing of existing bonds. 
(1) Represents “underlying ratings” given 
(2) Represents MTA’s debt service coverage ratio in the year the bonds were issued 
Source: Maine Turnpike Authority 
MTA’s management and Board members assert bond ratings have stayed strong 
despite legislative activity because: 
• MTA has been able to fend off any legislative involvement that would 
decrease their autonomy; 
• the rating agencies have seen some of these changes, such as the move to 
the “operating surplus” language and the 1995 reasonable alternatives 
requirement, as positives rather than negatives; 
• the level of legislative activity has been low in the eyes of rating agencies 
and has given those agencies a level of comfort about the limits of political 
interference in MTA’s finances;  
MTA asserts its rating has 
stayed high despite 
legislative actions in part 
because it has prevented 
actions that would 
decrease autonomy and 
has also typically insured 
its bonds.  OPEGA believes 
it is likely because none of 
the activity interfered with 
ability to repay 
bondholders and there 
were positive factors that 
offset any negative 
changes. 
• MTA has typically insured its bonds, making investments in MTA bonds 
essentially risk free, which rating agencies have seen as a significant 
strength4; and 
• MTA stopped making cash transfers to MaineDOT in 1997. 
OPEGA reviewed the rating agencies’ reports and found no specific explanation 
for why the noted legislative actions did not negatively impact the Authority’s bond 
ratings.  We believe it could have been for two primary reasons.  First, it could have 
been due to the fact that none of these changes substantially interfered with MTA’s 
ability to repay bondholders.  This continues to be of critical importance in bond 
ratings. 
A second reason could be that positive factors offset or overshadowed any negative 
changes.  OPEGA also noted legislative activity that could have had a positive 
impact on MTA’s bond rating – like increasing the authorized bonding limits and 
                                                     
4OPEGA notes that the situation with bond insurance has significantly changed in the past 
couple of years as bond ratings on the surety bonds MTA purchased as insurance have 
declined below the ratings on MTA’s own bonds.  Consequently, MTA currently does not 
have the level of bond insurance it has maintained in the past. 
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authorizing the widening of the Turnpike.  In addition, MTA has typically 
maintained a debt service coverage ratio at or above 2x.  It also has a mature toll 
road with little competition and a stable management team.  These are factors 
rating agencies have noted as contributing to positive ratings.   
It can not be assumed, however, that these positives will always be able to offset 
any negative impacts from legislative activity.  Consequently, any actions that could 
potentially affect MTA’s revenue stream or its ability to repay bondholders should 
still be approached with caution.  Such actions include any potential legislation that 
would: 
• impact MTA's independent ability to raise tolls (e.g. requiring legislative or 
executive approval of toll increases);  
Any legislative actions that 
could affect MTA’s ability 
to repay bondholders 
could impact its bond 
rating and should be 
carefully considered. 
• impact MTA's ability to implement the Consulting Engineer's 
recommended capital plan and adhere to recommended maintenance and 
improvement schedule as required by the Bond Resolution (e.g. requiring 
legislative approval of the capital budget and specific projects or lowering 
the bond cap below what is necessary to cover capital needs);  
• weaken MTA’s financial position and/or impact MTA's ability to maintain 
an acceptable debt service coverage ratio (e.g. diverting MTA revenue to 
the State); or 
• impact MTA’s ability to maintain roadways to recommended standards 
without increasing revenues and/or impact MTA’s ability to adequately 
fund reserve maintenance and capital improvement funds (e.g. requiring 
MTA to maintain additional roadways thereby increasing operating 
expenses and capital costs). 
In addition to impacting MTA’s bond ratings, there could be legal ramifications 
associated with any legislation that substantially hinders MTA’s ability to repay its 
bondholders or violates other key provisions contained in the Bond Resolution.  
These contractual obligations are discussed below. 
MTA’s Obligations to Bondholders―――――――――――――――――――― 
MTA’s Specific Obligations to Bondholders 
OPEGA contracted with a law firm that has expertise in bond resolutions and 
other bond related legal issues to consult on questions related to MTA’s Bond 
Resolution.  That consultant, Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge, reviewed the 
Authority’s current Bond Resolution and noted that it includes a number of 
obligations that affect how MTA must manage its finances, assets, operations or 
planning.  These obligations represent contractual duties that can be legally 
enforced against MTA through the Trustee.   
The Bond Resolution 
represents a contract 
between MTA and its 
bondholders. The 
obligations included in the 
document can be legally 
enforced against the MTA 
by the Bond Trustee. The full report provided by Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge (EAPD), detailing all 
the obligations, may be seen in Appendix C.  Articles V, VII and VIII, concerning 
the Authority’s financial accounts and covenants, are most relevant to this review 
and are summarized below. 
Office of Program Evaluation & Government Accountability                                                                                                        page  19      
The Maine Turnpike Authority 
Articles V – Funds and Accounts 
Article V of the MTA’s Bond Resolution directs that MTA funds be placed into 
specific accounts, with specific requirements for the level of funds in each account, 
and limits the purpose for which the money from each account may be used.   
These accounts include the Capital Fund which holds bond proceeds and as a 
result can be used only for “Turnpike projects” or for other purposes provided the 
Bond Trustee agrees.5  The level of funding required in the Capital Fund is 
determined based on capital improvement needs identified by the MTA, the 
Consulting Engineer, the MTA Board's Long-Range Planning Committee, and 
approved by the Board. 
The other accounts specified in the Bond Resolution receive funds from MTA’s 
operating and other revenue.  They are arranged as a series of "buckets" such that 
only when the higher priority bucket's requirements have been met may the next 
lower bucket receive funding.  This system is designed to protect the bondholders 
by prioritizing MTA's revenue.  These accounts include: MTA’s Bond Resolution 
requires the Authority to 
deposit its revenues into a 
number of specific fund 
accounts, some of which 
are to be held by the 
Trustee. Each account has 
its own allowable uses and 
many have minimum 
funding amounts. 
Revenue Fund - All revenues received by the Authority are deposited in the 
Revenue Fund.  The moneys in the Revenue Fund are primarily used to pay 
operating expenses.  Funding that exceeds operating expenses flow to the 
downstream buckets, and all funds in excess of 15% of the Annual 
Operating Budget must be flowed to other funds by the fifteenth of each 
month.  
Debt Service Fund/ Debt Service Reserve Fund - Moneys in the Debt 
Service Fund are used to pay debt service on the revenue bonds.  The 
funding level is determined by the amount of annual principal and interest 
payments due on outstanding bonds.  The Debt Service Reserve Fund 
holds required backup funds available to pay the interest and principal on 
bonds in the event the Debt Service Fund has insufficient cash to make 
those payments.  This reserve fund includes a combination of cash and 
surety bonds, and between those two, the fund’s value must be equal to the 
Debt Service Reserve Requirement6.  
Reserve Maintenance Fund - Section 806 of the Bond Resolution stipulates 
that the recommended funding level for the Reserve Maintenance Fund is 
specified by the Consulting Engineer’s annual inspection report from the 
prior year.  Moneys in this account may be used: 
• for costs associated with Reserve Maintenance Fund projects; 
• for costs of Turnpike projects, provided that such payment is 
necessary to prevent a loss of revenues; 
• to pay premiums for insurance required by the Bond Resolution; 
                                                     
5 Capital Fund moneys have been used for other purposes, with the Trustee’s agreement, 
twice in recent years, once in 2007 and once in 2009.  In both cases the funds were 
transferred to the Debt Service Reserve Fund to cover shortages that had suddenly occurred 
in that fund due to circumstances beyond MTA’s control. 
6 The Debt Service Reserve Requirement is equal to either the maximum annual debt 
service (MADS) or, if MTA has maintained two times the amount of debt service coverage for 
the prior two fiscal years, then only half the MADS. 
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• to replenish the Debt Service Reserve Fund if there are insufficient 
moneys in the General Reserve Fund to replenish it and certain 
other conditions are met; and 
• to pay for an emergency, subject to certain conditions.  
General Reserve Fund - Section 509 of the Bond Resolution describes 
the many allowed uses of the General Reserve Fund.  MTA explained 
that the General Reserve Fund is comprised of three major accounts, the 
MaineDOT account, the Interchange account, and the Improvement 
account.  The MaineDOT account is used for debt service on the 
subordinated bonds that were issued for MaineDOT, and residually to 
fund any transfers to the MaineDOT.  The Interchange account is used 
to pay for interchange related capital costs.  The Improvement account is 
used pay general capital or maintenance expenses and to meet any 
funding deficiencies in the higher buckets.  Under the Resolution, 
moneys in this account can also be used “to pay for any other lawful 
corporate purpose of the Authority as authorized in the Enabling Act,” 
as long as certain criteria are met.  
Articles VII-VIII – Authority Covenants Article VIII of the Bond 
Resolution requires MTA to 
take specific steps to 
manage its finances, 
assets and operations. 
These steps include 
keeping the Turnpike in 
good repair, charging 
adequate tolls, and 
employing a consulting 
engineer to report annually 
on the Turnpike’s 
condition. 
Article VII includes the Authority covenants to pay debt service on the bonds, to 
take all action that may be necessary to confirm the pledge made under the Bond 
Resolution, and to do all that may be necessary to ensure the tax-exempt status of 
any tax-exempt bonds.  Section 704 specifically prevents the Authority from issuing 
any indebtedness secured by the Turnpike revenues other than the bonds and the 
subordinated bonds.  
Article VIII contains the provisions that most directly affect how the Authority 
must manage its finances, assets and operations.  Section 801 requires the Authority 
to operate the Turnpike in a sound manner and keep it in good repair and working 
condition.  It stipulates the conditions under which the Authority may acquire a 
road that is more than five miles long.  This Section further provides that the 
Authority may not transfer more than $8.7 million to the Department of 
Transportation from the Department of Transportation Provision Account in any 
fiscal year. 
Section 802 of Article VIII requires the tolls established by the Authority must be 
sufficient (1) to provide funds for the payment of operating expenses and (2) to 
provide net revenues that are at least equal to the net revenue requirement7 in any 
fiscal year.  Section 803 provides a timeline for the Authority’s submittal of a 
preliminary and final budget. It further specifies the amount expended on 
operation and maintenance of the Turnpike may not exceed the amount provided 
for operating expenses in the annual budget, except in the case of an emergency or 
if paid from the Reserve Maintenance Fund or General Reserve Fund.  
                                                     
7Net Revenue Requirement is, for any stated fiscal year, the greater of: 
(a) 120% of the debt service; and 
(b) 100% of the sum of (i) the debt service, (ii) the required Reserve Maintenance 
deposit, (iii) the required debt service reserve deposit and (iv) any other required 
deposit set forth in any Supplemental Resolution.  
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Section 804 provides a deadline for the Authority to file its audited financial 
statements and also stipulates the information it must file annually with the Trustee 
and Consulting Engineer.   
Sections 805 and 806 require MTA to employ independent firms to carry out the 
duties of the Consulting Engineer and the Traffic Consultant.  The Authority must 
have the Consulting Engineering submit a report by October 1 of each year to 
include the firm’s findings with respect to the condition of the Turnpike; 
recommendations for proper operation and maintenance of the Turnpike for the 
following fiscal year, including estimated costs; recommendations for the insurance 
to be carried by the Authority; and recommendations for the amount to be 
deposited in the Reserve Maintenance Fund. 
Other sections in Article VIII deal with additional financial matters like the types of 
insurance that the Authority is required to carry and stipulations related to 
construction contracts.   
MTA’s Bond Resolution Compared to Those of Other Tolling Authorities 
According to EAPD, the terms of MTA's Bond Resolution are generally 
comparable to those of other toll revenue bond issuers.  This is true both for bond 
documents originally used in the early 1990's as well as the current market.  The 
terms are expected to differ some between issuers to reflect the individual 
circumstances of each issuer and the nature of the governmental entity that is 
issuing the debt.  Most revenue bond issuers need to balance the terms of their 
financing documents against their overall responsibilities for operating their 
particular revenue enterprise. 
MTA’s Bond Resolution is 
generally comparable to 
those of other tolling 
entities. It includes a few 
covenants that are more 
detailed than others.  
While the specificity may 
be more restrictive on MTA 
in some situations, it also 
provides greater clarity for 
bondholders and MTA. 
While typical, the consultant also noted that certain covenants contained in MTA's 
Resolution are more detailed than those contained in governing documents for 
other revenue bond issuers.  The increased specificity may be more restrictive on 
the MTA in certain circumstances but also provides more clarity with respect to 
MTA's obligations to bondholders as compared to the more general terms of other 
bond documents.  Examples of such detail noted by the consultant included: 
• formulas for the Debt Service Reserve Fund requirement;  
• set of requirements MTA must meet if it wants to expand the system;  
• requirements for the annual report; and  
• the requirement for the Consulting Engineer to conduct an annual 
inspection of the system. 
Also according to the consultant, the roles for the Consulting Engineer in MTA's 
Resolution are defined more specifically than in some other resolutions.  It is 
typical to require various independent third parties to be involved in certain matters 
to give comfort that the issuer is fulfilling obligations.  However, the roles for the 
CE specifically defined in the bond document are usually related just to the physical 
condition of the Turnpike.  The consultant offered examples of why the CE may 
have been specified for the other roles but could not opine on the current CE's 
expertise in any of those areas. 
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Bond Resolution Constraints on Legislative Actions  
OPEGA asked EAPD to provide their opinion on how, if at all, the obligations to 
bondholders contained in the Resolution might limit any actions the Legislature 
could consider taking regarding the Authority.  Below is a summary of the 
consultant’s response.  The full response is included in the consultant’s complete 
report in Appendix C.   
EAPD notes the Authority was established by an act of the Maine Legislature and, 
in general, it remains subject to further legislative action that could either expand or 
restrict the activities of the Authority.  The primary concerns in regard to legislative 
action that might conflict with the Bond Resolution are presented by the contract 
clauses of the United States Constitution and the Maine Constitution which 
provide, in part, that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligations of 
contracts.  
In the opinion of OPEGA’s 
bond consultant, the MTA 
is a creation of the 
Legislature and is subject 
to further legislative 
action, so long as that 
action does not adversely 
affect the Authority’s 
contractual obligations. 
However, the contract clause does not disallow all legislation that might adversely 
affect the Authority’s contractual obligations under the Bond Resolution.  United 
States Supreme Court decisions have found legislative action that does “impair” a 
contract constitutional to the extent the impairment is reasonable and necessary to 
serve an important public purpose.  It should be noted, however, that the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Maine, approximately 20 years before the U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions, established an arguably more stringent standard that would prohibit 
virtually any impairment, regardless of how material. 
Assessing the outcome of any particular controversy depends on the actual facts 
and circumstances of the legislation. For example, necessity will be found if the 
objectives of the legislation could not be satisfied by a “less drastic alternative”. 
Other factors used to assess reasonableness include the extent of the impairment 
and whether the circumstances giving rise to the impairment were foreseeable at the 
time the contract was made.  
MTA’s Outstanding Debt ―――――――――――――――――――――――――― 
Amount of Debt MTA Has Currently Outstanding 
Unlike State bonds, MTA revenue bonds do not require voter approval.  The 
Maine Turnpike Authority uses a mixture of toll revenues and bonding to fund its 
capital program.  Bond funds are only used for long term capital improvements and 
the term on bonds issued for any project is no longer than the useful life of the 
asset.  Shorter lived capital projects, such as paving projects, are paid for with cash 
and bonds are never used for MTA’s operational expenses.   
Title 23 §1968 caps 
MTA’s revenue bonds at 
$486 million. The 
Authority’s audited 
financial statements show 
a total of $390 million in 
outstanding revenue 
bonds as of 2009. 
Title 23 MRSA §1968 sets limits on MTA's bonding authority.  The current limits 
are $486 million for revenue bonds and $40 million for special obligation bonds 
specific to pay costs of MaineDOT projects.  Statute further specifies the $40 
million in special obligation bonds could be issued no later than June 30, 1997. 
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MTA’s audited financial statements report MTA had approximately $390 million in 
revenue bonds and $18.5 million in special obligation bonds outstanding as of 
December 31, 2009.  Though the statutory deadline has passed for issuing 
additional special obligation bonds, MTA could issue additional revenue bonds of 
almost $96 million without exceeding its statutory bond cap.  Table 6 shows MTA’s 
outstanding bonds as compared to the bond caps in statute. 
Table 6. MTA’s Outstanding Debt as of 2009 Compared to Statutory Caps 
Revenue Bonds Special Obligation Bonds  
Statutory Cap $486,000,000  $40,000,000  
Outstanding Debt $390,115,000  $18,530,000  
Remaining Bonding Capacity $95,885,000  $0 * 
*MTA has no remaining bonding capacity for special obligation bonds because statute 
required all bonds of that type to be issued by June 30, 1997. 
Processes for Deciding the Timing and Amount of Bond Issuances 
New Bond Issuances 
The decision to issue new bonds is based on the 20 year financial and capital 
planning model described on page 10.  Only the Board can authorize the issuance 
of new bonds, but the decision-making process also includes the involvement of 
the Consulting Engineer (CE), the Traffic Consultant, and members of MTA staff.   
MTA’s Board makes 
decisions to issue new 
bonds based on MTA’s 20 
year plan and considers 
the input of the Consulting 
Engineer, Traffic 
Consultant and MTA staff. 
Outline of Steps in Deciding Whether to Issue New Bonds 
1. CE performs annual inspection.  
2. CE presents inspection results in preliminary capital improvements report.  
3. Traffic Consultant prepares preliminary traffic and revenue projections.  
4. Staff reviews capital needs, and projected revenues and costs with the Board 
to assess whether new bonds are necessary to support capital needs.  
5. The Long Range Planning Subcommittee of MTA’s Board reviews capital 
projects and selects which will be funded with cash and which will be funded 
with bond proceeds. An initial determination is made of whether new debt will 
be needed in the coming year.  
6. The Finance and Audit Subcommittee of the MTA Board reviews the results of 
the Long Range Planning Subcommittee's work, and the two work together to 
finalize the capital plans and bonding decisions.  
7. The full Board authorizes bond issuance if new bonds have been determined 
to be necessary.  
Refinancing Outstanding Debt 
The process involved in deciding to refinance existing debt is far simpler than that 
for deciding whether new debt should be issued.  Refinancing may be suggested by 
MTA staff, MTA’s Board, or the Authority’s senior bankers.  Once it has been 
decided that refinancing is worth consideration, the Authority’s bankers prepare a 
proposal or analysis for MTA staff to review. 
MTA pays close attention to the net present value and current dollar value of 
refinancing and considers: 
• how much the refinancing will cost; 
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• how long it would take for the cost of refinancing to be recouped; and When deciding whether to 
• whether refinancing would produce at least $1 million in savings, preferably 
$2 million or more. 
refinance existing bonds, 
MTA considers the cost of 
refinancing, the time 
needed to recoup those 
costs, and whether 
refinancing would produce 
at least $1 million in 
savings over the 
repayment of the bond. 
If MTA managers decide refinancing makes sense for the organization, then the 
proposal is brought before the Board’s Finance and Audit Subcommittee.  The 
Finance and Audit Subcommittee reviews the proposal and brings the proposal to 
the full Board for a final decision if they agree it should be considered. 
Assessing Whether MTA’s Current Debt Load Is Reasonable 
OPEGA considered a number of criteria in assessing the reasonableness of MTA’s 
current debt load including whether: 
• all bonding has been clearly related to organization’s mission; 
• the current debt is within the limits of the bond cap established in statute;  
• rating agencies have made any negative comments about MTA’s debt levels 
in their recent rating analyses;  
• MTA has maintained a debt service coverage ratio of 2.0 or higher; 
• debt was the sole funding source for capital improvements; 
• bond proceeds are ever used to cover operating expenses, debt service 
payments or reserve maintenance requirements; 
• plans to issue bonds were adjusted as capital needs changed; and 
• there has been an established and reasonable process, with appropriate 
Board involvement, for deciding when to bond and for how much. 
OPEGA concluded that overall MTA’s current debt level is reasonable.  It is within 
the limits of the bond cap established in statute.  Rating agencies have made no 
negative comments about the debt levels in MTA’s recent rating analyses, and the 
bond ratings have risen.  Furthermore, MTA uses funds other than debt to fund 
some portion of the capital and maintenance projects required by the CE.   
OPEGA concluded that 
MTA’s current debt level is 
reasonable because it is 
within the statutory bond 
cap, has drawn no 
negative comments from 
rating agencies and has 
been used to support 
capital projects that have 
also been funded partly 
with cash from revenues. 
We reviewed the details of MTA’s most recent refinancings, and found they are 
generally well supported and justified in terms of cost savings or cashflow 
improvements.  New issuances from recent years were also reviewed and found to 
be tied to capital projects that appear reasonable and related to MTA's mission.   
Furthermore, we observed the Authority’s Board appears to have a strong and well-
established process for deciding when to bond and for how much, based on a 20 
year planning model.  Our opinion of the soundness of this process, and the 20 
year Plan, assumes the CE only recommends projects that are necessary to the 
operation of the Turnpike.  It was beyond the scope and resources of this review to 
reassess the necessity of the CE’s recommended projects, and we have no reason to 
believe any unnecessary projects have been recommended.  However, we did note 
that the firm currently serving as the Consulting Engineer fills a dual role for MTA 
that does present some risk with regard to required projects.  (See 
Recommendation 2.)   
Office of Program Evaluation & Government Accountability                                                                                                        page  25      
The Maine Turnpike Authority 
Contractor Selection and Contract Management ――――――――――― 
Overview of MTA’s Current Contracts 
MTA contracts for large projects such as a bridge reconstruction, and smaller 
projects such as servicing office copiers.  Although not legally required to award 
contracts by competitive bid, the Authority uses a competitive public process most 
of the time and aims to select vendors that represent "best total value."  Best total 
value is defined by MTA as the lowest price quoted which provides quality, service 
and delivery to meet the requirements of the proposed work or usage.   
MTA’s contracts can be divided into two categories — construction and non-
construction — each of which are handled somewhat differently both in terms of 
how contractors are selected and in the way contracts are administered once they 
are established.  Contracts for construction and reconstruction projects include 
work specified by the Consulting Engineer.  They generally follow a process 
outlined in the Maine Turnpike General Specifications, which is a slightly modified 
version of the Maine Department of Transportation Standard Specifications.  Non-
construction contracts follow the process described in MTA’s Purchasing Policy.  
OPEGA assessed whether MTA’s processes included appropriate practices for 
ensuring best value through discussions with MTA management and reviewing files 
for a selected sample of the highest dollar contracts in both categories. 
MTA has 100 currently 
active contracts. Some are 
for large projects, like 
bridge construction, and 
others are for minor 
service, like copier repair. MTA provided OPEGA a list of 98 active contracts.  In our testing of 
expenditures, we identified an additional two contractual situations bringing the 
total of active contracts we are aware of to 100.  Two of the 100 contracts are 
associated with the service plazas along the Turnpike and generated about $3.8 
million in revenue for MTA in 2009.  Total 2009 payments on the remaining 98 
contracts were about $44.3 million. 
Ten of MTA’s contracts represent situations where the Authority is locked into a 
particular vendor.  For example, MTA is part of the State’s employee benefit plans 
and four of the contracts were for those benefits with vendors used by the State.  
Four more of the ten were situations where the need for the contract and/or the 
vendor has been mandated by State government.  These include the contract with 
the State Police for patrolling the Turnpike and three contracts associated with 
alternative transportation requirements that are part of the permit MTA received to 
modernize and widen the Turnpike. 
Seventy-five of MTA’s 100 
contracts were 
competitively bid. Of the 
25 not bid, ten were 
situations where the 
Authority was locked into 
using particular vendors. 
Ninety contracts, then, represent situations where MTA makes choices about how 
contractors will be selected.  Of those 90 contracts, MTA considers 80 as having 
been competitively bid, meaning the vendor was selected through a formal process 
that solicited information on vendor qualifications and proposals for cost and 
approach.  Vendors for the other 10 contracts were selected without soliciting 
qualifications or proposed costs from other vendors and were categorized by MTA 
as sole source contracts. 
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In our review of selected contracts, we determined that five of the contracts MTA 
had categorized as competitively bid were effectively sole source contracts.  There 
was either no evidence of a competitive bidding process having ever occurred or 
the bidding was long ago with the contract having been continued with the same 
vendor since then.  Table 7 summarizes the number of MTA contracts OPEGA is 
aware of by type and contractor selection method. 
Table 7. Summary of MTA’s 2009 Contracts by Type and Contractor Selection Method 
 Competitively Bid Not Biddable Sole Sourced Total 
20 0 20 Construction  0 
78 Non-Construction - Expense 55 10 13 
2 Non-Construction - Revenue  0 0 2 
Total – All Types of Contracts 75 10 15 100 
Construction Contract Processes 
MTA has 20 construction contracts and all are established through a competitive 
bidding process.  In fact, Turnpike construction and reconstruction work must 
follow the procedures required for competitive sealed bids as outlined in MTA’s 
General Specifications.  The process starts when a construction or reconstruction 
project need is identified in the CE’s annual report and incorporated into MTA’s 
Plan.  
All of MTA’s 20 
construction contracts 
were competitively bid 
using a RFP process. 
Under that process, bids 
are evaluated based on 
projects specs. The lowest 
bid from a pre-qualified 
contractor that meets 
those specs is generally 
selected. 
Plans and contract documents are drawn up using the MaineDOT Specifications as 
modified by MTA’s Engineering Department.  For larger projects, a Request For 
Proposal (RFP) is written and a public invitation to bid is advertised in all major 
local newspapers.  Bids are typically solicited directly from several pre-qualified 
contractors on smaller dollar projects.  A pre-bid conference is held to address any 
bidder questions prior to the bid submission deadline. 
Bids are evaluated based on the project specifications.  The lowest bid proposal 
that meets the required specifications is generally selected.  MTA’s Board approves 
all major construction and reconstruction projects; however it will occasionally 
authorize the Executive Director to make an award if there are issues connected to 
the timing of a project.  MTA’s Purchasing Department explained that when 
several factors other than price are important to the selection decision, a more 
formalized scoring process may be used.  This is done rarely, for example during 
the selection of architectural services for MTA’s administration building.  
Active construction 
contracts are monitored by 
MTA’s Engineering 
Department. Engineering 
staff review and approve 
all construction 
documents, including 
monthly invoices, and 
conduct regular project 
meetings to discuss 
progress, safety, 
scheduling and traffic 
control. 
Once established, construction contracts are overseen by MTA’s Engineering 
Department.  Although there is no formal, written procedure detailing contract 
administration responsibilities, MTA describes a standard process for construction 
contracts that includes appropriate monitoring and approvals.  All projects are 
assigned to either the MTA Deputy Director of Engineering & Building 
Maintenance or the MTA Project Administrator for management and coordination.  
During the bid phase, a resident engineer and construction inspectors are also 
assigned to the project.   
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MTA engineering staff reviews and approves all construction documents.  The 
inspector works with a project engineer, contractor, and any consultants hired for 
quality control testing.  Monthly invoices from the contractor are reviewed and 
approved - first by the inspector, and then by either the Deputy Engineer or 
Project Administrator.  Weekly or bi-weekly on-site project meetings are held to 
discuss various construction issues such as schedule, safety, progress, change orders 
and traffic control.  Any contractor claims or disputes are settled based on a 
decision matrix developed during the pre-construction meeting. 
MTA’s Board receives periodic status updates on significant projects.  Board 
approval is required for final payment and to release all retainage8 upon successful 
project completion. 
Non-Construction Contracts Processes 
Non-construction contracts are for goods or services not associated with specific 
construction or reconstruction projects.  MTA has 80 of these, 10 of which 
represent situations where MTA is locked into a particular vendor as previously 
described.  The majority of the remaining 70 have been established through a 
competitive process.  Fifteen of the 70, including the two revenue generating 
contracts, are sole source arrangements. 
Non-construction contracts 
may be for goods or 
services. Fifty-five of MTA’s 
non-construction contracts 
were competitively bid 
using procedures detailed 
in the Purchasing Policy. 
Under this process, bids 
are solicited, generally by 
RFP, then evaluated for 
“best total value”. 
Contracts of particularly 
high cost may be awarded 
by the MTA Board. 
MTA’s Purchasing Policy describes the process for competitively selecting vendors 
to supply non-construction goods and services.  A purchasing need is identified by 
MTA staff and approved by a manager.  An approved purchase requisition is sent 
to MTA’s Department of Purchasing.  Vendors who should receive proposals are 
selected by Purchasing which also determines which type of bid request is 
appropriate for the situation.  There are three types of bid request processes: 
• formal sealed bids if the expected cost is greater than $5,000 (or when 
MTA's interests will be best served);  
• requests for quotations if cost is expected to be less than $5,000; or 
• fax or telephone quotations for low value items, urgent purchases, or 
otherwise at MTA’s discretion. 
Request for Proposal specifications and the contract may be developed by either a 
manager or by Purchasing, as deemed appropriate.  After soliciting bids, but before 
they are due, a pre-bid conference may be held to clarify the scope of work for 
certain services, such as landscaping or snow removal.  
The Department of Purchasing, along with the appropriate manager, reviews the 
bids or quotes and determines to whom the award will be made based on "best 
total value".  If the contract is particularly significant, such as the annual salt 
contract, the MTA Board may award the contract.  According to the Purchasing 
Department, awards go to the lowest bid proposals that meet the specifications.  
Active non-construction 
contracts are monitored by 
the responsible MTA 
department in the manner 
that seems appropriate to 
the individual contract. 
                                                     
8 Although invoices are paid as a construction project progresses, 7.5% of the total cost 
(1.5% when project is substantially complete) is retained until the project is complete and 
the MTA Board approves the final payment. 
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MTA’s Purchasing Policy does not describe any process for selecting vendors 
without a competitive process.  MTA also has no other formal policy to guide 
when sole sourced contracts are appropriate, or how they should be justified.   
Once established, non-construction contracts are administered and monitored by 
the appropriate department within MTA, in whatever manner is deemed most 
appropriate for the individual contract.  MTA’s Purchasing Policy outlines 
responsibilities for monitoring quality, quantity and prices of goods purchased and 
received.  However, there are no formal, written procedures describing 
responsibilities for administering contracts and monitoring contractor performance 
related to contracts for services.   
Results of Contract File Review 
Construction Contracts 
OPEGA reviewed contract and invoice documentation for 10 of the 20 
construction contracts, representing 2009 payments of about $12.4 million.  We 
found that MTA’s policies, procedures and processes for selecting contractors and 
administering contracts are adequate to ensure that MTA receives best value for 
contracted construction services. 
OPEGA’s review of 10 
contracts for construction 
services found practices 
for selecting those 
contractors and 
monitoring the contracts 
adequate to ensure MTA 
receives best value. 
The bid information is detailed and accessible to bidders.  There is a reasonable 
pre-qualification process in place using MaineDOT's pre-qualified vendor list for 
construction and reconstruction projects.  MTA has written policies that describe 
how the bid process should be handled.  Construction contract files are easily 
located and complete.  We also observed evidence that the standard contract 
administration and management process described to us is consistently adhered to. 
Non-Construction Contracts 
OPEGA also reviewed contract and invoice documentation for 13 non-
construction contracts where the vendor was not pre-determined by a government 
mandate or other situation.  MTA’s 2009 payments associated with these 13 
contracts totaled approximately $12.5 million.  We found that these contracts were 
generally not as formal as construction contracts and took a variety of forms.  
Some were detailed contracts, but others were just rate sheet agreements or letters 
accepting a low bid. 
OPEGA’s review of 13 non- Four of the contracts reviewed were for procurement of goods.  Documentation in 
the files showed that the expected controls for ensuring best value, as described in 
MTA’s Purchasing Manual, were usually performed.  These controls include 
competitive selection, inspection of goods received, comparison of quantity and 
price received to what was ordered, and approval of the invoice by a knowledgeable 
employee.  
construction contracts 
revealed that practices for 
purchasing goods 
generally included 
expected controls for 
ensuring best value. 
However, practices for 
purchases of services 
were generally less robust. 
Processes and practices for ensuring best value were, however, not as robust for 
the nine services contracts we reviewed.  The services covered by eight of these 
contracts had not been bid recently or, in a few cases, ever.  There was no written  
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justification for these sole source arrangements, although MTA management did 
provide explanations for them.  Based on these explanations, two of the contracts 
do not appear to be good candidates for competitive bidding because of the 
particular conditions under which these services are being procured.  The other six, 
though, were services that could be competitively bid.   
We also found that some of the professional services contracts did not reflect work 
currently being performed or current prices being charged.  For example, we noted 
that neither MTA’s sole sourced contract for engineering services nor its sole 
sourced contract for legal services provided sufficient detail on the scope of 
services or the duration of the contractual relationship.  These contracts were also 
less formal than others reviewed and were out of date in some aspects, such as 
travel reimbursement rates for contractor staff. 
OPEGA also noted the monitoring of work performed under services contracts 
was less robust than that of other contracts.  Invoices for services contracts were 
properly approved by individuals in a position to be knowledgeable about the 
contractors work.  However, enhanced processes for monitoring the quality of 
services would reduce the risk that MTA does not receive the full service it pays 
for, and may be worth considering given that some non-construction service 
contracts are high value.   
Lastly, we observed that original, signed versions of non-construction contracts, 
particularly those for professional services, were not maintained in a central 
location.  Rather they were in the possession of whichever MTA staff person was 
most involved with the vendor.  Consequently, these documents are not readily 
accessible to all who may need them.  The lack of centralization may also explain 
why OPEGA’s expenditure testing found contract-type agreements that MTA had 
not included on its contract list 
For more discussion on contract issues and OPEGA’s recommendations, see 
Recommendations 3 and 4. 
Oversight and Governance  ―――――――――――――――――――――――― 
Entities Involved in Overseeing the Maine Turnpike Authority 
In accordance with statute, the members of the Authority are appointed by the 
Governor, subject to review and confirmation by the Legislature.  The Governor 
also designates one of the appointed members as Chair of the Authority.  
Accordingly, the Governor has significant influence over the composition of the 
Authority.  
MTA Board members are 
appointed by the Governor 
and confirmed by the 
Legislature. Besides the 
Board, other entities with 
oversight of MTA include 
the Legislature, 
MaineDOT, the Bond 
Trustee and the Consulting 
Engineer. 
For the purposes of this review, however, OPEGA considered oversight entities to 
be any entity outside management with direct influence over the Maine Turnpike 
Authority's decisions, actions, operations or structure.  Based on this definition, we 
determined the following entities had a prescribed oversight role assigned in either 
statute or the Bond Resolution: 
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• Maine Turnpike Authority Board;  
• Maine State Legislature;  
• Maine Department of Transportation;  
• Bond Trustee; and  
• Consulting Engineering.  
As depicted in Figure 2, each of these oversight entities fills a different role with 
respect to the MTA.  Taken together they represent a relatively comprehensive 
governance structure if all of them are functioning effectively.  OPEGA observed 
that all the entities appear to have appropriate and adequate authority to fulfill their 
roles, although effectiveness could be impacted by the characteristics, perspectives 
and priorities of the individuals representing them. 
  Figure 2.  Entities Involved in Oversight of the Maine Turnpike Authority 
The Maine Turnpike Authority Board 
The Authority Board provides policy direction, contractual approval, budgetary 
review and approval, financial oversight, approval of capital projects, and general 
direction to the MTA’s operating staff in addition to overseeing compliance with 
MTA’s Bond Resolution and all relevant statutes. The Board has three 
subcommittees that provide more detailed oversight in the specific areas: 
• The Finance and Audit Subcommittee – oversees financial and related 
policies and procedures to ensure compliance with MTA objectives and 
other best practices; reviews results of independent audits; works with Long 
Range Planning Subcommittee to determine whether capital projects 
require new bond issuances; and reviews annual budget in detail before 
recommending it to the full Board. 
The MTA Board provides 
policy direction, contract 
approval, budgetary 
review, financial oversight, 
capital project approval 
and general management 
direction to MTA staff. 
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• The Long Range Planning Subcommittee – reviews MTA projects that 
involve long planning timeframes or have potential for major community 
impacts; reviews the proposed 20 year Plan and its supporting detail to 
develop a list of capital projects prioritized according to MTA’s financial 
planning goals; and works with the Finance and Audit Subcommittee to 
determine whether the capital plan requires new bond issuances. 
• The Personnel Subcommittee – reviews and approves collective bargaining 
agreements and determines adjustments to compensation, including cost of 
living adjustments and pay scales.  This subcommittee also reviews MTA’s 
human resource practices and policies, and oversees the development or 
revision of policies, to ensure compliance and consistency with MTA’s 
objectives and other best practices. The MTA Board currently has no vacant seats and 
holds formal meetings 
usually once or twice a 
month.  The Board has 
three subcommittees 
actively engaged in 
oversight of specific 
segments of MTA’s 
business. 
The MTA Board currently has no vacant seats and is quite active.  They hold 
formal meetings as necessary—usually once or twice a month—and individual 
Board members stop by the MTA offices more often to attend subcommittee 
meetings, sign contracts or other documents, or to talk with MTA management 
about specific concerns, questions, or ideas they may have about the Authority’s 
finances or capital projects. 
The Maine State Legislature 
Title 23 §§1961-1983 provide for legislative oversight of the Maine Turnpike 
Authority in a number of ways: 
• Each year the Legislature votes to approve MTA’s operating budget after 
the Transportation Committee has reviewed the budget in detail and 
reported it out in a bill. 
• The Legislature sets the amount of MTA's bond cap in statute.  
• The Transportation Committee, and then the full Legislature, reviews and 
confirms the Governor's appointments to the MTA Board.  
• The Transportation Committee, and then the full Legislature, reviews and 
considers any proposed legislation pertaining to the MTA. 
The Legislature’s Joint Standing Committee on Transportation is the legislative 
entity with the most direct oversight of the Maine Turnpike Authority.  The 
Committee has the opportunity, during Committee meetings, to ask questions of 
MTA’s management about any of the Authority’s significant decisions, such as 
decisions affecting timelines for capital projects, plans for adjustments to tolls, or 
plans to issue new bonds. 
The Legislature oversees 
MTA by approving the 
agency’s operating budget, 
setting its bond cap, 
confirming gubernatorial 
appointments to the Board 
and considering any 
proposed legislation 
affecting MTA. The Joint 
Standing Committee on 
Transportation is the 
legislative entity with the 
most direct oversight of 
MTA. 
The Transportation Committee assigns a subcommittee of its members to review 
and scrutinize the detail of MTA’s operating budget before it goes to the full 
Committee for consideration.  OPEGA reviewed the materials MTA provides as 
part of the operating budget review process and noted that they contain substantial 
detail on MTA’s budgeted and actual expenses.  However, we also found that the 
operating budget submitted for review, and ultimately legislative approval, does not 
include all of MTA’s operating expenses. (See Recommendation 5.) 
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MTA is also subject to review by the Legislature under the Government Evaluation 
Act (GEA) as required by 3 MRSA §§951– 963.  The Authority’s last GEA review 
was conducted by the Transportation Committee in 2005.  As part of this process, 
MTA is required to submit a report containing a variety of information about its 
activities, finances and performance.  OPEGA observed that MTA’s 2005 GEA 
report was very well done and included all the information required by the GEA 
statute.  
The Maine Department of Transportation 
The Maine Department of Transportation has an interesting and unique oversight 
role with respect to MTA.  Statute dictates MaineDOT’s commissioner is an ex-
officio member on the Board.  The Commissioner may appoint a designee, and 
currently the Deputy Commissioner fills this role.  As a full member of the MTA 
Board, MaineDOT, through its Deputy Commissioner, has a say in all of the 
Authority’s most significant long term planning, financial management, and capital 
projects.  MaineDOT’s Deputy Commissioner is also currently a member of the 
Board's Long Term Planning Subcommittee. 
MaineDOT must approve 
all MTA construction 
contracts. In addition, the 
MaineDOT Commissioner, 
or his designee, is a full 
member of the MTA Board 
and, therefore, a full 
participant in all Board 
oversight activities. 
In addition to a seat on MTA’s Board, statute also gives MaineDOT approval 
authority over some specific MTA contracts.  Title 23 §1966.2 requires the 
MaineDOT to approve all contracts and agreements relating to the construction or 
reconstruction of the Turnpike, and the construction or reconstruction of 
connecting tunnels and bridges, overpasses, underpasses, interchanges and toll 
facilities.  According to MTA, the Authority generally expects MaineDOT to 
question whether the applicable project uses MaineDOT specifications, is within 
projected budget and has been part of the regular planning process.  
The Trustee 
There are three primary parties involved in the Maine Turnpike Authority’s bond 
instruments: 
• the grantor – MTA; 
• the beneficiaries – bond holders; 
• the trustee – currently Bangor Savings Bank.   
Bangor Savings Bank has been the corporate trustee for MTA revenue bonds since 
August 2006.  This is an administrative function carried out by the Fiduciary 
Department of the bank.  The representatives of Bangor Savings Bank that 
OPEGA spoke with explained that the specifics of the Bank’s role as Trustee are 
governed by MTA’s Bond Resolution, and where not defined in the Resolution, by 
general fiduciary laws.  The Trustee’s tasks include acting as the conduit for any 
information that needs to be disseminated to the public and making principale and 
interest payments to the bondholders in accordance with due dates.  They are also 
involved in the creation of new bonds and redemption or call of existing bonds. 
As MTA’s Bond Trustee, 
Bangor Savings Bank is 
responsible for 
communicating pertinent 
information to 
bondholders, and ensuring 
MTA’s accounts are 
adequately funded to 
cover all principal and 
interest payments to 
bondholders. 
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The Trustee's primary focus is whether the principal and interest payments on the 
Bonds are paid on time.  MTA is required to fund the accounts from which these 
payments are made on the 15th of each month.  Interest payments are made on 
January 1st and July 1st of each year.  The annual principal payment is made on July 
1 of each year.  The Trustee monitors the appropriate accounts to be sure they are 
funded adequately and then makes the payments to the Depository Trust Company 
which disburses the funds to each bondholder.   
In addition, the Trustee releases funds to cover MTA’s capital and operating 
expenses after receiving certification from MTA of the need for the funds.  MTA 
can not access their funds without the Trustee’s release.  The Trustee does not 
generally question the appropriateness of the expenditures before releasing the 
funds.  Instead it relies on a formal certification by MTA’s management as adequate 
evidence that the funds are needed for budgeted expenditures.   
The Trustee receives certain information and reports from MTA as required by the 
Bond Resolution, including financial statements and a copy of the Consulting 
Engineer’s annual report.  The Trustee does not generally interact with other 
entities involved with MTA or get involved in the MTA’s operations or how the 
Authority is spending its funds.  However, the Trustee is expected to interject as 
needed to protect bondholders, including bringing suit if necessary. 
The Consulting Engineer 
Sections 805 and 806 of MTA’s Bond Resolution describe the requirements and 
duties of the Consulting Engineer.  The MTA must employ an independent 
engineer or engineering firm or corporation having a nationwide and favorable 
reputation for skill and experience in such work as its CE.  The CE, in turn, must 
make an inspection at least once a year of the Turnpike and submit a report of 
findings to the Trustee and the Authority by October first of each year.  This 
report must include the CE’s: 
MTA’s Consulting Engineer 
must assess the turnpike 
annually and report on the 
road’s condition and 
required maintenance.  
The CE must also 
recommend the amount of 
insurance MTA needs to 
carry and the amount that 
MTA must deposit in the 
Reserve Maintenance 
Account each year. 
a) findings as to whether the Turnpike has been maintained in good repair, 
working order and condition; 
b) advice and recommendations as to the proper maintenance, repair and 
operation of the Turnpike during the next fiscal year and an estimate of the 
amount of money necessary for such purposes; 
c) advice and recommendations as to the insurance to be carried under the 
provisions of Section 807 of the Bond Resolution; and  
d) recommendations as to the amount that should be deposited during the 
next fiscal year to the Reserve Maintenance Fund. 
Office of Program Evaluation & Government Accountability                                                                                                        page  34      
The Maine Turnpike Authority 
MTA has contracted with Howard, Needles, Tammen & Bergendoff (HNTB) as its 
CE since the 1940’s and has never worked with any other CE.  HNTB also serves 
as the MTA’s general engineering services firm.  The current arrangement provides 
benefits with regard to efficiency and depth of knowledge of MTA’s system.  MTA 
also explained that the long term relationship is seen as a strength by bond rating 
agencies.  We believe, however, that the nature of the relationship between HNTB 
and MTA has potential to impact HNTB’s independence, and thus effectiveness, in 
fulfilling the Consulting Engineer’s role representing bondholders’ interests.  (See 
Recommendation 2.) 
Since the 1940’s, HNTB 
has been the MTA’s 
Consulting Engineer. This 
long term relationship has 
benefits, but presents 
some risks as HNTB has 
also been MTA’s primary 
contractor for project 
management and 
engineering. 
Comparing MTA’s Legislative Oversight to Other States’ 
OPEGA selected four tolling authorities from other states to compare their 
legislative oversight with MTA’s.  These four were selected because they are most 
comparable to MTA in type of asset and region, and MTA agreed they were the 
best comparables. They are the New York Thruway Authority, the New Jersey 
Turnpike Authority, the New Hampshire Turnpike Bureau and the Pennsylvania 
Turnpike Commission.  The New Hampshire Turnpike Bureau is part of New 
Hampshire’s Department of Transportation (NHDOT).  The other three tolling 
authorities are independent like MTA. 
OPEGA reviewed the sections of statute from each state pertaining to governance 
and legislative oversight of the tolling authority.  We noted that MTA has similar 
legislative oversight to three of the four other state turnpikes although it is the only 
independent tolling authority we reviewed that has its operating budget approved 
by the Legislature.  Our comparison is summarized in Table 8. 
Table 8. Comparison of Legislative Oversight in Five Northeastern States 
 
  Maine Turnpike Authority 
New Hampshire 
Turnpike Bureau 
New Jersey Pennsylvania New York Turnpike Turnpike Thruway Authority Authority Commission 
BUDGET X X*       
CAPITAL PLANNING   X*       
TOLL CHANGES   X       
BOND ISSUANCE OR 
BOND CAPS X**  X   X  X** 
REVIEW GOVERNOR 
APPOINTMENTS TO 
AUTHORITY 
X N/A X X X 
*Since New Hampshire's Turnpike is part of NHDOT, the Legislature implicitly approves toll rates and bond 
issuances when approving the NHDOT budget and capital plan. 
**These states had bond caps but no legislative involvement in bond issuance. 
Source: State statutes as compiled by the Law and Legislative Reference Library. 
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Similar to Maine’s, each of the other authorities, with the exception of New 
Hampshire, has an independent board whose members are appointed by the 
Governor with the advice and consent of at least one branch of the legislature.  
There is also usually a close relationship between the Commissioner of 
Transportation for the state and the authority board with commissioners or their 
designee's serving on the board as is the case in Maine.  In addition, most states, 
except New Jersey, had their turnpike authority bond caps set by the legislature in 
statute.  Some legislatures had adopted statutory language requiring their turnpike 
authorities to competitively bid contracts for construction projects.  MTA is subject 
to similar requirements by virtue of the fact that MaineDOT must approve 
construction contracts.   
OPEGA compared the MTA 
to four other tolling 
entities and found their 
oversight was generally 
comparable. However, of 
the four, MTA is the only 
independent Authority with 
its operating budget 
subject to legislative 
approval. 
MTA’s Expenditures   ―――――――――――――――――――――――――――― 
Expectations for Use of Toll Revenue 
Title 23 §1974 limits the uses of toll revenues, and all other revenues derived from 
Turnpike operations, to the following purposes: 
A. Maintenance, repair and operation of the Turnpike and the establishment of 
related reserves required or permitted by the resolutions authorizing the 
issuance of bonds or by the trust indentures relating to those bonds. 
B. Payment of the cost of any debt incurred by the Authority, including, but not 
limited to, interest and principal payments on issued bonds and payments into 
any required sinking funds.   
C. Construction or reconstruction to improve the Turnpike to meet greater 
traffic demands or improve safety of operation, including related necessary 
and authorized reserves.  Title 23 §1974 defines the allowable uses for MTA’s 
revenues. The uses 
specified in statute are 
consistent with those in 
the Bond Resolution. 
D. Maintenance, construction or reconstruction of access roads and interchanges, 
or portions thereof. 
E. Payments to reserve or sinking funds established to meet anticipated future 
costs of constructing or reconstructing designated interchanges or portions 
thereof, or to accomplish other designated purposes for which the Authority 
is authorized to issue bonds.  
F. Repayment to the federal government for grants or loans that were used in 
connection with the construction or reconstruction of any portion of the 
Turnpike or of any interconnecting access roads, but only to the extent that 
the repayment is required in order for the Authority to maintain or establish 
tolls on the Turnpike.  
G. Payment or repayment to the federal government or any agency of the federal 
government of any charges, taxes or other payments required by law in 
connection with the construction, reconstruction or operation of the Turnpike 
or the financing or refinancing of the Turnpike or any part of the Turnpike. 
These uses are consistent with the uses allowed in the Bond Resolution for the 
various accounts established by the Resolution – described on pages 20 and 21 - 
that receive monies from toll and other operating revenue.   
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What MTA Spends Its Toll Revenue On 
MTA uses its toll revenue for three general purposes: 
• operating expenses, including routine maintenance; 
• principal and interest payments for issued bonds, and required reserves; and 
• repair, reconstruction or construction projects for maintenance and capital 
improvement. 
Table 9 gives the revenue dollars spent in each category for 2005 – 2009.  
Table 9. Uses of MTA Toll Revenue 2005 – 2009 (in thousands, rounded to nearest thousand) 
Category 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Revenue $  84,068 $  86,819 $  87,804 $  85,821 $ 105,707 
      
Operating Expenses $  32,460 $  35,989 $  37,466 $  37,794 $   38,110 
Principal, Interest & Reserves for Debt $  22,232 $  23,862 $  26,516 $  28,566 $   29,277 
Construction & Reconstruction Projects $  20,899 $  26,928 $  25,639 $  27,383 $   23,507 
    Total Uses  $  75,670 $  86,778 $  89,621 $  93,742 $   90,894 
Source: MTA’s Source and Application Fund Report provided annually to MaineDOT 
Roughly 28% of MTA’s toll revenue was spent on construction and reconstruction 
projects in the period 2005 - 2009.  MTA strives to repave the entire 109 miles of 
the Turnpike every 12-15 years, so paving projects are ongoing nearly every paving 
season.  In addition, MTA is responsible for the maintenance and repair of 
approximately 175 
bridges and overpasses, 
50 of which will need 
rehabilitation within the 
next 10 years.  While 
bond proceeds are used 
for capital projects, 
MTA tries to cover a 
substantial portion of 
the costs of those 
projects using toll 
revenue.   
Roughly 28% of MTA’s toll 
revenue was spent on 
construction and 
reconstruction in the 
period 2005 - 2009. 
Another 40% was spent on 
operating expenses. 
Operating expenses 
include salaries, wages and benefits, employee training and recognition, 
maintenance supplies, the State Police Troop G budget, utilities, and other typical 
day to day expenses.  This category also includes routine maintenance on the 
Turnpike, i.e. plowing, sanding and mowing.  MTA spent about 40% of toll 
revenue on operating expenses for the period 2005 - 2009.  Both the operating 
expenses and construction project categories may also include unplanned 
expenditures, such as repair of damage to an overpass or bridge struck by a vehicle.  
Public information on MTA’s finances can be found: 
• in MTA’s Annual Reports which contain the annual 
independent auditor’s report and MTA’s financial 
statements (available on MTA’s website), 
• in MTA’s 2005 Government Evaluation Act Report 
(available in the Maine State Law and Legislative 
Reference Library);  
• on various bond information websites, including DAC 
Bond and EMMA (Electronic Municipal Market 
Access); and 
• in documents submitted to the Legislature’s Joint 
Standing Committee on Transportation. 
 
MTA often discusses its use of toll and other operating revenues in terms of the 
funds and accounts from which it funds those expenditures.  As described on page 
20, those funds and accounts are established by the Bond Resolution and are 
arranged in a “bucket” system that serves to prioritize the use of MTA’s revenues.  
Figure 3 illustrates how revenue flows through those accounts in order of priority 
and what use categories each account typically funds. 
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 Figure 3.  Uses of MTA’s Operating Revenue and the Bond Resolution Accounts  
Principal and Interest 
Payments on Revenue Bonds  
Required Reserves for Debt – 
Revenue Bonds 
 
Repair, Reconstruction and 
Construction Projects 
Emergencies and Contingencies 
(i.e. unexpected, unbudgeted 
expenses) 
Revenue Fund
Debt Service Fund
Debt Service Reserve Fund 
Reserve Maintenance Fund 
General Reserve Fund
Subordinated Debt Service Fund 
Subordinated Debt Service 
Reserve Fund 
MaineDOT Provision Account 
Interchange Account (2)
Improvement Account (1) 
Capital Fund
Bond 
Proceeds
Revenue Uses
Legend 
Solid arrows – represent what MTA typically uses each fund for..
Dashed arrows – represent other uses for that fund allowed by the Bond
Resolution if certain situat ions and/or condit ions exist.  
(1) Improvement Account can be used to f ill shortfalls in higher accounts. 
To do this it must be transferred to the Revenue Fund and then flow 
into the account with the shortfall. 
(2) Projects funded by the Interchange Account are done in coordination
with MaineDOT.
Funds Established
Under Current MTA  
Bond Resolution  
Operating Expenses including 
Routine Maintenance (e.g. 
plowing, sanding,  mowing) 
Any Other Lawful Purpose 
Subordinated Bonds 
(Spec ial Obligation Bonds for 
MaineDOT) 
Required Reserves for Debt 
- Subordinated Bonds 
 
Toll and 
Concession 
Revenue 
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Analysis of MTA’s Operating Expenses 
From an accounting perspective, an organization’s operating expenses are typically 
those expenses necessary for the normal day-to-day running of a business or 
income-producing property.  MTA’s Bond 
Resolution similarly defines operating 
expenses as “the Authority's reasonable and 
necessary current expenses of maintenance, repair 
and operation of the Turnpike…” .  It further 
specifies that operating expenses shall 
include, without limitation, the following 
expenses, to the extent they are “properly and 
directly attributable to the operation of the 
Turnpike, …”: 
Typical operating expenses for an 
organization include:  
• salaries, wages and benefits 
• rent  
• equipment and fixtures 
• maintenance and repairs, such 
as snow and trash removal, 
janitorial service, pest control, 
and lawn care 
• marketing and advertising 
• office expenses • all ordinary and usual expenses of 
maintenance, repair and operation, 
which may include expenses not 
annually recurring; 
• supplies 
• taxes and legal fees 
• telephone and utilities 
• insurance 
• travel and vehicle expenses • premiums for insurance; • professional services, such as 
accountants, attorneys, and 
payroll providers 
• all administrative and engineering 
expenses relating to maintenance, 
repair and operation of the 
Turnpike; and 
• all fees and expenses required to be paid by the Authority under the 
provisions of the Resolution or by law.  
Operating expenses, according to the Resolution’s definition, shall not include any 
reserves for extraordinary maintenance or repair, any costs or expenses for new 
construction, any allowance for depreciation, or any deposits or transfers to the 
credit of the other accounts established under the Bond Resolution, including the 
Reserve Maintenance Fund. 
OPEGA analyzed 
expenditures coded to 
MTA’s various operating 
expense accounts in 2005 
- 2009.  In addition to 
operating expenses, these 
expenditures include the 
costs of construction 
projects paid for with 
revenue.  The 
expenditures we analyzed 
averaged $61 million 
annually and 72.8% were 
for salaries, benefits and 
contractual services. 
OPEGA analyzed expenditures coded to MTA’s operating expense accounts for 
2005 – 2009.  These expenditures averaged about $61.2 million annually and 
included both operating expenses and construction project uses shown in Table 9.  
Appendix D contains detail by expense category for each year. 
Table 10 shows the 30 expense categories that contain approximately 97% of 
MTA’s operating expenses for the period 2005 - 20099.  Approximately 73% of 
those expenditures have been for salaries, employee benefits and contractual 
services.  Of the 30 expense categories, 18 had overall increases or decreases of 
25% or more from 2005 to 2009.  
                                                     
9 The expenses categories are assigned by MTA staff under MTA’s current detailed account 
structure as part of the accounting process.  OPEGA has combined some similar expense 
categories for the purposes of our analysis. 
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Table 10.  MTA Expense Categories Comprising 97% of Total Operating Expenses for Period 2005 - 2009 
Expense Category 
Total $ 
2005 - 2009 
% of 5 yr 
Total 
  
  
2005 
$ Spent 
2009 
$ Spent 
% Change 
over 5 yrs 
Salaries $104,832,997  34.2%   $19,212,872  $22,493,744  17.1% 
Contractual Services $75,943,643  24.8%   $11,375,641  $13,370,412  17.5% 
Employee Benefits  $42,263,438  13.8%   $7,333,513  $9,973,406  36.0% 
Consulting Engineering Fees & Exp. $14,772,341  4.8%   $3,048,915  $2,319,622  -23.9% 
Work Performed By Others $13,924,373  4.5%   $3,282,610  $2,079,445  -36.7% 
Telephone $4,521,762  1.5%   $942,052  $710,840  -24.5% 
Salt & Calcium Chloride $4,040,111  1.3%   $853,818  $486,266  -43.0% 
Comprehensive Gen. Liability $3,316,909  1.1%   $892,095  $471,802  -47.1% 
Workers Compensation  $3,294,873  1.1%   $309,449  $986,615  218.8% 
Electricity $2,965,070  1.0%   $493,238  $598,190  21.3% 
Reg. & Spec. Counsel Fees & Exp. $2,585,408  0.8%   $319,243  $455,926  42.8% 
Office Machines & Equip. Pur/Rent $2,377,744  0.8%   $344,103  $496,514  44.3% 
Fuel For Heating  $1,997,305  0.7%   $340,333  $519,106  52.5% 
Snowplowing Equipment $1,668,897  0.5%   $524,282  $255,750  -51.2% 
Money Transport Services $1,593,876  0.5%   $302,455  $334,223  10.5% 
Diesel Oil Equipment Maintenance $1,586,882  0.5%   $292,155  $256,166  -12.3% 
Trustee's Fees $1,542,919  0.5%   $190,082  $352,459  85.4% 
Truck Purchases $1,500,397  0.5%   $433,049  $23,150  -94.7% 
Gas Equipment Maintenance $1,348,595  0.4%   $224,361  $218,477  -2.6% 
Postage & Shipping $1,183,636  0.4%   $225,706  $317,241  40.6% 
Travel & Subsistence $1,104,402  0.4%   $411,847  $132,441  -67.8% 
Printing $1,093,359  0.4%   $253,355  $249,424  -1.6% 
Acct. Mach Supplies & Maintenance $1,049,545  0.3%   $319,686  $255,873  -20.0% 
Paint Products $1,011,570  0.3%   $154,636  $237,017  53.3% 
Informational Services $985,628  0.3%   $146,907  $199,331  35.7% 
Indemnification Insurance $970,198  0.3%   $61,520  $331,355  438.6% 
Rent: Land/Buildings $967,406  0.3%   $194,023  $177,636  -8.4% 
Truck Parts, Accessories & Repair $862,004  0.3%   $187,797  $197,361  5.1% 
Auto Purchases $697,457  0.2%   $41,440  $0  -100.0% 
Organization Fee $629,603  0.2%   $164,023  $102,354  -37.6% 
Source: Calculated by OPEGA from data in expense file provided by MTA.  Full analysis in Appendix D. 
Our full analysis shows that MTA’s total operating expenses have increased 
15.5% over the five year period.  Table 11 shows the percentage changes from 
year to year.  The amount of change between years is inconsistent in part 
because costs for construction 
and reconstruction projects 
vary each year depending on 
the nature and timing of 
projects.  Similarly, costs of 
Turnpike maintenance like 
plowing and sanding are 
impacted by weather 
conditions and vary annually. 
Table 11. Annual % Change in Operating Expense 
Year 
Total Operating 
Expense 
% Chg From 
Prior Year  
2005 $53,359,195.86   
2006 $62,916,662.80 17.9% 
2007 $63,104,363.39 0.3% 
2008 $65,241,802.13 3.4% 
2009 $61,616,332.14 -5.6% 
Total 5 Yr. Period $306,238,356.32   
  
The Maine Turnpike Authority 
Defining Reasonableness 
MTA defines reasonable expenditures as those that are legal, consistent with the 
MTA's mission and goals, within approved budgetary limits, and authorized for 
payment.  This definition provides fairly wide latitude for assessing the 
reasonableness of operating expenditures.   
The Legislature and the Authority’s Board play a role in determining the 
reasonableness of MTA’s operating expenses via their approval of the Authority’s 
operating budget.  In fact, both 
statute and the Bond Resolution 
require that MTA’s operating 
expenses in any year not exceed 
the approved budget.  Under 23 
MRSA §1961-6, the Authority may 
only pay operating expenses in 
accordance with allocations 
approved by the Legislature or as 
necessary to satisfy the 
requirements of any resolution 
authorizing bonds of the 
Authority.  Similarly, Section 803 
of the Bond Resolution requires 
the Authority to adopt a budget 
each year that must be filed with 
the Trustee.  It further provides that the Authority will not incur operating 
expenses that exceed what is provided for in the annual budget unless those 
expenses are paid from funds other than the Revenue Fund.  
Excerpt of 23 MRSA §1961-6 
On or before January 31st of each year, the Authority shall present to each 
regular session of the Legislature for its approval a budget for the operating 
expenses of the Authority for the calendar year that begins after the 
adjournment of that regular session…….. The Authority may only pay operating 
expenses in accordance with allocations approved by the Legislature or as 
necessary to satisfy the requirements of any resolution authorizing bonds of 
the Authority.  
 
Excerpt of Section 803(e) from MTA’s Current Bond Resolution 
The Authority covenants that the Operating Expenses incurred in any Fiscal 
Year will not exceed the reasonable and necessary amount thereof, and that it 
will not expend any amount or incur any obligations for maintenance, repair 
and operation in excess of the amounts provided for Operating Expenses in the 
Annual Budget, except as provided in Section 504 hereof and except amounts 
payable from the Reserve Maintenance Fund and the General Reserve Fund.  
The Legislature’s Transportation Committee receives detailed information related 
to the operating budget MTA submits for the Legislature’s approval.  This 
information includes budgeted versus actual expenses by expense category for 
several previous years, as well as detailed salary and wages by position.  The Board 
also receives this detailed information and likely is provided more as it is involved 
in making decisions about all of MTA’s finances.  OPEGA noted several issues, 
however, that interfere with the Legislature’s ability to have a complete picture of 
what it is costing to operate the Authority, to understand all expenses and/or judge 
their reasonableness.  See Recommendation 5. 
The Legislature receives 
detailed information about 
the operating expenses 
paid from MTA’s Revenue 
Fund. However, the budget 
the Legislature approves 
does not include expenses 
paid from the Reserve 
Maintenance Fund, which 
represent roughly 40% of 
MTA’s total annual 
operating costs. 
The primary issue is that the operating budget submitted to the Legislature for 
approval does not include all of MTA’s operating expenses.  In our analysis of 
operating expenses for 2005 – 2009, we noted that on average about 40.6% of 
MTA’s operating expenses each year have been paid for from MTA’s Reserve 
Maintenance Fund.  These expenses are not included in MTA’s operating budget.  
Table 12 and Figure 4 show the breakdown of expenses funded from the Revenue 
Fund versus the Reserve Maintenance Fund by year. 
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All of MTA’s expenses for insurance, i.e. worker’s compensation and liability, are 
paid for from the Reserve Maintenance Fund.  Other categories typically 
considered operating expenses that have been funded 50% or more from the 
Reserve Maintenance Fund in the period 2005 – 2009 include: 
MTA’s Reserve 
Maintenance Fund pays 
for 50% or more of costs 
such as insurances, safety 
equipment, travel and 
subsistence, legal counsel 
fees and printing, among 
others. 
• Truck and Auto Purchases • Postage 
• Office Machines and 
Equipment (Purchase, Rent 
and Maintenance) 
• Snowplowing Equipment 
• Printing 
• Organization Fees and Dues • Safety Equipment • Electrical Supplies • Rent • Employee Training • Informational Services • Travel and Subsistence • Legal Counsel Fees • Telephone 
 
Table 12. Operating Expenses Funded by Revenue and Reserve Maintenance Funds  
     Funded by Revenue Fund  Funded by Res Maint Fund 
Year Total Oper Exp  RF $ % of Total RMF $ % of Total 
2005 $53,359,196 $32,459,653 60.8% $20,899,542 39.2% 
2006 $62,916,663 $35,988,601 57.2% $26,928,061 42.8% 
2007 $63,104,363 $37,465,689 59.4% $25,638,675 40.6% 
2008 $65,241,802 $37,793,531 57.9% $27,448,271 42.1% 
2009 $61,616,332 $38,109,687 61.8% $23,506,645 38.2% 
Total 5 Year $306,238,356 $181,817,162 59.4% $124,421,195 40.6% 
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Figure 4. Percent of MTA’s Total Operating Expenses 2005- 2009 
Reasonableness of MTA’s Operating Expenditures 
OPEGA sought to assess the reasonableness of MTA’s operating expenses.  
MTA’s status as a quasi-State agency, with its own self-generating revenue source, 
made it challenging to find a standard for comparison.  Some expect MTA to 
behave like a State agency; others expect it to behave like a for-profit private entity.  
Whether MTA’s operating expenses are judged as reasonable, depends on what 
those expectations are.  In conducting this review, OPEGA has used what is 
typically expected of both types of organizations as comparisons. 
Office of Program Evaluation & Government Accountability                                                                                                        page  42      
The Maine Turnpike Authority 
We analyzed MTA’s operating expense transactions for 2005 – 2009 and identified 
those with the highest potential for being judged unreasonable.  We selected a 
judgmental sample of these transactions and reviewed the related 224 invoices or 
other documents used for processing payment of these expenses. Expenditures 
processed on those documents totaled $1,008,609 – representing 0.3% of MTA’s 
total operating expenses over the five-year period.  We sought explanation for 
MTA’s purpose in incurring the expenses and tested for proper approvals, adequate 
supporting document and accurate account coding.   
OPEGA reviewed 224 MTA 
invoices from 2005 – 
2009 totaling about $1 
million in expenses. Some 
of the expenditures 
reviewed could potentially 
be questioned on the 
basis of their nature or 
magnitude. 
MTA’s expenditures are generally consistent with the culture of a regulated private 
entity that is financially sound, values quality, desires to stay current, believes in 
being a good corporate citizen, recognizes its employees and assertively promotes 
its own best interests.  From this perspective, MTA’s expenditures could be judged 
as reasonable.  In fact, the Authority’s consistent pursuit of technologies to 
improve efficiencies and customer service, and its investments in higher quality 
equipment and assets that have a longer useful life, would likely be seen as sound 
business strategies. 
However, a number of the expenditures we reviewed – by virtue of their nature or 
magnitude – might be questioned as to their reasonableness, appropriateness or 
necessity when judged against the expectations for fiscal restraint and adherence to 
mission typically applied to governmental entities.  The categories that most of 
these expenditures fell into are described below. 
Operating Expenditures that Might Be Questioned The expenses OPEGA 
identified that might be 
questioned were in five 
categories: Employee 
Recognition, Sponsorships 
and Donations, Lobbying, 
Travel and Meals, and 
Support of Other State 
Efforts. All expenses in 
these groupings totaled 
$2.3 million over a 5 year 
period. 
Certain expenditures contained within the five categories we identified as possibly 
questionable would likely be recognized as reasonable and appropriate regardless of 
one’s perspective.  Other expenditures within each category, however, could be 
questioned and OPEGA examined many of these in detail. 
The five year total of expenditures identified by OPEGA in all of the following 
categories is $2,265,773.53.  Some of these categories correspond directly with 
established MTA expense account codes. We included all expenses coded to that 
category in this total, though we did not review them all in detail.  Other categories 
described below are groupings of expenses determined by OPEGA as a result of 
our detailed expenditure review.  
The five year total calculates to an average annual expense of $453,154, 
representing only 0.74% of MTA’s average annual operating expenses.  Roughly 
70% of the five year total expenditures ($1,591,295) were budgeted and expensed 
within perennial projects funded by the Reserve Maintenance Fund and not 
approved by the Legislature. 
From 2005 to 2009, MTA 
spent $257,780 on 
employee recognition 
including service awards, 
banquets and cookouts, 
safety awards, holiday 
turkeys and items sent to 
staff members serving in 
the military overseas. 
Employee Recognition.  In the five year period under review, MTA coded 
$222,159 to expense categories for employee recognition events and items.  
OPEGA identified an additional $35,620 that had been charged to other account 
codes bringing total 2005 - 2009 expenses identified in this category to about 
$257,780.  Employee recognition expenditures included length of service awards 
and gifts, annual employee banquets or cookouts, safety awards and gifts, annual 
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gift certificates for turkeys at Thanksgiving and items sent to MTA employees 
serving overseas in the military.   
Sponsorships and Donations.  OPEGA identified $297,238 in expenses for 
sponsorships or donations to charitable and non-charitable non-profit 
organizations that were coded to several different expense categories.  According to 
MTA, donations in 2005 – 2007 were also made in the form of gift certificates.  
OPEGA identified over $157,000 in gift certificate purchases made in 2005 and 
2006 from various hotel chains and restaurants that were coded to the Travel and 
Subsistence expense category.  MTA reports that the gift certificates were donated 
to a variety of organizations, although no formal records of the donations exist.  In 
all, OPEGA identified $454,238 sponsorships or donations made to 50 different 
organizations. Some organizations received contributions on an annual basis. 
MTA spent $454,238 over 
five years on sponsorships 
or donations to at least 50 
different non-profit 
organizations. $157,000 
of this total was for gift 
certificates purchased in 
2005 and 2006 from 
various hotel chains and 
restaurants then donated 
to other organizations.  
MTA is a member of some of the recipient organizations and, consequently also 
provides support through membership dues or other payments.  We noted that 
sponsorships or donations also went to non-charitable organizations that did not 
appear to have a direct tie to MTA’s mission.  This may be because MTA’s top 
management sits on the boards or councils of some of the organizations, or could 
be indicative of an expansion of MTA’s mission. (See Recommendation 6.) 
Lobbying.  OPEGA identified $577,237 in 2005 – 2009 expenses that primarily 
appear to be for lobbying services.  MTA has an internal government relations 
function, which was supplemented at various points with services from a former 
MTA employee, an independent government relations consulting firm (Maine 
Governmental Relations), and Preti Flaherty Beliveau and Pachios, the firm that 
provides most of MTA’s legal counsel.  
Lobbying costs totaled 
$577,237 for the MTA 
over a 5 year period, not 
including the cost of their 
internal government 
relations staff. 
Travel and Meals.  From 2005 – 2009, MTA coded $1,104,402 to the expense 
category Travel and Subsistence.  OPEGA determined that at least $157,000 of this 
was attributable to the purchase of gift certificates for donations mentioned earlier.  
A substantial portion of the remaining $947,402 can be attributed to: 
• Frequent national and international travel, primarily from 2005 through 
2007, to participate in conferences and meetings of several industry 
organizations, meet with various entities involved in MTA bond issuances, 
meet with MTA’s Consulting Engineer, or visit other tolling authorities and 
observe their operations (e.g. to research open road tolling).  This travel 
was primarily on the part of MTA’s Executive Director, but occasionally 
involved other members of MTA’s management team or Board.  Often 
these trips involved stays at expensive hotels as well as expensive meals - 
some of which appeared to involve MTA paying for people other than 
MTA staff. 
Over 5 years the MTA 
coded $1.1 million as 
travel and subsistence 
expenses. These expenses 
included: frequent national 
and international travel 
(mostly before 2008); 
meals at regular 
supervisory and employee 
meetings; meals for board 
meetings and events; 
meals for management 
meetings and events; and 
workday lunch meetings.  
• Meals associated with mandatory quarterly supervisory meetings, and 
annual employee meetings, with the Executive Director to discuss MTA 
policies, procedures, organizational issues and other matters. 
• Meals associated with MTA Board meetings or gatherings at Maine-based, 
higher end restaurants.  Such meetings or gatherings typically appear to 
include one or more members of MTA’s management team.  Sometimes 
they also appear to include other guests like MTA’s consultants. 
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• Meals associated with meetings and gatherings of members of MTA’s 
management team at Maine-based restaurants or other facilities.  Frequently 
these expenses were incurred for what appear to be dinner meetings at 
expensive restaurants that occasionally included consultants or other guests.  
We also observed expenses for what appear to be work day luncheon 
meetings among two or more members of MTA’s management team.  The 
lunches were either on site at MTA facilities or at local restaurants.  While 
not overly expensive individually, these luncheon meetings seem to occur 
with some frequency, and sometimes include consultants or other invited 
guests.  
As shown previously in Table 10, MTA’s expenses in the Travel & Subsistence 
category have declined by 67.8% 
from 2005 to 2009.  There has 
been a fairly consistent 
downward trend each year since 
2005 as shown in Table 13 and 
Figure 5.  The decline appears to 
be primarily related to a 
reduction in national and 
international travel, as well as less 
frequent in-state meals.  MTA 
management explained that these 
changes in behavior were partly the result of negative public reaction to some 
expenses in 2006 and 2007 that made the Authority more aware of public 
expectations for its activities.  Some of the decline is likely also due to the fact that 
MTA discontinued the practice of purchasing gift certificates for donations that 
were being coded to the Travel & Subsistence expense category in 2005 and 2006.   
MTA’s travel and 
Table 13. Annual % Change in Travel & Subsistence subsistence expenses 
declined by 67.8% from 
2005 to 2009. This was 
primarily due to reduced 
travel and less frequent 
meals. MTA managers 
explained they made 
changes to their practices 
in response to negative 
public reaction from news 
stories about some 
expenses in 2006 and 
2007.  
Total T&S % Chg From 
Year 
Figure 5. Travel & Subsistance Expense 2005 - 2009
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MTA’s written policy on travel and meal reimbursements has been in place since at 
least 2004 and had some minor updates in 2006.  This policy is comprehensive and 
should serve to limit travel and meal expenses to only those that are reasonable and 
necessary for the conduct of MTA’s business.  However, we noted several issues 
with travel and meal expenses, including non-compliance with certain aspects of 
the policy, that indicate it has not been effectively implemented, particularly among 
MTA’s top management.  (See Recommendation 7.) 
Expense Prior Year  
2005 $411,847   
2006 $215,683 -47.6% 
2007 $169,985 -21.2% 
2008 $174,446 2.6% 
2009 $132,441 -24.1% 
Total 5 Yr. Period $1,104,402   
-47.6% 
-21.2% 2.6% 
-24.1% 
A comprehensive travel 
and meals policy has been 
in place at the MTA since 
2004, but was not 
effectively implemented 
among management. 
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Support of Other State Efforts.  MTA has also incurred expenses for purposes 
that seem more closely related to supporting general economic development, or 
other State efforts, than to its own core mission.  OPEGA identified miscellaneous 
expenditures, totaling $29,116 over the five years, that fell in this category.  These 
include: 
From 2005 to 2009, the 
MTA spent $29,116 on 
support of other state 
efforts. These costs 
stemmed from requests 
made to MTA by various 
individuals within State 
government, but were not 
always clearly linked to the 
MTA’s mission. 
• the purchase and distribution of tourism-related giveaways, e.g. lighthouse-
shaped cookie cutters; 
• travel costs for MTA’s Board chairman to participate in international trade 
missions; and 
• sponsorship to cover costs for the Legislature’s Clerk of the House to 
attend a national training conference. 
MTA management indicated that some of these expenses were incurred as a result 
of requests from various individuals within State government.  While such 
expenditures are immaterial in relation to MTA’s total operating expenditures, they 
are indicative of a possible expansion of MTA’s mission that is being driven either 
by the State, MTA’s perception of its role, or both.  Such expenses also represent a 
use of toll revenue that some may not expect based on the language in MTA’s 
statute and the Bond Resolution.  
Benchmarking Against Other Tolling Authorities     ――――――――――― 
MTA’s Performance Compared to Other States’ 
OPEGA intended to answer questions about the MTA’s performance by 
comparing performance data for the Turnpike Authority and a number of its peers 
in other states.  In our attempt to complete that comparison we encountered more 
than the usual number of data collection issues, including difficulty finding truly 
comparable entities, available data that was self-reported and not reported similarly 
from one entity to the next, and in the end, entities in other states that mostly 
refused to comply with our requests for specific and up-to-date performance data.  OPEGA intended to compare MTA’s 
performance data to that 
of its peers, but 
encountered difficulty 
obtaining reliable data for 
the other tolling entities.  
We were unable to 
complete this analysis 
despite our best efforts. 
The MTA and the NH Turnpike Bureau were the only ones to provide data in a 
useable form as requested.  Limited additional data on other states was gathered 
from publicly available sources, but it was not from the same time period, and had 
very apparent issues with inconsistent reporting of critical information such as 
administrative costs and number of employees assigned to admin versus traffic 
enforcement versus road maintenance.   
In the end, there was too little available data for meaningful analysis.  Even a 
comparison of MTA to NH Turnpike Bureau was complicated by uncertainty as to 
the comparability of certain reported financial data, like administrative costs, given 
that the NH Turnpike Bureau is incorporated within NH’s Department of 
Transportation.  We concluded that drawing comparisons between tolling entities is 
a challenging task since the tolling authorities are independent entities with widely 
varying asset types and organizational structures.  They also appear generally 
uninterested in being compared to others, and therefore unmotivated to make their 
performance data available in a uniform format that facilitates such comparisons. 
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However, in the course of our work on this question we identified a number of key 
performance indicators that could prove useful in tracking MTA’s performance if 
MTA, in conjunction with its oversight bodies, was to set goals and measureable 
objectives for each and consistently report how its actual performance compared to 
the goals and objectives year to year.  Having such a performance measurement 
system would help MTA management, and its overseers, identify areas where the 
Turnpike Authority is meeting or exceeding its goals, and areas where it may be 
falling short and could reconsider its strategies or the allocation of resources.  In 
addition, the act of working with its oversight bodies to determine the goals for 
each performance measure could be a useful activity to galvanize all involved 
parties around a set of clear, specific goals for what a high performing MTA would 
look like. 
As part of the performance 
comparison effort, OPEGA 
identified a number of key 
performance indicators 
that could prove useful in 
tracking MTA’s 
performance over time. 
Meaningful goals and objectives should focus on the activities that are most critical 
to achievement of MTA’s mission.  Ideally, they should also represent the following 
performance categories as appropriate for the activity:  
• effectiveness – whether the desired outcome is being achieved; 
• efficiency – how the inputs used compare to outputs produced; 
• timeliness – whether the outputs are produced at the appropriate time 
without requiring excessive waiting on the part of customers; 
• quality – whether the outputs are as expected and meet customer 
expectations; and  
• economy – how well the costs associated with the activities are being 
contained and controlled. 
In the case of MTA, it may make sense to choose measures for both the 
maintenance of the Turnpike and the organization’s customer service operations.  
MTA appears to already have some financial and performance objectives and is 
collecting or tracking some types of data that could be utilized in a more formalized 
performance measurement effort.  That effort, however, would still require MTA 
to clearly define what performance measures are most useful, what processes will 
be used to assure the data is consistently and accurately captured.  
Table 14 includes several of the performance measures OPEGA identified, along 
with the type of data that would be needed for each measure, where that data 
should be available, and what elements of performance each measure would assess.  
These are by no means the only performance measures that could be used, and are 
perhaps not the best ones, but they are offered as examples should the MTA and 
its oversight entities choose to begin using the performance measurement approach 
outlined above. 
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Table 14. Examples of Potential Performance Measures for the Maine Turnpike Authority 
Performance Purpose Data Required Source for Data 
Measure 
Total costs, 
Administrative costs 
MTA’s 
accounting 
system 
Administrative Costs 
as a % of Total Costs 
To assess how much 
administrative costs are 
driving MTA’s budget 
MTA’s 
accounting 
system and in-
house statistics 
Maintenance costs, 
Number of lane 
miles 
Maintenance Costs 
Per Lane Mile 
To assess the annual cost 
of maintenance per lane 
mile of MTA roadway 
Condition of each 
bridge as rated 
during the current 
year 
MTA’s in-house 
engineers, 
contracted 
engineers, or 
the CE report 
Average Bridge 
Condition 
To assess the overall 
condition of the 
Authority’s bridges and 
whether the bridge assets 
are being maintained 
adequately 
Statistics 
maintained by 
MTA and/or the 
State’s Highway 
Safety Division 
Number of fatalities 
per year,  Number of 
road miles operated 
by the MTA 
Number of Fatalities 
Per 100 miles 
To assess safety of the 
Turnpike in terms of 
quality of the policing 
function and adequacy of 
response to accidents 
Consistency in calculating the measures from one year to the next is critical to the 
usefulness of performance measures such as these.  If administrative costs are 
calculated to include items such as meetings with employees and provision of 
employee recognition in one year, but those items are included in maintenance the 
next year, the data will not be comparable over time and will be useless for spotting 
trends.  For this reason, it is important to assure a specific calculation method is 
pre-defined and consistently applied for each performance measure. 
In any performance 
measurement system, it is 
critical to consistently 
calculate the data from 
year to year in order to 
facilitate trending and 
comparisons. 
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Recommendations ―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――
Expectations for Cash Transfers to MaineDOT Should be Clarified  
1 
Title 23 §1961(6) states that MTA must transfer its operating surplus to the 
Department of Transportation each year.  Operating surplus is defined in 23 
MRSA §1964(6-A) as total annual operating revenues, “after money has been put aside to 
pay the reasonable operating expenses, to pay or to reserve for capital expenditures and to meet the 
requirements of any resolution authorizing bonds of the Maine Turnpike Authority…”. 
These statutory provisions were established as the result of a referendum that 
passed in November 1991.  Prior to that time, cash transfers from MTA to 
MaineDOT were made based on an amount set in statute.  Statutory provisions 
requiring transfers from MTA began in 1981 when the Legislature took action to 
continue the Authority as a separate entity, regardless of whether or not there were 
still outstanding revenue bonds to be paid.  Statute was amended to adjust the 
maximum amount of transfers several times throughout the 1980’s and early 1990’s 
with the amount ranging from $4.7 million to $17.4 million annually. 
Even after the requirement for a specified dollar amount was replaced with the 
requirement to transfer “operating surplus” in 1991, MTA continued to make 
annual cash transfers to MaineDOT in amounts ranging from $4.7 million to $8.7 
million.  These transfers continued until MTA began paying on the special 
obligation bonds issued on behalf of MaineDOT in 1996.  Initial annual payments 
on those bonds were approximately $4.7 million. 
No transfers of operating surplus have been made to MaineDOT since 1997, even 
though annual payments on the special obligation bonds were reduced by about 
10half through re-financings in 1998 and 2008 .  MTA maintains that it has had no 
surplus according to the statutory definition.  OPEGA’s review of MTA’s finances 
finds MTA’s conclusion supportable given the current definition of operating 
surplus which lacks specificity as to: 
• the point is time when the surplus is supposed to be calculated 
• whether it should be figured based on budgeted figures or actual revenues and 
expenditures; and 
• whether it is meant to capture only current year expenditures or also projected 
future expenditures.   
The Legislature and MaineDOT appear to have accepted MTA’s explanation as 
they have not required any transfers.  There is also some indication that at least 
MaineDOT, and perhaps the Legislature’s Transportation Committee, no longer 
expected any transfers once MTA began paying on the bonds for MaineDOT.  
                                                     
 These special obligation bonds will be paid off in 2018. 10
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There is, however, no clear public record to clarify what the expectation might have 
been and statute has not changed.  
The statutory requirements for cash transfers since 1981, and the past history of 
MTA making transfers even after the 1991 language change, raises an expectation 
that there is a surplus to be transferred.  It is our observation, however, that any 
future cash transfers of surplus under the current definition are unlikely.   
Recommended Legislative Action:   
We believe that clarifying the Legislature’s current expectations regarding cash 
transfers from MTA to MaineDOT would be beneficial to both the Legislature and 
MTA.  If the Legislature no longer finds transfers to be necessary or appropriate, it 
could consider removing the statutory requirement for the transfer of operating 
surplus.  If the intent is for MTA to make additional cash contributions beyond 
what it already pays toward cooperative projects and payment on existing bonds for 
MaineDOT, then the Legislature should consider either: 
• amending the definition of operating surplus to include more specificity about 
when and how the surplus is to be calculated, particularly in regard to the terms 
“pay or reserve for” and “set aside”; or 
• replacing “operating surplus” with a specific dollar amount to be transferred.   
As discussed on page 15, requiring a transfer of a specific dollar amount would 
have implications for MTA’s financial situation and potentially its bond rating.  It is 
likely that MTA would make other adjustments to compensate for transferred 
revenues after analyzing its options and their impacts.  The Legislature should seek 
to understand those possible consequences when considering potential actions. 
MTA’s Relationship with its Contracted Engineering Firm Needs 
to be Redefined 
MTA has had a long-term and exclusive (sole source) relationship with its current 
engineering services contractor, HNTB.  Over the years this firm has served both 
in the capacity of Consulting Engineer, required by the Bond Resolution, and as 
MTA's general engineering services firm for construction and maintenance 
projects.  As a result, HNTB's VP and Principal Engineer assigned to MTA has 
effectively become part of MTA's management team.  MTA appears to view and 
use HNTB as an extension of its own Engineering Department.  
The current relationship provides benefits in efficiency and depth of knowledge of 
MTA’s system.  However, the sole sourced dual roles and the degree to which 
HNTB staff are integrated into MTA’s planning processes and decisions also 
present the following risks: 
• As Consulting Engineer, HNTB is in position to have significant influence over 
determining what maintenance and improvement work needs to be done, and 
the budgeted cost of those projects, while the firm is also in the position of 
profiting from these projects as MTA’s general engineering services firm.  This 
2 
risk would exist regardless of whether it was HNTB or some other firm that 
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filled both roles.  The risk is presently increased, however, because of the 
degree to which the firm participates in MTA’s capital and maintenance 
program planning, budgeting and decision-making. 
• HNTB may not have sufficient independence from MTA to effectively fill the 
role of Consulting Engineer, and provide bondholder protection, as intended 
by the Bond Resolution. 
• MTA and MaineDOT may pay more for engineering services on those 
cooperative projects administered by MTA.  HNTB will be involved in those 
projects and rates for services under MTA’s sole source arrangement may be 
higher than those that MaineDOT would be able to secure through its 
competitive procurement process. 
Recommended Management Action:   
MTA reports that it has worked to bring more separation between MTA and 
HNTB over the years as MTA has developed its own Engineering Department.  
MTA’s Board should take steps to continue moving toward a more arm’s length 
relationship with HNTB.  Options include:  
• Splitting the two roles into separate contracts and competitively bidding one or 
both every four years using a process for contractor selection that is consistent 
with the process used in selecting consultant engineers at MaineDOT.  Each 
contract would specify scope of work, performance expectations, and cost.  
• Continuing to move some of the work typically performed by HNTB to MTA’s 
own Engineering Department.  This will likely require additional resources for 
either a) doing the actual engineering work on projects or b) managing a 
competitive bidding process for project engineering services and subsequent 
monitoring of engineering contracts and administration of the contracts.  
MTA’s Board should conduct an objective cost benefit analysis of outsourcing 
versus in-house resources before making this decision.   
MTA Should Improve Contract Management for Services 
OPEGA’s review of contract files found that contract management practices for 
construction services and purchases of goods were generally sound.  Management 
of contracts associated with services, however, has often been informal and 
inconsistent.  This increases the risk that: 
• Unnecessary services will be provided and paid for; 
• Services not meeting MTA’s expectations for quality or price will be procured;  
• Expense reimbursements to vendors will be higher than necessary; and 
• MTA will not have adequate legal remedies available to address contractor 
performance or billing issues. 
3 
Specifically we noted:  
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a) MTA does not have written policies and procedures that set forth 
expectations and responsibilities for monitoring and administering service 
contracts.   
b) Original, signed versions of contracts for professional services were not all 
filed in a centralized location.  Rather they resided in the files of the person 
responsible for the contract.  If that person was not available, MTA had 
difficulty producing the contract.  OPEGA discovered one written agreement 
between MTA and a provider of government relations services that was not 
included in the list of MTA contracts initially provided to OPEGA because it 
had been overlooked. 
c) Several situations in which MTA has procured a service from a specific 
vendor over a period of time, but the contracts have not been kept current or 
there had never been a contract formalizing the contract period, scope, 
performance expectations and agreed upon prices or rates. 
Of particular note was MTA’s administration of its engineering services contract 
with HNTB, for which MTA paid over $5.7 million in 2009.  Due to the nature of 
the relationship between the two parties, management of the contract has been 
more informal than is prudent for external contractors.   Specifically, OPEGA 
noted that: 
a) The contract has not been kept current and does not reflect current 
arrangements and expectations between MTA and HNTB. The contract was 
established in 1985 with an amendment in 1997 that increased the allowable 
rate for overhead and profit.  It references an outdated bond resolution and 
the scope of services defined in the contract for Consulting Engineer are 
related to past resolution requirements that no longer exist.  The contract also 
calls for outdated reimbursement rates for mileage, and does not reflect 
current arrangements between HNTB and MTA for reimbursement of 
expenses.  
b) There is often no formal written agreement or other documentation on the 
agreed upon scope or price of any particular work that MTA requests.  Rather, 
it is common to establish these specifics through a verbal negotiation and 
understanding between MTA’s Chief Operations Officer and HNTB.  
OPEGA notes that Article I.B of the contract does require that "Special 
Services" - which are really the project engineering services - shall be 
performed by HNTB only upon written instruction from the Authority.  
c) The information provided on HNTB invoices for billing of subsistence and 
travel expenses (including mileage reimbursement) is not detailed enough to 
allow MTA’s staff to know what those expenses are for, or to judge their 
reasonableness.  MTA does not regularly review the detailed support for these 
charges that HNTB says it maintains.  These expense reimbursements can add 
up.  OPEGA documented a total of $45,411 in subsistence and travel 
reimbursements paid on invoices for the three month period October to 
December 2008, with total reimbursable expenses on those invoices being 
$253,064.  
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Recommended Management Actions:   
A. MTA should establish formal, current written agreements for all contracts. 
They should have defined contract duration and cost, scope of services, 
expected deliverables, and specific terms and conditions, including rate 
schedules and agreements with regard to reimbursement of expenses 
B. MTA should develop a centralized filing and tracking system for all services 
contracts, like the existing construction contract file, to aid: 
• Accessing original, signed contracts; 
• Monitoring contracts for expirations or updating; and  
• Identifying situations where contracts should be established. 
C. MTA should establish and adhere to a standard process for monitoring and 
administering services contracts that includes appropriate procedures for 
assuring only needed services are provided, services provided meet 
expectations for quality, timeliness, etc. and charges for those services are in 
accordance with the contract before payment to contractors are made.  
Responsibility for these procedures should also be clearly assigned. 
D. As a best practice, MTA should also formalize its processes for managing 
both construction and other services contracts into written policy and 
procedure as a means of communicating it to all staff and assuring consistent 
adherence to the established practices.  
E. Specifically related to HNTB, MTA should assure there is a written agreement 
on scope and estimated cost of each project MTA requests HNTB services 
for.  In addition, MTA should require HNTB to provide additional detail on 
invoices that includes: 
• summary of total monthly hours and expenses by employee across all 
projects, 
• detail of individual reimbursable expenses, i.e. date incurred, what the 
expense is for, breakdown of mileage charges for HNTB vehicles.  
MTA should also periodically review HNTB’s supporting documentation for 
its invoices.  This would be most effective if conducted through a periodic 
audit conducted by MTA’s external auditors or by a MTA department not 
responsible for approving the HNTB invoices.  
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Controls Over Sole Sourcing Should be Strengthened 4 
Fifteen of MTA’s 90 active contracts that could have been competitively bid 
(16.6%) are sole source arrangements, meaning the vendor was selected without 
soliciting proposals or costs from other vendors.  Two of these contracts are 
associated with service plazas along the Turnpike and generated about $3.8 million 
in revenue for MTA in 2009.  The other 13 had associated payments of about $10.3 
million in 2009.     
OPEGA reviewed eight of the 15 sole source arrangements as part of our contract 
review.  All the contracts in our sample were for services.  Some of the services 
associated with these contracts had never been competitively bid, including some 
procured from HNTB.  Others had apparently been competitively bid at some 
point in the past and then never re-bid.  The bid process occurred so long ago in 
some cases that MTA was not sure when it was done and could provide no 
documentation.   
There was no written justification for the seven sole source arrangements we 
reviewed, although MTA management provided reasonable explanations for them.  
Based on these explanations, two of the contracts we reviewed do not appear to be 
good candidates for competitive bidding because of the particular conditions under 
which these services are being procured.  The other five, though, were services that 
could be competitively bid. 
OPEGA acknowledges there are situations in which sole source procurement may 
be more appropriate.  However, MTA has no formal criteria or written policy for 
determining when sole source arrangements are appropriate, or documenting 
justification and approvals for them. 
According to management, the reasons for selecting each sole source vendor are 
unique, and therefore the decision making process has never been reduced to a 
written policy.  Management also described sole sourced contracts as resulting from 
situations that require a lengthy ongoing collaboration between the parties, usually 
11in the development of a unique product and/or relationship.    
OPEGA observed that MTA management also values the familiarity, and related 
efficiencies, that come from long-term relationships with the same vendors.  
Without a competitive selection process, however, the Authority is at risk of 
procuring goods and services that are not the best value.  Policies for determining 
when sole sourcing is appropriate, and requiring some type of justification and 
approval for sole source arrangements, can mitigate these risks.   
Recommended Management Action:   
MTA should adopt a formal policy that includes criteria for when sole sourcing and 
contract extensions are appropriate.  MTA managers should be required to justify 
their sole source requests, and continuing contract extensions, against the criteria 
and document that justification in writing.  Sole source contracts, or other 
                                                     
11 The Legislature’s Transportation Committee, reviewed MTA’s specific reasons for sole 
sourcing six of its contracts as part of the 2005 Government Evaluations Act review. 
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arrangements, exceeding an established dollar amount should be reviewed and 
approved by the MTA Board.   
MTA could consider whether to adopt the State’s Purchasing Policy and 
procedures for sole source contracts, which have recently been revised in response 
to OPEGA recommendations to strengthen the State’s processes. 
 MTA Should Provide Detail on All Operating Expenses as Part of 
Legislature’s Statutory Review and Approval of Budget 
Statue requires that MTA submit its budget for operating expenses to the 
Legislature for approval each year.  Under 23 MRSA §1961-6, the Authority may 
only pay operating expenses in accordance with allocations approved by the 
Legislature, or as necessary to satisfy the requirements of any resolution authorizing 
bonds of the Authority.  In this way, the Legislature plays a role in establishing 
MTA’s operating expenses at a “reasonable” level. 
The Joint Standing Committee on Transportation reviews the budget submitted by 
MTA as part of the Legislature’s approval process, which takes the form of a bill.  
Past Transportation Committee members said they were pleased with the 
expenditure detail MTA provides, noting that the information is much more 
detailed than that typically provided by State agencies.  Committee members also 
commented on MTA’s responsiveness to their questions and willingness to provide 
additional information and detail when requested to do so. 
OPEGA reviewed the materials and information supplied to the Transportation 
Committee.  We agree that the detail provided allows for a substantial amount of 
transparency and noted that the budget materials even include detail on prior years’ 
actual versus budgeted expenses for each expense category. 
However, the operating budget submitted to the Legislature for approval does not 
include all of MTA’s operating expenses.  Rather, it only includes those operating 
expenses that MTA is planning to fund with monies from its Revenue Fund 
account.  Operating expenses that MTA plans to pay for with monies from its 
Reserve Maintenance Fund are presented separately, for informational purposes 
only, in the form of budgeted costs for “perennial” projects.  MTA does not 
routinely present any information on actual expenditures incurred for these 
“perennial” projects, and paid for from the Reserve Maintenance Fund, to the 
Legislature. 
This format does not allow the Legislature to see, or approve, MTA’s operating 
expenses in total, or the dollars budgeted and spent for particular operating 
expense categories.  In our analysis of operating expenses for 2005 – 2009, we 
noted that on average about 40.6% of MTA’s operating expenses each year have 
been paid for from the Reserve Maintenance Fund and, were not part of the 
operating budget submitted for Legislative approval. 
Furthermore, the format does not allow the Legislature to monitor whether MTA 
5 
is keeping its actual operating expenses within the approved budget.  OPEGA saw 
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evidence that expenditures identified by MTA as “unbudgeted” are sometimes 
coded so they can be paid for under Reserve Maintenance Fund “perennial” 
projects.  The Bond Resolution allows this as it only requires MTA to adhere to the 
budget for operating expenses approved by the Board and funded by the Revenue 
Fund.   
We also noted that the information provided in the operating budget is typically 
detailed by MTA department and that some summarization of the detail would 
allow the Committee to more easily see the total, and trends, of expenditures 
budgeted and spent in particular expense categories.  Either MTA or non-partisan 
legislative staff should easily be able to provide such summarization if requested, 
but we think it would be helpful for MTA to provide it as part of the prepared 
budget materials.   
Lastly, throughout our analysis of MTA’s operating expenses we noted 
inconsistency in the account coding for similar types of expenses.  For example, 
some expenses for employee recognition items were coded to the safety equipment 
expenses and sponsorship and donations were coded to a variety of different 
expense categories.  Such inconsistency affects MTA’s and the Legislature’s 
understanding of exactly how many dollars are going to each type of expense. 
Recommended Management Action:   
To fully comply with statute, MTA’s budget presented to the Legislature for 
approval should include all expenses typically considered operating expenses, 
regardless of what account they are being funded from.  MTA could show detail by 
the funding accounts if desired.  This would be similar to how State agencies show 
detail by funding source for different types of expenses within individual programs.  
MTA could also provide information on which expense categories, and the dollars 
budgeted for them, were at levels required by the Bond Resolution, i.e. insurance.  
The budget materials for the entire operating expense budget should continue to 
include information on actual expenditures in each category for prior years.  
At a minimum, MTA should provide the Legislature the same type of expense 
detail on its “perennial” budget funded from Reserve Maintenance as it does for 
the operating budget that is submitted for approval. 
MTA should also provide, in the budget materials prepared, a summary of the 
detail budget and actual expenditures by expense category for all of MTA operating 
expenses, regardless of fund, to accompany the breakdowns by department. 
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MTA Should Formalize Criteria and Processes for Sponsorships 
and Donations 6 
OPEGA identified at least $454,238 in sponsorships and donations to as many as 
50 different charitable and non-charitable organizations.  It was difficult to 
determine exactly how much MTA has in these types of expenditures as there is 
not a specific expense account code to capture them.  The sponsorship and 
donation expenses we identified had been coded to expense categories 
Organization Fees, Informational Services, Work Performed by Others, 
Miscellaneous Fees and Travel and Subsistence. 
The total dollars we identified includes $157,000 in gift certificates that MTA says 
were donated to various organizations although there have been no records kept of 
the specific donations made or received by any particular organization.  These gift 
certificates were purchased by the Executive Director in 2005 and 2006.  He 
reports distributing these, with no involvement from other MTA personnel, as 
donations over the period 2005 – 2007.  The gift certificate purchases had been 
coded to the Travel and Subsistence expense category.  We understand that MTA 
discontinued the practice of making donations in the form of gift certificates after 
2007. 
We noted the following about the sponsorship and donation expenses we 
identified: 
• MTA’s typical donation to charitable organizations ranged from $200 - $500 in 
any given year.  There were several organizations that received more than that, 
however.  For example in 2009, L/A Arts received $600, the Maine Irish 
Heritage Center received $2,500, and the Nature Conservancy of Maine 
Chapter and the New England Pond Hockey Festival each received $1,000. 
• Some of the organizations receiving sponsorships and donations are also 
supported by MTA through membership dues and other payments.  Examples 
include: 
Maine Better Transportation Association (MBTA) to which MTA made total 
payments of $403,640 between 2005 and 2009.  Some of this amount is for 
annual membership dues.  MTA also pays MBTA rent for office space for 
MTA’s Government Relations Director to use when he is in Augusta at $1,375 
per quarter.  We identified an additional $39,438 in payments that appear to be 
12sponsorships and donations.   According to MTA, MBTA was also the 
recipient of substantial donations in the form of gift certificates. 
Maine Development Foundation (MDF) to which MTA paid membership dues 
of $1,500 per year.  MDF received at least an additional $18,100 from MTA in 
the form of sponsorships over the five year period. 
Maine State Chamber of Commerce to which MTA made total payments of 
$103,295 over the five year period that included $10,000 per year in 
                                                     
12 OPEGA is unsure what the remaining payments to MBTA were for as there was not enough 
detail in the electronic transaction file we were provided to make that determination without 
reviewing each individual invoice. 
Office of Program Evaluation & Government Accountability                                                                                                        page  57      
The Maine Turnpike Authority 
membership dues.  An additional $35,500 of that total appears to be for 
sponsorships or donations.  
• MTA has made donations to non-charitable organizations with no direct link to 
MTA’s mission and purpose.  Some of them are organizations that have 
members of MTA management or Board members on their boards or 
commissions.  Donations to some of the others are possibly indicative of an 
expansion of MTA’s mission.  For example, over the period 2005 – 2009, MTA 
has spent at least the following in donations and sponsorships: $10,000 to the 
Maine Center for Economic Policy, $3,255 to GrowSmart Maine, $2,500 to the 
Maine Grocer’s Association, $10,000 to the Maine Restaurant Association as an 
Expo sponsor, $11,000 for the Governor’s Conference on Tourism, and 
$27,000 to the Maine Preservation Foundation.  According to MTA, the Maine 
Preservation Foundation also received substantial donations in the form of gift 
certificates. 
OPEGA reviewed the documentation associated with a number of the sponsorship 
and donation expenses during our testing of MTA’s expenditures.  We noted in 
general that these expenses are not well supported by documentation showing the 
solicitation to MTA, the purpose the donation would be put to, or confirmation of 
receipt of the donation.  We also noted that MTA has no formal policies or 
procedures for guiding what types of organizations will receive MTA support and 
how much support they will receive.  
Given the expense activity OPEGA observed, we believe there is risk of MTA 
resources being used to support efforts not directly tied to its mission.  There is 
also risk that perceived, or actual, personal benefit will accrue to members of MTA 
management from these sponsorships and donations. 
Recommended Management Action:   
The Authority should establish a formal policy and process for sponsorships and 
donations that includes criteria for deciding which organizations will receive them 
and in what amounts.  Sponsorships and donations should be approved by vote of 
the MTA Board and be well documented with copies of the solicitation requests 
received by MTA, as well as receipts or letters confirming receipt by the 
organization.  
MTA should also establish a specific expense code for sponsorships and donations 
so that a budget can be set and actual expenditures tracked against it.  This expense 
category would show as a detailed line item in MTA’s operating budget presented 
for Legislative approval.   
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MTA Should Clarify and Ensure Adherence to Approval and 
Documentation Requirements for Expenses, in Particular Travel 
and Meal Expenses  
MTA processes payments for operating expenses on a variety of documents 
including invoices from individual vendors, credit card statements, employee 
reimbursement requests, Request for Check Forms, and Revolving Checks.  
OPEGA reviewed 224 of these documents specifically selected because they 
contained one or more expenses that had potential for being considered 
inappropriate, excessive or unnecessary.  We noted the following with regard to 
approvals on these documents: 
• 20 payments did not have proper approvals, either because they had been 
approved by individuals that did not have approval authority under MTA’s 
current Purchasing Policy, or because they had been requisitioned and 
approved by the same individual. 
• Monthly credit card payments being made via a Request for Check were 
typically approved by MTA’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO).  Those payments 
covered the charges on the individual statements for all cardholders, including 
those for the CFO and Executive Director.  There was no review and approval 
of the credit card statements by the supervisor of the employee incurring 
charges, or by the Board for the charges incurred by the Executive Director. 
The lack of appropriate approvals may stem from the fact that MTA’s approval 
policies for the types of expenses we reviewed were not particularly clear on whose 
approval is required for different dollar limits, different documents or different 
kinds of expenses.  For example, the Purchasing Policy contains an approval matrix 
that OPEGA found confusing for determining who should be signing for various 
departments and dollar limits.  That Policy does not state that the same individual 
cannot approve both the requisition and the subsequent invoice for an item even 
though MTA’s Director of Finance told us that was prohibited.  
We also noted several issues specific to travel and meal expenses.  MTA has a 
comprehensive Travel and Meal Reimbursement Policy that clearly applies to 
employee reimbursements.  It specifically notes that the requirements are meant to 
apply to travel and meal expenses incurred on MTA credit cards.  Despite this, our 
review of travel and meal expenses charged to MTA credit cards found instances of 
MTA paying for expenses incurred by members of MTA’s management team that 
were discouraged, or not allowed, under the Policy including:  
• private limousine services;  
• hotel rooms of a type that would be viewed as exceeding what is necessary to 
be “consistent with reasonable living standards”; 
• meals and entertainment during business meetings with fellow employees that 
are not documented as meeting one of the exceptions where reimbursement 
would be allowed;  
• in-room movies; 
• airline club dues; and 
7 
• alcoholic beverages. 
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We also found that in general travel and meal expenses incurred on MTA credit 
cards issued to MTA managers did not have all the supporting documentation 
required by the Travel and Meals Reimbursement Policy.  Many of the expenses 
had no supporting documentation at all.  The Policy requires expenses to be 
supported by detailed receipts along with records of the amount, time, place, names 
of persons and business purpose for each.  Despite the lack of required 
documentation, MTA had still paid for the expenses. 
Finally, we observed that travel and meal expenses processed on documents other 
than employee reimbursement requests or credit card statements, although not 
technically covered by the Travel and Meal Reimbursement Policy, also included 
items not allowed under the policy, like alcoholic beverages and private limousine 
services.  The expenses on these documents often did not have adequate 
supporting documentation such that we could determine the business purpose of 
the expense, specifics on who was covered by the expense and the dates or 
locations of the expenses. 
Recommended Management Action:   
MTA should take steps to clarify, and ensure effective implementation of, its 
policies governing:  
• authorized approvers and approval limits for various types of expenses and 
expense documents; 
• supporting documentation required for all travel and meal expenses paid 
for by MTA, regardless of who incurred or authorized the expenses or what 
type of documents they are processed on; and 
• allowable travel and meal expenses for all MTA employees and managers, 
regardless of the type of document they are processed on. 
Such steps should include developing or revising written policies as appropriate, 
communicating the specifics of those policies to MTA employees at all levels, and 
establishing controls to assure policies are adhered to.  
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Agency Response―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― 
In accordance with 3 MRSA §996, OPEGA provided the Maine Turnpike 
Authority an opportunity to submit additional comments on the draft of this 
report.  The Authority’s response letter can be found at the end of this report.   
In addition, OPEGA discussed the preceding issues and recommendations with 
MTA’s management in advance.  Upon receiving our recommendations, MTA 
devoted significant attention to developing action plans that would address those 
issues that are the Authority’s responsibility.  Details of the proposed actions were 
shared with OPEGA as MTA sought feedback on whether they would sufficiently 
address the concerns identified.  According to MTA management, some of 
OPEGA’s recommendations have provided further impetus for implementing 
ideas they had already been considering. 
We understand MTA has already begun implementing some actions, and others 
will be submitted to the Board for review and approval.  MTA has sought to strike 
a balance between fiscal controls and efficient operations, as well as balance 
between compliance with statute and compliance with the terms of its Bond 
Resolution.  Not all of the proposed actions exactly mirror OPEGA’s 
recommendations, but in our opinion they are reasonable, both in scope and 
timeframe, for addressing the issues we raised.  If effectively implemented, they 
should strengthen MTA’s processes, begin to substantially redefine the relationship 
with HNTB, and bring additional transparency to MTA’s budget and expenditures. 
We note that some actions being taken by MTA go beyond the scope of OPEGA’s 
recommendations and will provide for additional improvements and efficiencies. 
We also observe that MTA’s detailed plans have been developed with an eye 
toward using any new resources, e.g. personnel or technology, most efficiently and 
effectively for MTA’s longer term needs.  We see this as an indication that MTA is 
truly interested in fully integrating the changes in a way that impacts MTA’s culture 
and makes it a stronger organization.   
MTA’s planned management actions, as provided by its management team, are 
summarized below.  They are numbered to correspond with the issues described by 
OPEGA in the Recommendations section of the report.   
MTA's Relationship with its Contracted Engineering Firm Needs to be 
2 Redefined 
MTA’s Chief Operating Officer has proposed a detailed action plan that will be 
substantially implemented in the first half of 2011.  The plan formalizes MTA’s 
agreements with HNTB, and provides for transitioning portions of work HNTB 
has historically performed to either in-house resources or other consultants.  It 
addresses issues identified by OPEGA as well as policies, procedures and staffing 
requirements MTA considers vital to the successful management of a larger capital 
program in 2011 to 2015. 
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When crafting the plan, MTA was mindful of its need to continue to provide 
timely, cost-effective, safe, quality-driven, and environmentally sensitive projects.  
Consequently, HNTB will continue to be MTA’s primary engineering consultant 
on 2011 – 2012 projects currently in progress, and until MTA has developed 
sufficient capacity to manage its procurement of various engineering services 
differently.  Key actions included in MTA’s overall plan are: 
A. Establish new contracts with HNTB that have defined durations, scopes of 
service, terms and conditions and costs.  
1. By June 2011, establish four new general consulting agreements (GCA) 
with HNTB to reflect the various services MTA expects to procure.  
These are consulting engineer services13, program management 
services14, project engineering services and construction inspection 
services. 
2. By December 31, 2011, establish a project-specific written agreement 
defining duration, scope and cost for each 2011 and 2012 project 
assigned to HNTB under the GCA’s for project engineering or 
construction inspection services.  
The MTA Board, with Trustee approval, will award the Consulting Engineer 
contract and re-approve it every five years.  MTA expects to continue awarding 
this contract to HNTB, with five year terms, until such time as the Board 
deems it appropriate or advisable to competitively bid the consulting engineer 
services.  The other three services will also continue to be procured from 
HNTB initially, but MTA expects to reduce the amount of services procured 
under these contracts as it builds in-house capacity to perform or competitively 
bid more work.  
B. Develop a formal project management process during the first half of 2011 
where MTA Engineering Department will assign and manage all engineering 
work. 
1. By June 30, 2011, create and fill a new staff position to assume project 
management responsibilities.  These responsibilities involve: managing 
all consultant resources, including HNTB; managing the RFP process 
for new design projects and studies; providing additional review of 
plans and specifications; and providing the MTA with capacity to 
perform some assessment work in-house. 
2. By the end of 2011, implement a formal in-house process for selection 
and assignment of consultants to perform project development and 
design work, prior to project initiation.  For each project, MTA will 
decide whether to assign work directly to HNTB under the established 
                                                     
13 Scope of services for the Consulting Engineer Services contract will include fulfilling Bond 
Resolution functions; high-level planning and assisting with 20-Year Plan as requested by 
the MTA; providing advice and counsel to the MTA board and executive management team; 
acting as day-to-day traffic engineer; and forecasting functions.   
14 Through this contract, HNTB will continue to assist MTA’s engineering group with some 
administrative functions.  Scope of services will include managing the library of 
specifications and standards details for construction contracts; assisting with administration 
of the overall capital and reserve maintenance program, as well as the coordination of 
projects; performing some design work as assigned by MTA; and providing full project 
management on some projects, especially complex projects in HNTB’s area of expertise. 
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GCA or to solicit proposals from other MaineDOT pre-qualified firms 
and select one or more of those firms to perform work.  MTA expects 
that projects under $100,000 will continue to be directly assigned to 
HNTB for efficiency reasons, but it will begin competitively selecting 
the consultants for larger projects.  In 2011, the Authority intends to 
competitively bid the engineering services for at least one major 2012 
construction project.  
C. Use resources other than HNTB to assume some of the construction 
inspection responsibilities:  
1. By July 1, 2011, hire two additional MTA construction inspectors (one 
senior-level resident engineer and one resident engineer to join the 
three existing MTA technician-level inspectors.  MTA has performed a 
preliminary cost/benefit analysis and has determined that, in the long 
run, the two additional inspectors are warranted and the new positions 
will cost less than consultant resources.   
2. Due to immediate needs and their high level of experience and success 
working for the MTA in this area, HNTB will still have a contract to 
perform construction inspection.  However, by April 2011, MTA will 
solicit proposals from other engineering firms pre-qualified by 
MaineDOT to fill additional inspector openings created by the larger 
2011-2015 capital program.  MTA expects to establish contracts with 
other firms as a result of these proposals.  MTA engineering staff will 
manage those consultant inspectors directly. 
MTA Should Improve Contract Management for Professional Services 
3 
MTA has begun development of a contract management database and related 
procedures that is expected to be complete in April 2011.  This contract 
management system will provide for centralized tracking and review of all 
contracts.  The database will be used to determine when contracts are due for 
updating or reconsideration, and to help assure those contracts get timely attention.   
Once development of the contract database software is complete, MTA will begin 
populating the database with information on all its current contracts.  In 
conjunction with this process, MTA will be identifying all contracts that are out of 
date or do not have the specific terms and conditions recommended by OPEGA.  
MTA will take action to update and strengthen those contracts as they are 
identified.  MTA expects to be completed with the review of all contracts, and to 
have the database fully populated, by October 1, 2011. 
MTA will also establish a formal contract management and administration policy 
for all contracts by fall 2011.  The policy is expected to clarify the roles and 
responsibilities associated with monitoring professional services contracts to assure 
acceptable contractor performance, and adherence to contract terms and 
conditions. 
In response to OPEGA’s recommendations for management of HNTB contracts, 
MTA intends to establish new contracts as described in Action 2 above.  In 
addition, MTA will require that HNTB provide additional detail for reimbursable 
expenses on each invoice, similar to what HNTB is required to provide on its 
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invoicing to MaineDOT.  MTA is also considering the most cost-effective way to 
periodically audit HNTB’s expenses.  Initially, MTA expects to hire its external 
auditors to conduct this audit, with the first audit performed by spring 2012.  This 
work may eventually be conducted under an in-house internal audit program. 
Controls Over Sole Sourcing Should be Strengthened 
4 MTA staff will draft a formal policy on sole sourcing consistent with OPEGA’s 
recommendations for standard criteria, written justification and Board review of 
sole source arrangements.  Staff expects to submit the draft to the Board’s Finance 
and Audit Subcommittee by the summer of 2011.  Staff will work with the 
Subcommittee to finalize the policy and present to the full Board for approval.  
Assuming Board approval is obtained, MTA expects to implement a policy in the 
autumn of 2011.  In conjunction with this effort, MTA will establish written 
guidelines on the Request for Quotations process for professional services. 
MTA will also begin conducting a regular review of sole source contracts to 
determine if their sole source status remains appropriate as part of the contract 
management system described above in Action 3. 
 MTA Should Provide Detail on All Operating Expenses as Part of 5 Legislature’s Statutory Review and Approval of Budget 
MTA's Board and management strongly believe that protecting its ability to pay 
certain operating expenses is critical to maintaining the desired bond ratings.  
Consequently, MTA intends to continue budgeting for operating expenses that are 
critical to complying with bondholder expectations in the Reserve Maintenance 
project budget that is not subject to the Legislature’s approval.  MTA is committed, 
however, to improving the transparency of all its operating expenses, and assuring 
that any expenses excluded from the operating budget submitted for legislative 
approval are appropriately limited.  To this end, MTA will take several actions: 
1. Expand information provided to the Legislature in the budget materials. 
Beginning with the budget for 2013 submitted in fall of 2011, budget 
materials will include: 
• detail by expense category for all operating expenses, regardless of the 
fund they are budgeted to, with indication of which are included in the 
operating budget for the Legislature’s approval and which are not; and 
• a summary of total actual versus budgeted operating expenses by 
expense category across all MTA departments and funds. 
2. Review all operating expenses currently funded by the Reserve Maintenance 
Fund and identify those that are not critical to complying with Bond 
Resolution terms. In the future, these expenses will be funded from the 
Revenue Fund and will be included in operating budgets presented for 
legislative approval.  MTA staff have already begun this review. The Board 
has requested that bond counsel also participate in this process and provide 
an opinion.  
3. Audit expenses paid for by the Reserve Maintenance Fund annually, 
thereafter, to assure any that should be submitted for Legislature’s approval 
are captured in the operating budget considered by the Legislature.  MTA is 
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assessing whether to establish an in-house internal audit program that 
would be assigned this responsibility.   
4. Update accounting reference codes for expenses and standardize use of 
these codes across departments by winter 2011-12.  
6 MTA Should Formalize Criteria and Processes for Sponsorships and Donations 
MTA staff will draft a formal policy on sponsorships and donations consistent with 
OPEGA’s recommendations.  The policy, which will include criteria and process 
for guiding expenditures of this type, will be submitted to the MTA Board for 
review and approval in the autumn of 2011.  Assuming Board approval is obtained, 
the policy will be implemented by January 1, 2012. 
In addition, MTA intends to develop annual budgets for sponsorships and 
donations that specify the amounts MTA expects to contribute to particular 
organizations each year.  An accounting code will be established to capture 
sponsorship and donation expenditures, and regular monthly reports will be 
generated for monitoring actual expenses against the budget.  MTA expects to have 
the first budget prepared for the calendar year 2013 and implement the monitoring 
process in 2012.   
MTA Should Clarify and Ensure Adherence to Approval and Documentation 
7 Requirements for Expenses, in Particular Travel and Meal Expenses 
MTA has identified a number of written policies and procedures that will be 
updated or established to clarify the Authority’s expectations regarding approval, 
documentation and appropriateness of expenditures.  MTA will update its 
Purchasing Policy, including the approval matrix, field purchasing policy, invoice 
authorizations and purchasing card policy by November 1, 2011.  In addition, 
policies and procedures covering the following will also be current and in place by 
that time, and will include proper controls to minimize risk of inappropriate 
expenditures:  
• travel; 
• company paid meals; 
• company credit cards; 
• payroll reimbursement and cell phone reimbursement; and 
• petty cash and the revolving checking account. 
MTA will distribute the policies and discuss their requirements with all MTA 
supervisors at the regular quarterly Supervisors’ meetings.  Management has already 
sent memos on approval and documentation requirements for travel and meal 
expenses to all credit card holders and those supervisors that have Open Purchase 
Orders for these types of expenses.  The agenda for the March 2011 Supervisors’ 
meeting will include a review and discussion of the Travel Policy.  Other policies 
and procedures will be distributed and scheduled for discussion as they are 
finalized.     
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MTA is also considering the most cost-effective way to audit for compliance with 
various policies and procedures.  Options include requiring review of expenses by 
MTA’s Controller, requesting that external auditors incorporate specific testing into 
their annual audit or establishing an in-house internal audit program as described 
below.   
 
In the course of addressing issues raised by OPEGA, MTA identified several additional opportunities to 
strengthen its internal control framework.  MTA intends to act on these opportunities by the end of 2011: 
Establish a system for tracking status of MTA policy documents using the same database framework and 
process as the system being developed for contract management.  This tracking system will provide for 
identifying when policies need to be reviewed for updates, and will assign responsibility for those reviews 
and updates to particular individuals.  As part of the process of populating the policy database, MTA will 
review all policies and update them as necessary. 
Update or establish additional written policies and procedures to govern employee job training and 
internships, protection of whistleblowers, network access, computer usage, and union negotiations. 
Develop a formal internal audit program within MTA that may include establishment of an internal audit 
position.  MTA will seek assistance from a consultant in designing a program that has sufficient 
independence and resources.  MTA envisions that capacity for handling whistleblower complaints would 
also be built into the internal audit program. 
Replace a soon-to-be-vacant position with a Project Engineer position.  Responsibilities of the new 
position will include: creating and administering proposed future asset and fleet management systems; 
tracking and managing performance measures in Operations & Maintenance; and providing general 
project coordination. The new position will replace an existing position in the budget.  
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 Appendix A.  Scope and Methods 
The scope for this review, as approved by the Government Oversight Committee, included a number of questions 
covering a broad range of topic areas.  In order to answer each question fully, OPEGA conducted work including: 
• interviewing the managers and staff of the Maine Turnpike Authority as needed; 
• reviewing MTA’s documented policies and procedures concerning purchases and travel and meals; 
• surveying tolling entities from other states in an attempt to gather performance data for comparison with 
MTA’s; 
• interviewing the Bond Trustee, MaineDOT Commissioner, Consulting Engineer, Transportation Committee 
chair, and MTA Board members about their oversight roles and functions; 
• obtaining a data file including all of MTA’s transactions from 2005 to 2009, and subjecting it to rigorous 
analysis; 
• reviewing MTA’s most recent annual report, enacting statute, audited financial statements, 20 year planning 
documents, Consulting Engineer’s reports and Traffic Forecast reports; 
• reviewing the MTA’s legislative history; 
• obtaining and reviewing the statutes of tolling entities from other states in order to compare the oversight 
required by statute to that of MTA; 
• analyzing the methods rating agencies used to determine the MTA’s bond rating, the trends in MTA’s bond 
rating, and MTA’s bond rating in comparison to those of other tolling entities 
• obtaining records from both the Legislature’s Office of Fiscal and Program Review and the MTA of cash 
transfers from the MTA to the State, and analyzing the types and amounts of transfers; 
• obtaining record of non-cash contributions MTA has made to Maine’s transportation infrastructure, and 
• selecting a sample of MTA’s expense transactions for detailed review, and reviewing all invoices and other 
• TA’s Purchasing Policy and to assess the 
• 
• 
Early in this review, OPEGA decided to contract with a consultant to opine on issues that require legal and bond 
e 
 
ecific covenants included in the MTA’s current Bond Resolution; 
those in the resolutions of other 
• tricted by the Bond Resolution, or anything else, in what future 
legislative action can be taken with regard to the Maine Turnpike Authority.     
 
attempting to confirm the value of these contributions with MaineDOT; 
documentation associated with those transactions; 
selecting a sample of contracts to review for compliance with M
adequacy of the Authority’s contractor selection and contract administration processes; 
seeking performance benchmarks appropriate to entities like the MTA that are responsible for the operation 
of a toll road; and 
reviewing MTA’s current Bond Resolution. 
expertise in relation to MTA’s Bond Resolution.  OPEGA sought recommendations for a consultant from the Stat
Attorney General, the State Treasurer and the Executive Director of the Maine Municipal Bond Bank.  From this 
process, we selected Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge and requested that firm address the scope related questions
concerning: 
• the sp
• whether MTA’s Bond Resolution includes covenants that are atypical of 
tolling entities that issue revenue bonds; and 
how the Legislature may, or may not, be cons
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Summary of 23 MRSA Chapter 24 Sections Relevant to OPEGA's Review 
dix B.  Summary of Selected Sections of 23 MRSA Chapter 24 
§1961 Legislative Findings; Cooperation with the Department of Transportation; Bonds; Governmental Function – 
States that a safe, efficient and functional turnpike is essential to the State transportation system and the well-
being of Maine’s citizens. Requires the MTA carry out its purposes in cooperation with the MaineDOT and 
provide its operating surplus to the MaineDOT each year. Declares that the purposes of the chapter are public 
and that the MTA shall be regarded as performing a governmental function. Requires the MTA to comply with 
the Sensible Transportation Policy Act. Requires the MTA submit to the Legislature, annually, a budget for the 
following year’s operating expenses, along with a statement of revenues needed for capital costs, reserves, and 
to meet bond resolution requirements. 
§1962 Preservation of Rights – Protects the rights of existing bondholders and anyone to whom the MTA owes 
contractual obligations. 
§1963 Maine Turnpike Authority – States that the MTA will operate and maintain the Turnpike from Kittery to Augusta 
until the Legislature provides for its termination. 
§1964 Definitions – Defines certain terms as used in the chapter. 
§1965 Maine Turnpike Authority; Powers; Membership – Describes the powers of the MTA and establishes the 
membership of the Authority: the MaineDOT Commissioner as an ex officio member, and 6 other members 
appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Legislature for 7 year terms. 
§1966 Obligations of the Authority – States that all contracts for Turnpike construction and reconstruction must be 
approved by the MaineDOT. States that revenue bonds issued under by MTA are not a debt of the State or a 
pledge of the faith and credit of the State. Requires a report detailing the Authority’s receipts and expenditures 
from all sources be submitted to the Legislature semiannually.  
§1968 Issuance of Bonds – Provides for the issuance of Turnpike revenue bonds, not to exceed $486,000,000, for 
purposes described in §1969, and for the issuance of up to $40,000,000 in special obligation bonds for 
MaineDOT projects prior to June 30, 1997.  States MTA bonds do not constitute a debt of the State and are 
payable from the operating revenues of the Turnpike and provides MTA the authority to set bond terms. 
§1969 Application of Proceeds of Bonds or Notes in Anticipation Thereof – States how bond proceeds shall be applied, 
including for: construction and reconstruction of the Turnpike, payment to the MaineDOT for MaineDOT 
projects, repayment of federal grants or loans used to construct or maintain the Turnpike, payment of costs to 
construct or reconstruct interchanges, bond issuance costs, creation of reserves. 
§1970 Bonds; How Secured – Provides the bonds may be secured by a trust indenture or bond resolution between the 
MTA and a trust company or bank, and describes what may be included in the trust indenture or resolution. 
§1971 Exemption from Taxes – States that by accomplishing the purpose stated in this chapter the Authority will be 
performing essential governmental functions, and will not be required to pay taxes on property or income. 
§1972 Refunding Bonds – Grants the MTA the authority to refinance existing bonds. 
§1973 Maintenance of the Turnpike – Authorizes the MTA to maintain and repair the Turnpike and utilize the services 
of the Maine State Police. Sets the maximum speed limit on the Turnpike. Gives the MTA tolling authority and 
declares the fixing of tolls is not subject to supervision or regulation by any State entity. Establishes that toll 
rates may be revised, will include a commuter system discount and will exempt the military. 
§1974 Use of Turnpike Revenues – States how Turnpike revenues may be expended. Provides for use of revenues for 
construction or improvement of interchanges not incorporated into the Turnpike. Describes Maine State Police 
duties to be paid by MTA. Provides for the use of revenues for certain MaineDOT projects. 
§1975 Provisions in Case of Default on Bonds – Describes duties of the bond trustee and the rights of bondholders in 
the event of default on bonds. 
§1978 Termination of the Authority – States the Authority will not be dissolved until the Legislature directs its 
termination and all bonds have been paid or a trust has been established sufficient to pay the bonds. 
§1979 Governmental Functions – States that the purposes of the chapter are public and that the Authority shall be 
regarded as performing a governmental function in the carrying out of the provisions of the chapter. 
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aine Tu pike Authority General Bond Resolution  
In acco ce with our engagement with the Office of Program
nt review of the Maine T
rity”), we have reviewed the Authority’s General Turnpike Revenue Bond Resolution adopted April 18
d through September 13, 2007 (the “Bond Resolution”). The Request for Quotations provided 
atters related to the Authority’s obligations under the Bond Resolution. This 
andum ddresses each topic in turn. Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein are used as defined i
ution.  
emorandum, in addition to the Bond Resolution, we have reviewed the Authority’s 
 MRSA §§ 1961-1983), the Official Statement of the Authority dated January 29, 2009 pertainin
00 Turnpike Revenue Bonds, Series 2009, the General Bond Resolution of the State of New 
pike System
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and Trust Agreements of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority
2
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PART 1  
A listin  and brief description of the specific legal obligations to bondholders contained in the Bond 
 affect:  
 Authority must manage its finances, assets, operations or planning; and/or 
ust establish or maintain for an organizational, governances and accountability 
tructure  
ngell Palmer & Dodge (“EAPD”) has served as bond counsel to the State of New Hampshire for a
suance fo  many years, including with respect to the establishment of and all revenue bond financings for the State of New 
Turnpike System.  
APD ser ed as underwriters’ counsel with respect to the 1997 bond issues of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority at which 
st agreements referenced herein w
uthority om December 2007 to November 2009 and since then has served as bond counsel to the Massachusetts Depa
tation, the successor to the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority.  
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This section of the memorandum summarizes each article of the Bond Resolution, focusing on the 
 finances, assets, operations or 
 must establish or maintain for an accountability structure. In particular, 
 of Article VIII highlights the financial tests, reporting requirements and other 
hority must meet on an ongoing basis.  
 does not impose any particular requirements regarding the organizational or 
governance structure of the Authority. The Authority is essentially permitted to conduct its activities as it 
Act and compliance with the terms of the Bond 
Resolu
obligations to bondholders that affect (i) how the Authority must manage its
planning; and (ii) what the Authority
the section-by-section summary
obligations that the Aut
The Bond Resolution
determines, subject to limitations imposed by the Enabling 
tion.  
Article I – Definitions  
Article I provides the definitions for each of the defined terms used in the Bond Resolution.  
Articles II-IV – Terms of Bonds  
Articles II, III and IV provide the general terms applicable to all Bonds issued under the Bond Resolution. 
The specific terms of each individual series of Bonds issued by the Authority under the Bond Resolution, such as 
the principal amounts, maturities, interest rates and redemption terms, are contained in the supplemental bond 
resolution related to such series of Bonds. The documents that are required to be delivered upon the issuance
each series of Bonds are listed in Section 202. The supplemental resolution for each series of Bonds may contain
additional conditions to the bond issue. For example, certain outstanding Bonds were issued with bond insuran
policies issued for the bene
 of 
 
ce 
fit of the applicable bondholders. This resulted in certain provisions of the Bond 
Resolution being modified to reflect the particular re  of the individual bond insurers. See, for example, 
the definition of “Investment Securities” in Section 101 and the provisions of Article IX that refer to the various 
Sections 204 and 205 set forth the requirements for the issuance of additional parity Bonds and additional 
Subo Net Revenues were 
at lea
3 
ich 
the A rate 
that, based on reports prepared by a consulting engineer and a traffic consultant, projected Net Revenues are 
expected to be (i) at least equal to the Net Revenue Requirement for a certain period of time following the 
issua
outsta
Requir
custom
 
 
 
 
 
quirements
bond insurers.  
rdinated Bonds. The most important requirement is that the Authority must certify that 
st equal to the Net Revenue Requirement for the fiscal year immediately preceding the fiscal year in wh
dditional Bonds are to be issued. In the case of additional parity bonds, the Authority must also demonst
nce of such additional parity bonds and (ii) at least equal to 120% of maximum Debt Service on all 
nding Bonds for any fiscal year in which such Bonds will be outstanding.  
3 
The Net Revenue Requirement means the greater of (i) 120% of Debt Service and (ii) 100% of the sum of Debt Service, the 
ed Reserve Maintenance Deposit, the Required Debt Service Reserve Deposit and any other Required Deposit. This is a 
ary concept for many revenue bond issues of all types.  
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Article V – Funds and Accounts  
e detail on how certain of these  
e 
bt 
rvice Charges on the Bonds. The Revenue Fund is also used to make up any deficiency in the Debt 
nce Fund and General Reserve Fund.  
ce on the 
spectively, whenever moneys in the Debt Service Fund or 
vice Fund, respectively, are insufficient for such purpose.  
he Interchange Account. On a monthly basis, the moneys in the General Reserve Fund are 
i) to 
e 
rve Fund or (iv) to another 
account within the General Reserve Fund.  
 
e final use of Revenues under the Bond Resolution. 
Moneys in this account may be used at the direction of the Authority to pay for Reserve 
Maintenance Fund Projects, Turnpike Projects or an Emergency, or transferred to the Debt Service 
Reserve Fund or another account within the General Reserve Fund or “to pay for any other lawful 
Article V includes the pledge of all Revenues and other moneys and securities held under  
the Bond Resolution to pay the Bonds and the Subordinated Bonds. Article V also establishes  
each of the funds and accounts under the Bond Resolution, and sets out the purposes for which  
such funds and accounts may be used. To the extent the Authority must follow the specifications  
of Article V in managing its finances, it is useful to provide som
funds function.  
 Revenue Fund – All Revenues received by the Authority are deposited in the Revenue Fund. Th
moneys in the Revenue Fund are used to pay the Operating Expenses of the Authority and the De
Se
Service Reserve Fund, Reserve Maintena
 Debt Service Reserve Fund / Subordinated Debt Service Reserve Fund – Moneys in the Debt Service 
Reserve Fund and the Subordinated Debt Service Reserve Fund are used to pay debt servi
Bonds and Subordinated Bonds, re
Subordinated Debt Ser
 Reserve Maintenance Fund – This fund can be used for any of the following purposes, as directed by 
the Authority: (1) pay the costs of renewal and replacement projects (“Reserve Maintenance Fund 
Projects”); (2) pay the costs of constructing, rehabilitating or improving the Turnpike (“Turnpike 
Projects”) in order to prevent a loss of Revenues; (3) pay insurance premiums; (4) replenish the Debt 
Service Reserve Fund, subject to certain conditions; and (5) to pay for an Emergency, subject to 
certain conditions.  
 General Reserve Fund – The Bond Resolution established within the General Reserve Fund, the 
Insurance Account, the Improvement Account, the Department of Transportation Provision Account 
and t
transferred to the accounts established to pay Debt Service on the Bonds and the Subordinated Bonds 
to the extent a deficiency exists in such accounts, and then to the Insurance Account, Improvement 
Account, Department of Transportation Provision Account and the Interchange Account in the 
amounts specified by the Authority. Any balance remaining after such transfers is deposited in the 
Improvement Account.  
 Department of Transportation Provision Account – Moneys in this account may be transferred (
a trustee for payment of special obligation bonds of the Department of Transportation (ii) to th
Department of Transportation, (iii) to replenish the Debt Service Rese
See the summary of Section 801 below for restrictions on certain transfers from this account.  
 Improvement Account – This account is th
corporate purpose of the Authority as authorized in the Enabling Act,” as long as there are no 
deficiencies in any fund or account, no event of default exists and Net Revenues were at least equal 
to 200% of Debt Service for the fiscal year preceding such payment.  
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Article VI – Investment of Funds  
The moneys on deposit in any fund or account created under the Bond Resolution can only be invested 
e applicable to 
nd 
d or Capital 
nt of moneys 
in each d. In general, investment earnings are transferred to the Revenue Fund, with certain 
excepti
Articles VI
as provided in Article VI. The investment parameters for some funds are more flexible than thos
other funds. For example, the types of investments available to the Debt Service Reserve Fund a
Subordinated Debt Service Reserve Fund are more limited than those available to the Revenue Fun
Fund. This is a common limitation. Article VI also dictates where the earnings from the investme
 fund are deposite
ons set forth in Section 602(d).  
I-VIII – Authority Covenants  
icle VII includes the Authority covenants to pay debt service on the Bonds, to takArt e all action that may 
be necessary to confirm the pledge made under the Bond Resolution, and to do all that may be necessary to 
ensure 
any indebte r, 
the Author pike 
Revenues o s are any moneys 
received by the Authority from
federal
Turnpike P e 
payment of
Art
finances, assets and operations.  
good repair
unless it is n, 
operation a
the tax-exempt status of any tax-exempt Bonds. Section 704 provides that the Authority shall not issue 
dness secured by the Pledged Collateral other than the Bonds and the Subordinated Bonds. Howeve
ity may issue indebtedness under a separate resolution that is secured by a pledge of Non-Turn
r other moneys that are not part of the Pledged Collateral. Non-Turnpike Revenue
 other than operation of the Turnpike, including payments received from the 
 government or the State or any fees levied by the Authority in connection with any project that is not a 
roject. However, Non-Turnpike Revenues do not include payments or taxes which are pledged to th
 debt service on Bonds issued under the Bond Resolution.  
icle VIII contains the provisions that most directly affect how the Authority must manage its 
Section 801 – The Authority must operate the Turnpike in a sound manner and keep the Turnpike in 
 and working condition. The Authority may not acquire a road that is more than five miles long 
authorized to charge tolls on such road in an amount sufficient to cover the costs of the acquisitio
nd maintenance of such road or unless the Authority demonstrates that, based on a Consultant’s 
t Revenues would be at least equal to the Net Revenue Requirement for each fiscal year in which the 
cquired and the five fiscal years thereafter. However, the Authority may authorize the acquisition of
ithout meeting the Net Revenue Requirement upon the unanimous consent of its members so long a
Report, Ne
road was a  
any road w s 
no event of default exists under the Bond Resolution and the Authority can demonstrate that it expects to be in 
compliance with the other covenants and conditions contai
and the
Sec from 
the Departm  amount in excess of $8,700,000 in any fiscal year.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n in the Bond Resolution for the current fiscal year 
 following five fiscal years.  
tion 801 further provides that the Authority may not transfer to the Department of Transportation 
ent of Transportation Provision Account an
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Section 802 – The tolls established by the Authority must be sufficient (1) to provide funds for the 
d (2) to provide Net Revenues that are at least equal to the Net Revenue 
Requirement in any fiscal year. The Authority may not reduce or modify tolls unless it demonstrates that, based 
on a Co
 the following fiscal year. The Authority must adopt and institute the 
th 
ues 
ast 
ty must file with the Trustee and Consulting Engineer copies of any revised 
toll sch
 each fiscal year, file the audited financial statements with the same parties 
receivin
ngineer or consultant to carry out the duties of the Consulting Engineer and the Traffic Consultant, 
spectively, set forth in the Bond Resolution.  
Section 806 – Report of Consulting Engineer – The Authority must cause the Consulting Engineering to 
o an annual inspection of the Turnpike and, by October 1 of each year, to submit a report to the Authority 
tting forth (i) the Consulting Engineer’s findings with respect to the condition of the Turnpike, (ii) 
commendations for proper operation and maintenance of the Turnpike for the following fiscal year and the 
stimated costs thereof, (iii) recommendations regarding the insurance to be carried by the Authority and (iv) 
commendations for the amount to be deposited in the Reserve Maintenance Fund.  
payment of Operating Expenses an
nsultant’s Report, it is expected that the Net Revenue Requirement will be satisfied in the current fiscal 
year and in each of the five fiscal years following the rate reduction or modification.  
If Net Revenues are less than the Net Revenue Requirement then the Authority must, before the 15
th 
day 
of February of the following fiscal year, request the preparation of a Consultant’s Report for the purpose of 
making recommendations as to a revised toll schedule in order that Net Revenues are reasonably expected to 
equal the Net Revenue Requirement for
revised toll schedule within 180 days after receipt of the Consultant’s Report.  
Section 803 – Annual Budget – On or before the 20 day of October of each year, the Authority must 
adopt a preliminary budget for the following fiscal year, which must include a preliminary determination of the 
Required Debt Service Deposit, the Required Reserve Maintenance Deposit and any Required Debt Service 
Reserve Deposit. On or before December 20 of each year the Authority must adopt a final budget, which sets 
the final Required Debt Service Deposit and Required Reserve Maintenance Deposit and any Required Debt 
Service Reserve Deposit. If the final budget is not approved by December 20, then the preliminary budget (if 
approved by the Consulting Engineer) is treated as the Annual Budget. The amount expended on operation and 
maintenance of the Turnpike may not exceed the amount provided for Operating Expenses in the Annual 
Budget, except in the case of an Emergency or if paid from the Reserve Maintenance Fund or General Reserve 
Fund.  
Section 804 – Annual Report and Audit – The Authority must keep accurate records of the Reven
collected, the number and class of vehicles using the Turnpike and the application of the Revenues. At le
once each fiscal year, the Authori
edule for the preceding fiscal year as well as an annual report setting forth:  
• an income and expense statement showing Revenues, Operating Expenses and Debt Service;  
• the number of vehicles in each class using the Turnpike;  
• all deposits and withdrawals from each fund and account;  
• the details of all Bonds issued, paid, purchased or redeemed;  
• a balance sheet;  
• the amounts in each fund and account at the end of the preceding fiscal year; and  
• the proceeds of any sales of property.  
The Authority must employ an Accountant to audit its books relating to the Turnpike for the preceding 
fiscal year and, within 120 days after
g the annual report described above.  
Section 805 – The Authority must employ an independent engineer or engineering firm and a traffic 
e
re
d
se
re
e
re
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mpensation insurance.  
 of 
uction must furnish a bond or 
market e 
 
 
 
he test for issuing additional parity bonds (as described in the second paragraph under the heading 
“Articl es 
nd 
 
 
Section 807 – This section lists the types of insurance that the Authority is required to carry. They 
include multi-risk insurance covering loss or damage to the Turnpike, use and occupancy insurance covering 
interruption in the use of Turnpike facilities, public liability insurance and workers’ co
Section 808 – Insurance Schedule – Within the first three months of each fiscal year, the Authority must 
provide the Trustee and Consulting Engineer with a schedule of all insurance policies currently in effect. This 
section sets forth the required disposition of insurance proceeds received on account of damage or destruction
any part of the Turnpike and the proceeds of use and occupancy insurance.  
Section 809 – Any person with whom the Authority contracts for constr
able securities to secure the performance of the work contracted for. Each contract must provide that th
Authority will retain a certain percentage of the payments to be made to ensure adequate performance.  
Section 810 – The Authority may allow the State or any of its agencies, departments or subdivisions to
pay the costs of operating and maintaining the Turnpike out of funds other than Revenues.  
 
Section 811 – The Authority may not sell or lease the Turnpike or create or permit to be created any lien
on the Revenues or funds created under the Bond Resolution. However, the Authority may sell or dispose of any
property if (i) such property has become obsolete or is to be replaced by other property or (ii) the Consulting 
Engineer states such disposition is consistent with prudent practice and the Authority certifies that it expects to 
satisfy t
es II-IV – Terms of Bonds” above) after such disposition. The Authority also may grant leases or licens
with respect to any property consistent with the operation of the Turnpike as permitted by the Enabling Act, a
the net proceeds of any such lease or license shall constitute Revenues and be deposited in the Revenue Fund. 
Article IX – Events of Default and Remedies  
Article IX lists the events that constitute an event of defaul
bo dholders upon an event of default, which include the right t
t and the remedies available to the Trustee and 
the n ccelerate the payment of the Bonds. Article 
IX o tion of acceleration, all Revenues shall be 
paid over to the Trustee to be applie ent of operating 
exp s  debt service on the 
Sub d
Article
o a
als  provides that, upon demand of the Trustee following a declara
d first, to the payment of certain fees, second, to the paym
en es, third, to the payment of debt service on the Bonds and fourth, to the payment of
or inated Bonds.  
 X – Fiduciaries  
Article X describes the responsibilities of the Trustee and the conditions under which the Trustee may 
resign or be removed.  
Article XI – Supplemental Resolutions, Amendments and Modifications  
The Bond Resolution may be amended and supplemented as provided in Article XI. Certain types of 
amendm
 
ents can be made by filing such amendment with the Trustee (as described in Section 1101), some 
amendments require the consent of the Trustee (as described in Section 1102) and some amendments can be
made only with bondholder consent (as described in Section 1105).  
 
The Maine Turnpike Authority 
Office of Program Evaluation & Government Accountability                                                                                                        page  75      
 
Article XII – Defeasance 
 
 
s 
y 
the debt service) on such bonds have been paid or provided to the Trustee.  
 
Article XII sets forth the circumstances under which the security provided by the Bond Resolution i
released with respect to any bonds issued under the Bond Resolution. Such release occurs when moneys 
sufficient to pay the debt service (or certain securities maturing in the amounts and at the times necessary to pa
Article XIII – Miscellaneous  
Article XIII provides that the Bond Resolution is binding upon successors of the Authority and it 
contains certain other standard provisions for any bond resolution or trust agreement.  
s 
ations 
t 
matter) vary to reflect the individual circumstances of each issuer and the nature of the governmental entity that is 
ing acts will result in differences, often in terms of governance of 
the entity. For example, the State of Maine chose to establish a separate legal entity, the Maine Turnpike 
Author
f the Bond Resolution are generally comparable to those of other toll revenue bond 
issuers. This is true both for bond documents originally used in the early 1990s as well as in the current market. 
rs need to balance the terms of their financing documents against their overall 
responsibilities for operating th
ng, 
ich any revenue bond issue is subject is only one consideration, among many, in the 
 in order to maintain operational 
reover, the types of covenants that 
might b
 
 
 
PART 2  
An opinion on whether these obligations are typical for revenue bond resolutions for bonds issued by 
tolling authorities developed in the early 1990s. In the current market? For example, are there obligation
that would not usually be found in revenue bond resolutions developed in these time periods, or oblig
that are more or less restrictive on the issuing entity than might be typical?  
The specific terms of the governing document for each issuer of toll revenue bonds (or any revenue bond for tha
issuing the debt. Differing state laws and enabl
ity. Other jurisdictions have used the same approach, but in some cases a statewide department of 
transportation has operational responsibility for the tolled facilities, but a revenue bond financing structure may 
still be used with the debt issued through the state treasurer’s office. The State of New Hampshire, for example, 
uses this approach.  
We believe the terms o
Most revenue bond issue
eir particular revenue enterprise, whether a toll road or some other system or 
facility. While more stringent legal covenants and protections for bondholders may allow for a higher debt rati
the legal structure to wh
rating process. An entity may still choose to adopt less stringent covenants
flexibility and to be able to adapt to changing circumstances over time. Mo
e required for a mature, well-established toll road, such as the Maine Turnpike will be different from 
those required for a new, start-up entity. The essential terms of the Bond Resolution seem appropriate for the 
Authority in light of its track record and responsibilities in 1991 as well as more current circumstances.  
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In undertaking our analysis, we reviewed the specific terms of the Bond Resolution and compared them to two 
other toll revenue bond documents: the State of New Hampshire’s General Bond Resolution for its Turnpike 
System of 
re the repayment of the bonds. (See 
ection 501). The first use of toll revenues, as with most revenue bond structures, whether toll roads or other 
perating expenses of the Turnpike. (See Section 504). Without the continued 
operation of the Turnpike, no revenues would be received to repay the debt. Net toll revenues are then used to 
pay deb nd on-
nds are available for any 
“lawful corporate purpose of the Authority as authorized in the Enabling Act…” (Section 509)  
Both New Hampshire and Massachusetts have similar provisions. The details, of course, vary to reflect in part 
specific requirements that pertain solely to a particular issuer. For example, the Bond Resolution incorporates 
various provisions required by terms of the Enabling Act. See, for example, the various provisions and references 
to the “Department of Transportation Provision Account” and the “Interchange Account.”  
Certain covenants contained in the Bond Resolution etailed than those contained in the governing 
documents for other revenue bond issuers. While the increased specificity may be more restrictive on the 
 
 The Debt Service Reserve Fund Requirement (see definition thereof in Section 101) is effectively 
 Revenue Bonds, which was adopted in November, 1987, and the Western Turnpike Trust Agreement 
the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority dated as of September 1, 1997. All of these documents contain 
fundamentally similar provisions. The Bond Resolution sets forth the terms under which bonds may be issued. 
(See Article II, III and IV) It pledges toll revenues and other moneys to secu
S
revenue enterprises, is to pay o
t service on bonds, replenish any shortfalls in the debt service reserve fund and then essentially fu
going capital improvements. (See Sections 504 through 509). Finally, any remaining fu
 are more d
Authority in certain circumstances, it also provides more clarity with respect to the Authority’s obligations to
bondholders as compared to more general terms of other bond documents. Examples of this include the 
following:  
established at one-half of maximum annual Debt Service so long as Net Revenues for the two 
preceding years were at least 200% of Debt Service on all Bonds Outstanding; otherwise, the 
requirement is 100% of maximum annual Debt Service. Other bond documents typically set the 
requirement at maximum annual debt service or, in some cases, simply at one-half the maximum 
amount, but less often with this hybrid approach;  
 Section 801 establishes a set of requirements if the Authority seeks to expand the system. (See 
description of this covenant above.) A similar concept is often found in the governing bond documents 
of other toll road bond issuers, although not necessarily with the same amount of detail. Most issuers 
 
me 
nd 
ses 
 
are permitted to expand their “system,” even if the expanded roads may or may not be tolled, but
compliance with the toll covenants is still needed.  
 The requirements for the annual report (see Section 804) are more detailed than may be found in so
other cases, although this specificity also provides more certainty as to what the Authority must 
provide; and  
 The Authority must conduct an annual inspection of the Turnpike (see Section 806) whereas other bo
resolutions may require less frequent inspections, such as at least once every 3 years, or, in some ca
no inspection may be required at all.  
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y all of the 
nt of bonds 
outstanding (see Section 1105) while other bond resolutions may be amended upon the consent of a majority of 
, at 
PART 3  
An op  
actions th ture’s 
ability to
The Auth er 
legislative ities of the Authority. The only limitation on future 
action by th
Const
no state sh
contains s
Authority t 
further leg ay only do so to the extent constitutionally 
permi
The Cont ations 
under the on or even Bondholders directly. Assuming that any particular legislative action does 
“impa
reason
431 U.S. 
held that a  to laws that impaired contracts of governmental entities, 
articularly financial covenants. In other words, while states retain significant power to modify private contracts 
rough the exercise of their police powers (for example, imposing new regulations or legal requirements for 
conduct of a particular business might adversely affect certain contractual relationships, but would likely be 
onstitutional to the extent the legislation protected public health or safety), a more substantial justification would 
be needed to justify impairment of financial obligations.  
The Bond Resolution also provides that the bonds may be subject to acceleration upon an event of default (see
Section 902). The remedy of acceleration is not universally available in revenue bond transactions. Absent 
significant cash reserves, the revenue bond issuer typically will not have sufficient funds on hand to pa
outstanding bonds at once. While accelerating the debt will preserve the aggregate claim for bondholders, 
satisfaction of the claim will likely not occur sooner than would have been the case without acceleration because 
the only source of repayment is the ongoing flow of toll revenues or other pledged revenues derived from the 
continued operation of the particular revenue enterprise. For example, the New Hampshire turnpike system 
revenue bonds do allow acceleration as a remedy, but the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority bonds do not.  
The requirements for amending the Bond Resolution vary from what some other revenue bond resolutions 
contain. The Bond Resolution requires the consent of the holders of two-thirds in principal amou
bondholders. Both thresholds are used in governmental issues. However, these amendment provisions are not 
used very often due to the fact that it is difficult in many cases to obtain the necessary consents of bondholders
whatever percentage is required. Also, in the case of bond insured issues, the bond insurer often retains the right 
either to consent in addition to the holders, or to consent in lieu of the actual holders.  
 
 
inion on how, if at all, the obligations to bondholders contained in the resolution might limit any
e Legislature could consider taking regarding the Authority or its function, or the Legisla
 establish statutory directives for the Authority.  
ority was established by an act of the Maine Legislature and, in general, it remains subject to furth
 action that could either expand or restrict the activ
e Maine Legislature is the contract clauses of the United States Constitution and the Maine 
itution. Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution (the “Contract Clause”) provides, in part, that 
all pass any law impairing the obligations of contracts. Article 1, Section 11 of the Maine Constitution 
imilar language. The issuance of the Authority’s bonds created a contractual relationship between the 
 and its Bondholders. As a result, while the Maine Legislature continues to have the power to enac
islation that may adversely affect the Authority, it m
ssible.  
ract Clause is not an absolute bar to legislation that might adversely affect the Authority, its oblig
 Bond Resoluti
ir” the contract with Bondholders, it may still be found constitutional to the extent the impairment is 
able and necessary to serve an important public purpose. In United States Trust Company v. New Jersey, 
1 (1977), the United States Supreme Court reiterated the basic principles of the Contract Clause and 
 higher degree of scrutiny would apply
p
th
c
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It should be noted that the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine arguably established a more stringent standard that 
 
 
While the analysis of any Contract Clause claim is fairly well settled, assessing the outcome of any particular 
controversy depends on the actual facts and circumstances of the legislation. For example, necessity will be found 
if the particular objectives of the legislation could not be satisfied by a “less drastic alternative.” Other factors 
used to assess the reasonableness of any particular impairment include the extent of the impairment and the 
degree to which the circumstances giving rise to the impairment were foreseeable at the time the contract was 
made. It is not possible to assess a potential Contract Clause claim in the abstract, other than to outline the 
considerations to be used in analyzing the question.  
would prohibit virtually any impairment, regardless of how material. In First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine 
Turnpike Authority, 153 Me. 131 (1957), the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine found unconstitutional an act by 
the Legislature that would have required the Authority to reimburse certain utilities for the relocation costs of 
their facilities because such reimbursement represented a diversion of funds pledged to bondholders under the 
Authority’s then-existing bond resolution. This case predated by 20 years the U.S. Trust decision cited above and 
it is not clear to what extent the earlier analysis would remain the law today. Such an analysis is beyond the scope 
of this Memorandum. It is worth noting, though, that the current Bond Resolution allows revenues to be used for 
any lawful corporate purpose of the Authority after the payment of debt service and the satisfaction of other 
required deposits and thus a particular legislative direction to the Authority might be permissible.  
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Appendix D. Analysis of MTA’s Expenditures 2005 – 2009 
 Line Item Name 
2005 
Total 
2006 
Total 
2007 
Total 
2008 
Total 
2009 
Total 
2005 - 2009  
Total 
% of 5 yr 
Total 
% Change 
Over 5 years 
Salaries $19,212,871.63 $19,894,574.70 $21,112,662.42 $22,119,143.99 $22,493,744.29 $104,832,997.03 34.2% 17.1% 
Contractual Services $11,375,640.81 $18,766,480.21 $15,416,252.40 $17,014,857.79 $13,370,412.03 $75,943,643.24 24.8% 17.5% 
Employee Benefits (Medical, Dental, Life, MSRS) $7,333,513.29 $7,463,849.16 $7,739,653.87 $9,753,015.85 $9,973,405.81 $42,263,437.98 13.8% 36.0% 
Consulting Engineering Fees & Exp $3,048,914.51 $2,826,181.22 $3,687,546.43 $2,890,076.56 $2,319,622.27 $14,772,340.99 4.8% -23.9% 
Work Performed By Others $3,282,610.04 $3,056,622.34 $3,322,401.25 $2,183,294.33 $2,079,444.68 $13,924,372.64 4.5% -36.7% 
Telephone $942,052.21 $1,209,508.61 $868,654.75 $790,706.03 $710,840.18 $4,521,761.78 1.5% -24.5% 
Salt & Calcium Chloride $853,817.85 $748,036.21 $850,719.70 $1,101,271.73 $486,265.82 $4,040,111.31 1.3% -43.0% 
Comprehensive Gen Liab $892,095.00 $862,112.00 $406,637.00 $684,263.22 $471,802.27 $3,316,909.49 1.1% -47.1% 
Workers Comp  $309,449.03 $915,014.31 $476,690.07 $607,104.95 $986,614.99 $3,294,873.35 1.1% 218.8% 
Electricity $493,237.79 $628,938.68 $662,614.17 $582,090.11 $598,189.54 $2,965,070.29 1.0% 21.3% 
Reg. & Spec Counsel Fees & Exp $319,242.82 $581,797.08 $532,211.60 $696,230.10 $455,926.05 $2,585,407.65 0.8% 42.8% 
Office Machines & Equip Pur/Rent $344,103.11 $443,355.63 $647,248.06 $446,523.85 $496,513.79 $2,377,744.44 0.8% 44.3% 
Fuel For Heating  $340,333.04 $294,141.41 $402,131.16 $441,593.34 $519,105.76 $1,997,304.71 0.7% 52.5% 
Snowplowing Equipment $524,281.75 $188,560.26 $484,139.98 $216,165.28 $255,750.04 $1,668,897.31 0.5% -51.2% 
Money Trnsprt Services $302,454.99 $307,183.72 $320,151.27 $329,863.29 $334,222.95 $1,593,876.22 0.5% 10.5% 
Diesel Oil Eq Maint $292,154.54 $209,224.62 $371,105.85 $458,231.28 $256,166.18 $1,586,882.47 0.5% -12.3% 
Trustee's Fees $190,081.64 $255,847.08 $378,146.38 $366,385.74 $352,458.64 $1,542,919.48 0.5% 85.4% 
Truck Purchases $433,048.95 $701,790.79 $354,966.00 -$12,558.72 $23,150.00 $1,500,397.02 0.5% -94.7% 
Gas Eq Maint $224,361.09 $249,304.67 $314,388.08 $342,063.40 $218,477.43 $1,348,594.67 0.4% -2.6% 
Postage & Shipping $225,705.51 $200,410.81 $224,911.11 $215,367.57 $317,241.30 $1,183,636.30 0.4% 40.6% 
Travel and Subsistence $411,847.35 $215,682.59 $169,984.73 $174,446.45 $132,441.16 $1,104,402.28 0.4% -67.8% 
Printing $253,354.97 $231,630.44 $196,895.23 $162,054.33 $249,423.93 $1,093,358.90 0.4% -1.6% 
Acct. Mach Supplies, Mnt, Parts, Service $319,685.90 $175,499.31 $167,605.66 $130,880.67 $255,873.48 $1,049,545.02 0.3% -20.0% 
Paint Products $154,635.99 $186,494.55 $201,068.65 $232,354.13 $237,016.91 $1,011,570.23 0.3% 53.3% 
Informational Services $146,906.66 $216,327.55 $266,366.60 $156,696.52 $199,330.73 $985,628.06 0.3% 35.7% 
Indemnification Insurance $61,520.00 $51,850.00 $411,103.00 $114,369.54 $331,355.00 $970,197.54 0.3% 438.6% 
Rent: Land/Buildings $194,023.26 $198,265.21 $164,500.60 $232,981.00 $177,635.73 $967,405.80 0.3% -8.4% 
Truck Parts, Accessories & Repair $187,796.78 $147,062.21 $155,983.87 $173,800.06 $197,360.83 $862,003.75 0.3% 5.1% 
Auto Purchases $41,440.00 $251,591.34 $88,077.80 $316,348.10 $0.00 $697,457.24 0.2% -100.0% 
Organization Fee $164,022.68 $130,440.06 $129,597.64 $103,188.75 $102,354.06 $629,603.19 0.2% -37.6% 
Hazardous Waste Disposal $156,244.58 $258,604.23 $146,217.26 $8,943.45 $24,387.23 $594,396.75 0.2% -84.4% 
Trs Bttrs Flters $124,698.88 $102,567.69 $99,006.25 $128,538.40 $126,981.57 $581,792.79 0.2% 1.8% 
Bituminous Material $74,113.39 $91,840.63 $58,492.28 $170,768.50 $146,274.53 $541,489.33 0.2% 97.4% 
Safety Equip $130,760.68 $111,991.06 $96,781.48 $86,684.83 $97,991.55 $524,209.60 0.2% -25.1% 
Steelbeam Guard Rail/Fittings $77,890.68 $6,175.84 $63,941.68 $71,223.02 $278,974.71 $498,205.93 0.2% 258.2% 
Fees Spec Employee Training $65,861.36 $102,446.69 $142,078.87 $108,356.34 $78,171.76 $496,915.02 0.2% 18.7% 
Radio Receivers/Transmitter $32,643.49 $91,342.96 $240,359.76 $55,103.24 $35,440.78 $454,890.23 0.1% 8.6% 
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2005 
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2006 
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2007 
Total 
2008 
Total 
2009 
Total 
2005 - 2009  
Total 
% of 5 yr 
Total 
% Change 
Over 5 years 
Traffic Controllers Purchase, Parts, Maintenance 1.50$78,65  $525.00 $141,350.31 $750.00 $203,739.70 $425,016.51 0.1% 159.0% 
Office Supplies $83,242.86 $84,944.33 $57,585.21 $73,701.61 $68,189.95 $367,663.96 0.1% -18.1% 
Office Building Service $46,251.82 $76,038.28 $74,156.10 $81,631.64 $77,296.49 $355,374.33 0.1% 67.1% 
Shop Supplies $49,916.59 $64,642.32 $59,666.68 $90,117.23 $80,232.88 $344,575.70 0.1% 60.7% 
Shop Tools & Equip (inc Power & Hand Tools) $55,074.20 $79,801.17 $95,988.02 $48,504.93 $45,636.51 $325,004.83 0.1% -17.1% 
Janitorial Supplies $47,404.42 $60,153.01 $52,505.51 $65,193.37 $66,013.65 $291,269.96 0.1% 39.3% 
Spreader Parts Access $25,075.45 $49,445.13 $185,409.19 $136.39 $0.00 $260,066.16 0.1% -100.0% 
Uniform Purchase, Repair & Cleaning $51,801.42 $54,639.72 $60,693.57 $35,023.98 $54,594.37 $256,753.06 0.1% 5.4% 
Auditing Fees & Expense Account $45,830.78 $42,594.50 $38,136.62 $55,242.38 $66,862.50 $248,666.78 0.1% 45.9% 
Electrical Supplies $68,531.93 $44,073.52 $46,939.58 $49,949.22 $35,969.88 $245,464.13 0.1% -47.5% 
Building Materials $49,119.93 $46,057.58 $72,028.91 $33,200.43 $21,830.56 $222,237.41 0.1% -55.6% 
Employee Recognition Public Meetings $37,309.26 $59,870.28 $39,150.75 $48,189.32 $37,639.58 $222,159.19 0.1% 0.9% 
Tool & Shoe Allow $28,664.79 $47,032.88 $47,911.16 $46,514.20 $47,537.29 $217,660.32 0.1% 65.8% 
Construction Equipment Parts Access $10,176.05 $49,556.96 $43,794.88 $47,406.70 $63,507.02 $214,441.61 0.1% 524.1% 
Water $30,604.91 $28,480.06 $32,325.41 $29,609.32 $49,749.01 $170,768.71 0.1% 62.6% 
Medical Services $27,079.30 $45,823.81 $29,072.24 $29,354.54 $37,025.03 $168,354.92 0.1% 36.7% 
Unemployment Comp Payments $25,350.44 $26,563.11 $20,019.40 $24,033.54 $58,889.39 $154,855.88 0.1% 132.3% 
OTHER -$938,306.04 -$316,324.73 $636,336.94 $830,816.31 $1,211,250.35 $1,423,772.83 0.5% -229.1% 
Total $53,359,195.86 $62,916,662.80 $63,104,363.39 $65,241,802.13 $61,616,332.14 $306,238,356.32 100.0% 15.5% 
Note: This financi
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Maine Turnpike Authority Notes on OPEGA Report 
 
 
I. The MTA's Bond Resolution  
 
• OPEGA engaged the services of  Edwards, Angell, Palmer & Dodge to analyze the provisions of the MTA Bond 
Resolution and we believe their review is a useful component of the report.   As the analysis recognizes, legislative 
action regarding the Authority has the potential to affect Authority bond ratings but it may also raise constitutional 
issues because of the Bond Resolution's status as a legally binding contract.  The focus of the constitutional analysis 
is on the Contracts Clause issue, but issues related to other constitutional provisions, most notably the takings 
clause and commerce clause, can also arise with legislation related to the Authority.  We believe the Edwards 
Angell review helps to explain why the MTA so often believes it has a fiduciary duty to raise bond resolution 
concerns in this context.  We are pleased to have an objective review of our bond resolution from an independent 
source and believe that this will be a helpful resource for discussion with legislators and other policy makers in the 
future 
  
 
II.  Consulting Engineers and Contractual Engineering Services 
• The MTA believes that our organization and our customers have been well served by our relationship with HNTB 
for many years.  However, we understand the concerns raised by OPEGA and agree that there is a need to take 
steps that will bring a greater transparency and accountability to this relationship.  We have therefore developed a 
detailed proposal that takes on more work in-house, formalizes our relationship with HNTB, and opens up some of 
the functions currently performed by HNTB to competition.   We believe that this proposal addresses the concerns 
raised in the report without sacrificing the cost and  efficiency benefits the MTA and its customers derive from our 
relationship with HNTB. 
 
 
III. Contracting Practices 
 
• We agree with OPEGA that having a policy on sole sourcing so that the decision making process around sole 
sourcing is more accessible would have benefits to the MTA and the public it serves.   MTA's sole source contracts 
are few in number, and, as OPEGA notes, have reasonable explanations for their sole source nature.   We also agree 
that a centralized contract management system would have efficiency benefits and have begun the process of 
implementing that system. 
 
 
IV.  Expenses 
 
• We agree with OPEGA's observation that the MTA's expenditures are generally consistent with the culture of a 
regulated private entity that is "financially sound ... values quality ", "desires to stay current" and "believes in being 
a good corporate citizen." The business function of the MTA requires interaction with other entities, including other 
toll agencies, trade groups, and rating agencies, that necessitates travel.  We believe that function also includes 
participation by the MTA in wider spheres of transportation, economic development and public policy.  For 
instance, participation with groups such as Maine Motor Transport or Chambers of Commerce, enable us to better 
understand the economic climate we are operating in and the needs of our business customers.  Participation with 
groups such as Associated General Contractors allows the MTA to better understand the issues faced by our 
contractors, which translates into more efficient and economic delivery of capital projects.  Participation in 
community organizations, even when an organization does not seem directly "transportation" related allows the 
MTA to better understand, and therefore satisfy, the communities we serve.  We also note that even from a purely 
governmental perspective membership and other forms of support for outside organizations is often a regular part 
of operation. 
 
• OPEGA was required by the Government Oversight Committee to evaluate whether the MTA's expenses were 
"reasonable" and did not conclude that any MTA expenses were unreasonable.  There was a category of expenses 
  
 the perspective of a governmental entity and we would describe 
that category of expenses as follows: 
 
(1) OPEGA believes that MTA's expenditures are "generally consistent" with "a regulated private entity 
nses 
questioned", which OPEGA classifies as "Travel and Subsistence", declined by 67.8%  over the five year 
period studied. 
 
ons OPEGA cited as being even potentially 
unreasonable are a very small percentage of the whole and continue to decline year after year.  Even if the travel 
n 
V. Ope
•  is, of course, the prerogative of the legislature to review or amend the provisions of any statute whenever they 
wish.  However, we are concerned with OPEGA's premise that the statute adopted by referendum in 1991 is 
ambiguous to the extent that it requires amendment.  This statute has served its function well for nearly 20 years 
ration or legislature attempting to revise it.  If the Committee believes this matter should be 
revisited, we believe the most appropriate action would be to initiate a formal discussion between the MTA, the 
it so 
VI. Pre et and Reserve Maintenance Fund 
 
• s OPEGA recognizes, the Transportation Committee has always been pleased with the amount of detail provided 
he MTA budget process, characterizing our submittals as "much more detailed than that typically provided 
by State agencies."  The MTA values this working relationship with the Transportation Committee and is more than 
ing 
 
 
that OPEGA thought "might be questioned" from
that is financially sound" and "from this perspective the MTA's expenditures could be judged as 
reasonable",  
 
(2) Less than three quarters of one percent of the MTA's operational expenses "might be questioned as 
reasonable" if the standards of a governmental entity are applied,  
 
(3) Even this small percentages of expenses that the Report states "might be questioned" contains expe
that "would be recognized as reasonable and appropriate  regardless of one's perspective", and  
 
(4) As OPEGA notes in the Report, a major component of this category of expenditures that "might be 
In summary, the number and dollar amounts of the transacti
and subsistence expenditures that OPEGA examined for 2009 were entirely eliminated, for instance, it would 
represent approximately two tenths of one percent of the MTA's operational expenditures and would not affect i
any way the MTA's existing toll rates or borrowing needs. 
  
 
rating Surplus 
 
It
without the administ
MaineDOT and the Transportation Committee, with participation by the Government Oversight Committee if 
desired. 
 
 
sentation of the MTA Budg
A
to it in t
willing to present its finances to the Legislature in any manner that would help to clarify the kind of expenses be
paid from any fund, including the Reserve Maintenance Fund.   We have proposed a solution to the issues raised by 
OPEGA which includes modifications to the format of our budget presentation and an analysis of whether some 
expenses could be shifted from the Reserve Maintenance to the Revenue Fund.  We believe that OPEGA agrees
that this is a reasonable proposal that would satisfy their concerns. 
 
 
